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1. Introduction 
Cities are affected by the economic system they are embedded in. Consequently, the central planning 
systems of the socialist period in Eastern Europe and Asia altered the urban environment to perform 
certain functions, thus leaving a socialist legacy behind. So far, only a few studies of post-socialist 
transformation in the built environment of urban landscapes exist. Post-socialist research has mostly 
concentrated on the socio-economic repercussions of transition. A small number of studies, mostly 
edited volumes, analyse changes in the urban morphology in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). The 
most recent include Stanilov (2007), Kliems and Dmitrieva (2010), Tsenkova and Nedovic-Budic 
(2006), Czepczynski (2008) and Boren and Gentile (2007).  
Contemporary researchers have come to the conclusion that there has been too little post-socialist 
research concerning cities outside the CEE region (Wiest 2012, 844). Several have compared socialist 
city elements across continental borders and different cultural contexts, see for example Boren and 
Gentile (2007), Forbes and Thrift (1987), Myers (1994), Kliems and Dmitrieva (2010) or Wasserstrom 
(2007). Yet, none have compared former socialist cities and their post-socialist development in East 
and Southeast Asian countries. Most comparative works on post-socialist urban Asia only cover the 
Chinese urban transition, especially the re-development of Shanghai. Wu and Yeh's (2003; 2007) as 
well as Gaubatz's (1999) contributions on China are especially prominent.  
This thesis aims to address this lack of research and tries to uncover whether the socialist city, as it is 
understood in Central and Eastern European urban development literature, also existed in other East 
and Southeast Asian countries and if so, what is happening to its legacy. Furthermore, it strives to 
reveal whether the current transformations in East Asian cities are in any way comparable to the 
transformations in Southeast Asian cities. Therefore the research question is: 
Is the transformation of socialist legacy in the urban environments in Beijing and Hanoi 
similar, and why? 
Why is the question even relevant? Socialism has ended almost everywhere in the world and was often 
unsuccessful in its social, economic and political goals. Eventually, research on the urban structures 
left by socialism will become unnecessary, as new urban layers dominate former socialist cities and 
obscure the socialist legacy. However, currently the urban form and function of post-socialist cities are 
still digesting these legacies.  
To lay the foundation for research on the post-socialist city, my analysis first has to clear up the 
question  if  the  socialist  city  is  a  globally  valid  concept  and  whether  it is  possible  to  distinguish 
common spatial elements that bear the mark of the socialist city. The socialist city theory is mostly 
derived from research on cities in the Soviet Union (SU)–it will therefore be interesting to find out if it 
also exists in China and Vietnam. Furthermore, the research is meant to contribute to the resolution of 
the wider question if the concept of a global post-socialist city exists.  
In this context it has to be noted that transcontinental urban analysis is generally difficult to execute. 
However, the global influence of socialist ideology produced similar economic, social and political 
backgrounds in which cities developed. This shared history of political and economic central planning 
has markedly influenced urban areas and brought forth recognisable socialist urban patterns. Thus in 10 
 
order to answer the research question about post-socialist transformation successfully, a first premise 
is that the research objects contain elements of the socialist city. My first hypothesis hence is: 
H 1: Socialist legacy can be found in the urban morphology of Beijing and Hanoi. 
If this first hypothesis is correct, I am going to compare the post-reform development of the socialist 
urban legacies. My  claim  is  that the  urban socialist  legacy  in  Beijing  and  Hanoi is  transforming 
similarly, due to a related socialist history and a comparable reform path. Furthermore, I assume that 
socialist urban legacy across the world transforms in similar fashion, because the market economy has 
demands on the urban environment that require the former elements of the socialist city to change their 
function in a specific way. 
Therefore, my second and final third hypotheses are: 
H 2: The transformations of socialist legacy in the urban environments in Beijing and Hanoi 
are similar. 
H  3:  There  are  two  main  reasons  why  transformation  of  socialist  legacies  in  the  urban 
environments is similar: A) the related socialist history and a comparable reform path, and B) 
the universal demands of the market economy on the urban environment. 
This thesis is divided into three main parts: (I) the theoretical background, (II) the analysis, (III) the 
results.  
Part I opens with Chapter 2 on definitions of the terms 'socialism' and 'transition' that are relevant for 
the understanding of the rest of the paper. Chapter 3 then deals with the social production of space and 
the relationship between cities, development and economic systems. The centre piece of the theoretical 
part is Chapter 4, where the concept of the socialist city is introduced and discussed. The theoretical 
part ends with a short explanation of what the post-socialist city is (Chapter 5).  
Part II is the analytical section of this research paper. In Chapter 6, the method and categories of 
comparison between Beijing’s and Hanoi’s transformation are discussed and justified. Chapters 7 and 
8 then deal with the in-depth examination of the five socialist urban elements in Beijing and Hanoi 
respectively.  
Finally,  Part  III  consists  of  the  comparative  analysis  in  Chapter  9.  After  presenting  the  socialist 
elements of Beijing and Hanoi, I will focus on how they have been transforming in the post-reform 
period. In the final Chapter 10, the most important conclusions with regard to the above mentioned 
claims and the research question are drawn. 
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PART I:   THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
2. Definitions 
Socialism. Since this research paper is about the post-socialist city and socialist legacy, the use of the 
term 'socialism' needs to be clarified. It describes a set of theories aiming to create a more equal and 
fair social order than was the case under capitalism (Gabler Wirtschaftslexikon, n.d.).  
The countries that are referred to as socialist in this paper were governed by totalitarian communist 
parties. Their economy was centrally planned and controlled, goods were publicly owned and private 
activity, whether it was political, economic or cultural, was censored (Herrschel 2007, 19). Herschel 
(2007, 25) argues that “it is the organisation of the economy that fundamentally shapes the concept of 
'socialism'”. Thus once their economy is not centrally planned and publicly owned anymore, they 
become post-socialist.   
The terms socialism and communism are frequently used as synonyms
1. The arbitrary terminology 
results from the labels that parties attributed themselves and from the labels that authors writing about 
them used (Herrschel 2007, 19). Communism is often understood as the radical and revolutionary 
execution of socialist doctrine. Yet theoretically, as advocated by Marx, communism precludes the 
dissolution of government in order to establish an egalitarian communist society (Herrschel 2007,  25). 
Since no leading communist party abolished itself, this stage was never achieved by any country. For 
this  reason  Kornai  prefers  the  term  socialist.  He  simply  argues  that  in  Marxism-Leninism 
'communism'  refers  to  the  utopian  state  of  society  in  which  everybody  will  be  equal  and  all 
possessions are equally shared (Kornai 1992, 10). Moreover, the communist parties of socialist states 
themselves had referred to their own political and economic regime as 'socialist' (ibid.). Throughout 
this thesis the term 'socialism' is used. 
Economic transition.  “Transition is the replacement of one economic system by another” (Gregory 
and Stuart 1999, 413). It refers to the changes that have occurred in former socialist countries after 
political and economic reforms. It is mostly applied in one direction describing the transition from a 
socialist economic system with a totalitarian communist party to some form of market economy.  
Some countries used the ‘big bang’ approach, which meant that reformers abolished the communist 
party and central planning mechanisms. They then replaced them with market mechanisms and the 
fitting legislation as fast as possible (Gregory and Stuart 1999, 417). Other countries, such as China 
and Vietnam have taken a more cautious and gradual approach (Herrschel 2007, 5).  
Economic transition affects urban development. In the context of cities that transform from socialist to 
post-socialist,  i.e.  some  form  of  market  economy,  some  researchers  (see  Wu  2003)  write  about 
'transitional' rather than post-socialist cities. Sometimes the equivalent term 'cities in transition' is used 
in this paper. The meaning of all of these expressions stays the same. 
   
                                                       
1 For a detailed description of the socialist/ communist labeling-debate see Herrschel 2007 and Kornai 1992.  12 
 
3. Cities and development 
Cities are important because at present a little more than half of the global population resides in urban 
areas.  Overall,  rapid urban  growth  is  going  to continue in the  future  and  it is  estimated  that the 
proportion of urban population will climb to 67 percent until 2050 (UN DESA 2012, 2). The highest 
concentration of big cities is found in large economies with a numerous population, such as the USA, 
China, Japan, Russia, India, Mexico or Brazil (Satterthwaite 2002, 245). Less developed countries still 
have a high percentage of rural population, but urban centres are rapidly growing as well. From the 
large proportion of people living in cities around the globe, it already becomes clear why studying the 
city  is  fascinating  for  researchers  from  various  disciplines,  such  as  economics,  anthropology, 
sociology, geography, urban planning or architecture, to name just a few. 
In the following subchapters, I will touch upon a few ideas in urban research that are relevant to my 
argument. In particular, I will elaborate on the way cities are produced and how economic regimes, 
more specifically capitalism and socialism, have an impact on the urban environment. 
3.1 The production and reproduction of urban space 
The Western origin of the production of urban space is based on the accumulation and concentration 
of resources and subsequent economic and social progress: 
Urban communities can be supported only when the foundation of life is such as to yield a surplus of food 
over  and  above  the  consuming  needs  of  the  food  producers,  and  also  when  the  means  are  available  to 
concentrate this surplus at particular spots (Turner, 1949, quoted in Sit 1995, 1).  
The city is inevitably linked to the rise of civilization, because the agglomeration of human capital led 
to safety in numbers and an increasingly complex way of life. It is a place of economic activity, social 
interaction  and  collective  creativity.  Density  in  human  resources  brings  innovation  and  learning 
capacity. Scott (2008, 6) describes cities as “spatially agglomerated activity systems”. Cities enable 
human achievement and concentrate wealth, economic and political power, arts, literature and science 
(Sit 1995, 5). Edward Glaeser (2011, title), a famous urban economist, even thinks that cities are "our 
greatest invention" - we being mankind. 
It is essential to understand that “[…] all cities are composed in the aggregate of varying times and 
places and people” (Gelazis, Czaplicka and Ruble 2009, 3). Cities are always changing because their 
inhabitants fluctuate, traffic flows, new buildings are erected, and so on. As a consequence, no city is 
static, but shaped by economic, political, social and cultural factors (Scott 2008, 149). However, any 
city also shapes the socio-economic dynamics that operate within its area of influence. This means that 
cities are both producing socio-economic institutions and are in turn being produced by set institutions 
(Szelenyi  1981,  174).  In  other  words:  “Urban  spaces  are  collectively  produced  and  socially 
constructed by human actions, and people in turn relate to their surroundings and are affected by them 
in complex ways” (Nedovic-Budic, Tsenkova and Marcuse 2006, 9). Subsequently, space should not 
be viewed as a container for human life, but rather as a product of everyday social processes that are 
executed and transformed by many different individuals (Broudehoux 2004, 8). From this point of 
view, space can never be uniform or static. 13 
 
Since cities are a product of their time, they are historic monuments depicting how its inhabitants 
envision the future, and how they choose to conserve the past. “Building and redesigning, conserving, 
and renovating are political acts making history in these cities” (Gelazis, Czaplicka and Ruble 2009, 
3). Gelazis, Czaplicka and Ruble also refer to Anselm Strauss, who once asked a very simple question: 
“What time is this place?” The answer to that question can be found in the built environment that 
always reflects the economic, political and cultural history of a city. Henri Lefebvre wrote in his 
seminal work, The Production of Space, that changes in the political and economic regime are only 
successful in transforming society if they manage to transform space: 
A revolution that does not produce a new space has not realized its full potential; indeed it has failed in that it 
has  not  changed  life  itself,  but  has  merely  changed  ideological  superstructures,  institutions  or  political 
apparatuses. A social transformation, to be truly revolutionary in character, must manifest a creative capacity 
in its effects on daily life, on language and on space. (Lefebvre 1991, 54) 
Since,  the  city  landscape  is  factually  shaped  by  economic,  social  and  political  actors  who  place 
physical structure within the city; these actors imbue it with representational power: 
Landscape in a similar way to language, can operate as a representational system. Signs, names, buildings, 
places, and spaces can be read and interpreted as geosymbols. [...] Landscape is one of the most visible and 
“communicative”  media,  through  which  thoughts,  ideas,  and  feelings  as  well  as  powers  and  social 
constructions are represented within a culture. (Czepczynski 2010, 17) 
Therefore planners and policy makers may use space and landscape to communicate their official 
messages and, for example, unite the population behind an idea. Broudehoux writes about the situation 
in China: "Throughout history, city leaders have manipulated cultural forms and symbols to engineer 
consensus among city residents, foster local pride, and promote a shared sense of identity in order to 
secure social stability and unity and boost confidence in the ruling party" (Broudehoux 2004, 27). She 
further  argues  that  policy-makers  use  urban  planning  to  manipulate  the  physical  environment  to 
strengthen the population's belief in the political ideology of the party (Broudehoux 2004, 27). 
The political, social and economic circumstances, which planners and policy makers are embedded in, 
define and restrict urban planning procedures: 
The characteristics of a nation’s urban planning system generally reflect the overall socio-economic  and 
political environment within which it operates. Or put in another way, the political economy of the society 
defines the necessity of urban planning and delineates the measures to which urban planning can possibly 
resort to. (Yeh and Wu 1999, 169) 
An interesting development in comparative urban studies, which relates to the production of urban 
space, is the convergence discourse. There is a lot of evidence that certain city elements develop in 
similar fashion all over the world. Stanilov (2007, 12) even criticises that cities all over the world are 
merging into a homogenous mass of inner city attractions, gated suburban communities and shopping 
malls. Central Business Districts (CBDs) around the world look strangely similar; they mostly consist 
of  modern  high-rise  office  blocks.  Transnational  companies  use  global  branding  strategies  and 
transplant successful concepts from one city into another. Thus, because CBDs look so much alike, the 
built environment evokes a familiarity among the employees and clients of multinational companies 
(Rowe 2005, 16). There is also the more practical correlation between form and function. Buildings 
with the same functions usually have the same form. For example office blocks need to be space- and 
cost-efficient  and  should  be  located  in  easily  accessible  areas  in  the  city.  Global  technological 14 
 
advancement, internationally standardised building practices and the fact that builders do not solely 
have to rely on traditional, local materials anymore, inevitably leads to a certain sameness in the built 
environment of cities around the world (Rowe 2005, 17). Most people who have recently travelled to a 
few cities on different continents can attest to this convergence trend of architectural form. While there 
is a lot of evidence that cities around the world develop similarly, local context still matters in the 
overall development of an urban area and no two cities are the same. 
A researcher who supports the convergence argument is Enyedi. He argues that all cities undergo 
similar  steps  of  development,  which  reminds  of  Rostow’s  model  for  economic  development. 
According to Enyedi, modern urbanisation is universal. The first phase consists of rapid urbanisation 
through migration and industrialisation. This phase currently occurs in economically less developed 
countries. The second phase is best compared to the post-World War II development in Western 
Europe, when cities expanded into the surrounding environment, thus creating suburbs. Moreover, at 
this stage industrial manufacturing is gradually replaced by the service sector. The third phase is 
embodied by cities in developed countries whose industries have shifted to high-tech development. 
There, cities begin to lose population again and rural areas reabsorb the outflow of city dwellers 
(Enyedi 1984, quoted in Stanilov 2007, 12). The post-socialist city can be placed between phase one 
and phase two. Enyedi’s hypothesis is simplistic and neglects to take different local socio-economic 
contexts into consideration. Moreover, it has been criticised at length for not addressing two major 
issues that plague post-socialist cities: (1) the possible building of urban slums where the socialist 
housing estates are located, and (2) the derelict industrial sites (Stanilov 2007, 13). 
In summary, cities are activity systems that are shaped by and shape the politically, economically and 
socially motivated behaviour of actors. Some urban forms tend to look similar across geographically 
distant places due to their functions in an increasingly interconnected global world. Therefore, global 
urban trends can be deduced. Nonetheless, cities are embedded in their local context, which adds local 
distinctions to global trends. 
The following sections will briefly outline the significance of urbanisation in capitalism and socialism. 
3.2 Cities and capitalism 
The relationship between capitalism and urbanization has been manifest since the first stirrings of modern 
industrialization  in  eighteen-century  Britain,  […].  The  city  is  not  only  a  response  to  the  pressures  of 
capitalism (via the formation of distinctive clusters of capital and labor on the landscape) but also a basic 
condition of the continued social reproduction of the capitalist economic system […]. (Scott 2008, 1) 
Industrialisation and urbanisation are closely interrelated. The Fordist production system let cities in 
the USA and in Western Europe swell up in the first half of the nineteenth century (Scott 2008, 2). 
Large-scale mass production clustered in urban areas, thus attracting even more employment-seekers. 
The resulting industrial agglomerations were at the heart and centre of fast-paced urbanisation (Scott 
2008, 9). 
Not  only  does  industrialisation  boost  urbanisation,  but  urbanisation  is  also  essential  to  industrial 
progress. First, industrial development requires a large number of workers. Second, in order to sell 
industrial goods, a concentrated market needs to be in place. Third, bundling industry in one location 
creates positive economies of scale (Mingione 1987, 30). A high level of urbanisation provides these 15 
 
three factors. The successful city knits many individual units of economic interaction together and 
creates positive linkages and synergetic networks of productive capital (Scott 2008, 6). 
The urban fabric in the city under capitalism is shaped by countless factors such as the public agenda, 
private  investors,  real  estate  markets,  residents’  attitudes,  environmental  concerns,  economic 
competitiveness, conservation of heritage, ownership disputes and so on. The decentralised decision-
making process makes planning often incoherent and difficult.  
Worth mentioning in the context of capitalism and cities is the currently very popular global city 
discourse,  based  on  John  Friedmann's  and  Saskia  Sassen's  analysis  of  how  cities  behave  in  a 
globalised economy (see Friedmann 1986; Sassen 1991). Essentially, cities all around the world are 
centres of accumulation that compete with each other in order to attract international global capital. 
Due to the chiefly service-based nature of the current global economy, large transnational companies 
are more flexible to change to more attractive places quickly. As a consequence, the development of 
cities that are embedded in the global capitalist system therefore reacts to international economic 
forces. 
3.3 Cities and socialism 
When analysing the role of cities under socialism, it is helpful to consider what Karl Marx theorised 
about the city: 
Die  klassische  alte  Geschichte  ist  Stadtgeschichte,  aber  von  Städten,  gegründet  auf  Grundeigentum  und 
Agrikultur; die asiatische Geschichte ist eine Art indifferenter Einheit von Stadt und Land; (die eigentlich 
großen Städte sind bloß als fürstliche Lager hier zu betrachten, als Superfötation²³ [sic!]über die eigentlich 
ökonomische Konstruktion); das Mittelalter (germanische Zeit) geht vom Land als Sitz der Geschichte aus, 
deren Fortentwicklung dann im Gegensatz von Stadt und Land vor sich geht; die moderne [Geschichte] ist 
Verstädtischung des Landes, nicht wie bei den Antiken Verländlichung der Stadt.“ (Marx 1858, 390-1) 
Marx and Engels propagated the view that the social differences between city and rural areas needed 
to be levelled. Still, they favoured the city as a catalyst for development over the countryside. For this 
reason,  most  Marxist  governments  were  biased  towards  developing  urban  areas  through 
industrialisation and achieving the desired equality by attracting people to the cities (Enyedi 1996, 
113).  
Dean Forbes and Nigel Thrift suggest a practical approach to identifying a socialist development 
programme. It should have the following characteristics (Forbes and Thrift 1987, 3):  
•  A high state ownership of means of production in industry as well as agriculture; 
•  a central planning economy; 
•  effective one-party rule; 
•  and egalitarian goals written down in state documents.  
For  urban  policy,  these  goals  mostly  translated  into  creating  an  egalitarian  urban  society  and 
preventing a city hierarchy (meaning that all cities and rural areas should be equally important in the 
overall development of the country). Hence, territorial development was more vital than the growth of 
one specific city region (Myers 1994, 452). Nevertheless, the central state prioritised certain cities 
over others. The urban hierarchy in the socialist state was thus imposed from the top − supposedly in 16 
 
the best economic interest of the whole nation. The major industrial centres were the most important 
followed by specialised middle-sized cities. Small towns often received little attention and financial 
help (Enyedi 1996, 114). Therefore, cities under socialism, much like in a market economy, were 
important nodes of economic development. Forbes and Thrift explain the significance of the city under 
socialism  as  follows:  “Cities  are  required  because  they  assist  the  formation  of  economies  of 
agglomeration and permit the creation of economies of scale, which are essential to the development 
of the forces (or means) of production” (Forbes and Thrift 1987, 11). This leads to the assumption that 
the emphasis in the socialist city clearly was on production. 
Under socialism the urban fabric had to bend to a different set of priorities, because "[...] the socialist 
city existed in a context of shortage; under such circumstances, the players in the urban game operated 
under different rules and conventions than they would in a market economy" (Boren and Gentile 2007, 
98).  Andrusz  stated  the  following  elements  that  were  important  for  the  spatial  development  in  a 
centralised socialist state: 
•  industrialization and urbanization were to be based on state ownership of the means of production and the 
centrally planned determination of the use and allocation of resources; 
•  priority was given to investment and heavy industry; 
•  economic planning took precedence over physical (spatial) planning; 
•  investment-production plans and locational choices were to be based not on market or profit criteria but 
on planners’ preferences which took into consideration local, regional and national needs; 
•  land was to be nationalized; however, the systems of agriculture have varied between countries, with each 
state evolving its own combination of private collective and state farming; 
•  the governments maintained monopoly control over foreign trade; 
•  the state provided cheap , highly subsidized public welfare goods and services, including food; 
•  light industry, consumer good production and the service sector were neglected (Andrusz 1996, 37). 
The  earlier  mentioned  elements  stem  from  or  are  themselves  factors  in  the  socialist  system  that 
differentiated  space  according  to  national  priorities.  Boren  and  Gentile  add  that  defence 
considerations, the existence of black markets and the ideological leadership of the Communist Party 
also  are  important  factors  in  socialist  urban  development  (Boren  and  Gentile  2007,  97).  The 
modernisation strategies and the role of urbanisation varied across socialist countries, but urbanisation 
was a key strategy for development in all of them.  
3.4 Conclusion: Main differences in the production of space under capitalism and 
socialism 
To  sum  up,  no  matter  what  economic  regime  a  city  is  embedded  in,  the  connection  between 
modernisation, industrialisation and urbanisation is undeniable. However, there are main differences in 
the production of space between the city under capitalism and under socialism. 
First, the range of actors differs. In a centrally planned socialist system, the state decides and allocates, 
whereas in a capitalist one many public and private actors need to be considered in the planning 
process. These include policy-makers, the public, environmental and non-governmental institutions, 
investors and planners.  17 
 
Second, it is easy to assume that cities under socialism were governed more cohesively than capitalist 
ones.  However,  this  is  not  universally  true,  because  cities  under  socialism  were  limited  in  their 
development by the shortage economy.  
Third, another important difference is of ideological nature. Socialist cities were meant to be places of 
production, whereas capitalism thrives on urban consumption.  
Fourth, social equality was more important under socialism than capitalism. All people in urban and 
rural areas were meant to be equally well-off.  
These different mechanisms for the production of space have led to disparate spatial outcomes in the 
respective cities. Due to local context, no city has developed like any other and the outcomes are 
countless. Still, there are common trends. The following chapter will outline socialist city planning 
principles and their impact on urban morphology.    18 
 
4. The socialist city: real and ideal 
In order to explore the hypothesis of this thesis, it is necessary to find out what the distinct elements of 
socialist cities are and whether such elements can be found in Beijing and Hanoi. The following 
chapter will elaborate on the idea and reality of urban areas under a socialist doctrine. The questions 
that will be dealt with in this chapter are whether a socialist city does exist, if it differs from the 
capitalist city and what its main characteristics are? 
4.1 The debate: Is there a distinct socialist city? 
French and Hamilton claim that “the socialist city is the most neglected subject in the field of urban 
studies” (French and Hamilton 1979, 2). The first question that arises is, “What is the socialist city?”. 
Even before that we have to ask if the socialist city even exists and whether it is different from the 
capitalist city? 
The socialist city as a concept for urban analysis is based on the general agreement that there are 
elements in cities that used to be under the influence of a socialist central planning system, which 
differ from those in classical capitalist cities. Despite this baseline agreement and anecdotic evidence, 
it is yet widely debated whether the socialist city should be considered as a distinct, separate concept 
from the capitalist city. Tsenkova and Nedovic-Budic lay out the extreme positions of the debate as 
follows: 
Two of the most sharply opposed streams of the debate over socialist versus capitalist cities are the ecological 
and the historical schools (Bodnár 2001; Hirt 2006; Szelenyi 1996). The ecological school argues that urban 
form is the outcome of universal processes of urbanization and industrialization that cross the capitalist-
socialist  boundary,  and  that  socialist  cities  represent  a  mildly  distorted  urban  model  (Enyedi  1996). 
Advocates of the historical approach believe that in minimizing private ownership of land, housing, and the 
means  of  production,  socialism  produced  a  truly  unique  urban  model  (Szelenyi  1996).  (Tsenkova  and 
Nedovic-Budic 2006) 
In other words, the ecological approach believes in one inevitable line of urbanisation, which starts 
with economic development and industrialisation. The socio-economic organisation of a place is an 
intervening  variable  that  slightly  distorts  the  general  path  (Szelenyi  1996,  289).  Enyedi,  whose 
theories have been touched upon in the chapter on cities and development, essentially argues that there 
is only one path of urbanisation and that all cities develop along this path. The socialist city is a mere 
detour that speeds up certain aspects while omitting others in the urbanisation process (see Enyedi 
1996). Hence the spatial results in the socialist city and the capitalist city are very much alike, albeit 
driven by different mechanisms. For example, offices are centrally located in both types of cities 
simply because locating workplaces in an easily reachable area is the most efficient way to guarantee 
their function (Enyedi 1996, 104). Yet, even Enyedi acknowledges that the socialist city has special 
features such as the role of rapid industrialisation or the high amount of rural population in the city 
(Enyedi 1996, 115-118). Yet, he does not elaborate on the fact that these special features eventually 
are the root cause of a different urban environment. 
The historical school, in contrast to the ecological school, which is represented by neo-Marxist and 
neo-Weberian scholars, emphasizes the importance of local historic heritage and institutions (Szelenyi 
1996, 290). Szelenyi describes the way he sees the socialist city as follows: “[...] these cities are here 19 
 
called socialist not because they necessarily looked the way socialist planners or ideologues wanted 
them to look, but because they were cities of industrial societies that had abolished private ownership 
as the means of production.” (Szelenyi 1996, 287) The most important influences on the distinct 
socialist urban structure are the public ownership structure as well as the central allocation of means. 
Szelenyi is a strong advocate for the argument that there is a socialist legacy in cities with a former 
socialist system.  
A second problem in the debate on the existence of the socialist city is that comparing cities across 
different countries is difficult because of the socio-economic, historical and cultural differences: 
As one might expect, there are significant differences in the geography of towns, not only between 'socialism' 
and 'capitalism', but also between the various socialist countries themselves - for good historical, social, 
economic and even political reasons (French and Hamilton 1979, 4).  
For example, the starting point of urbanisation varied in different cities. Russia was sparsely urbanised 
in 1917 with 18 percent of the people living in urban areas, whereas in the German Democratic 
Republic in 1945 the urbanisation rate boasted 67.6 percent (French and Hamilton 1979, 4). Still, the 
majority of countries had a low level of urbanisation at the time when they became socialist (French 
and Hamilton 1979, 2). 
 In spite of the different levels of urbanisation, different local historical, geographical context and 
historical paths when CEE countries were subjected to socialist policies, cities developed common 
urban structures and patterns. This happened mostly through the ideological application of socialist 
principles. Of course local culture and societal practices have produced obvious spatial differences, 
especially in areas of historic significance such as old city centres (French and Hamilton 1979, 14). 
Polish cities, for example, have a lot of cafés and former Yugoslav cities have many barber shops, 
which is due to historic influences of the Ottoman Empire. Nevertheless, common physical urban 
types have emerged across the socialist landscape. Socialist cities share especially great uniformities 
of spatial distribution, even though to the keen observer they are superficially very diverse (French and 
Hamilton 1979, 15).  
Another feature that separates the socialist and the capitalist city, is that population growth was slower 
in socialist cities than in capitalist ones. This was due to migration controls and the wish to keep cities 
compact and middle-sized. In some cities industrial workplaces grew faster than the population, which 
led to temporary shortages of workers and what Szelenyi calls under-urbanisation (Szelenyi 1996, 
294). Both Asia and Europe experience slower urban growth rates. In Vietnam the decline of urban 
population was more prominent, because the communist party tried to break the urban bourgeoisie 
apart  by  sending  them  away  or  eliminating  them.  China  focussed  on  building  up  rural  industry, 
therefore fewer migrants moved from the country to the big cities (Szelenyi 1996, 297). 
It also makes sense to consider the socialist city as its own distinctive framework, since ideas from 
Soviet planners spread throughout the Soviet Bloc and beyond to other socialist countries in the world. 
Some because overseas scholars studied in the SU; others because ideas were exported by Soviet 
planners employed abroad.  20 
 
The sharing of the foregoing concepts and actual planning strategies by planners in the various socialist 
countries, and the similar problems of translating theory into practice, have brought about a certain degree of 
uniformity in cities throughout the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. (French and Hamilton 1979, 14) 
The exchange in styles across socialist countries was so intensive in certain aspects, that one city 
resembled another. "Indeed, if one were transported into any residential area built since the Second 
World War in socialist countries, it would be easier at first glance to tell when it was constructed than 
to determine in which country it was" (French and Hamilton 1979, 15). Chinese urban patterns have 
been deeply influenced by the Soviet socialist city for example (Wu, Xu and Yeh 2007, 233). Another 
particularly  remote  example  is  the  socialist  experiment  for  urban  development  in  Zanzibar  City 
between 1964 and 1977 (Myers 1994, 451). The first master plan for Zanzibar City was written by a 
planner from the German Democratic Republic and the second one from a team from the People's 
Republic  of  China  (Myers  1994,  452).  The  foreign  planners  used  their  imported  knowledge  and 
designed the projects according to popular Soviet practices. Since a lot of scholars were educated in 
Moscow, the socialist urban concept spread all over Eastern Europe and to China and Vietnam. 
Another important reason why the socialist city has to be considered as distinctly separate from the 
capitalist city,  is its  relatively  long  period  of  isolation  from  the  international market.  "Due  to  its 
limited contact with the outside world, the socialist landscape to some extend resisted the flow of 
globalization until the early nineteen-nineties" (Czepczynski 2010, 25). Since there was little exposure 
to global architecture and planning styles, the socialist city has retained its authenticity until the 1990s. 
Even though there was regular exchange among countries of the communist bloc, there was little 
economic or politic interaction with the rest of the world. The lack of relations was either self-imposed 
or in some cases resulted from international sanctions. Most of the international exchange that took 
place was supervised and authorised by the central government (Mingione 1996, 37). 
The socialist city never was a “fundamental alternative” to the capitalist city (Andrusz 1996, 71). 
Andrusz suggests that the difference between the socialist and capitalist city simply stems from certain 
features in the spatial structure that were more prominent in socialist principles. While a capitalist city 
can be more easily differentiated through different social classes living in different areas, the socialist 
city is divisible in terms of land use patterns. Such features include neighbourhood units, distinct land-
use planning with functional zones and the importance of public transport, which will be discussed in 
more detail in the following subchapters.  
To sum up, there are more arguments that support the idea that there is a distinct socialist city. When 
contrasted  with  the  capitalist  city  it  is  most  easily  identified  in land  use  patterns  and the  spatial 
distribution of certain functions that were required of the city in order to convey socialist ideology. 
However,  no  city  is  static,  but  rather  dynamic  and  its  society  constantly  changing  itself  and  the 
environment.  Therefore,  no  socialist  city  is  like  another.  Bertaud  and  Renaud  state  that  "it  is 
appropriate to speak of a ’socialist city’ whenever urban development is expected to proceed without 
land markets and land use decisions are made administratively" (Bertaud and Renaud 1997 138). This 
description forms the baseline of the investigation into what further features the socialist city may 
have. The socialist city, as an analytical model today, is not a rigid concept.  21 
 
4.2 The real and ideal socialist city 
The core problem with the socialist city as an analytical concept is that it has not been coherently 
applied.  It  is  much  rather  a  framework  of  ideologically  and  economically  motivated  planning 
decisions. Despite central planning, socialist urban features were often unintended outcomes of the 
political and economic structure under socialism (Szelenyi 1996, 287). They were not all meticulously 
planned and controlled by a central planning agency. “Everywhere the broad aims of planners have 
been the same – to create an optimum living environment where enhanced productivity, social justice, 
and  maximum  satisfaction  of  the  inhabitants  would  be  attained.”  (French  and  Hamilton  1979,  5) 
Although the aims have been similar in the planning of all socialist cities, the degree of urbanisation, 
the availability of resources and the political will of the party have influenced what has been truly 
achieved. Objectives and reality are chaffing in the socialist city. 
Therefore, in order to truly understand what the socialist city is, researchers have to make a distinction 
between what was imagined and what actually happened. The authors of literature on the socialist city 
widely agree on this point: 
When speaking of the socialist city we refer to two categories, not exactly identical but overlapping in some 
aspects: the first is the ideal city, whose characteristics were defined in ideological and political literature; and 
the second is the city of real socialism. (Coudroy de Lille and Guest 2010, 36)  
Already in the 1960s and 1970s, the gap between the ideal socialist city and the reality was apparent to 
researchers. In an analysis from 1977, Bater clearly criticised how far apart the normative goals of 
socialist city planning and the actual state of what has been realised are (Bater 1977, 203). Even Fisher 
in 1962 realised that socialist city norms were not on track (Fisher 1962).  
The duality between norm and reality makes the concept 'socialist city' somewhat difficult to examine. 
Place  specificity  and  path-dependent  development  have  produced  very  different  cities,  therefore 
defining an exact outline merely based on empirical research in former socialist cities is complex. 
However, if the socialist city is approached as a normative concept, which it was for urban planners in 
Soviet  Russia,  it  becomes  fairly  straightforward.  Mingione  warns  that  when  analysing  socialist 
countries and their respective cities, using an idealistic approach is only of limited use, since most 
countries did not live up to their ideals. In order to understand the true socialist identity of any country, 
its socialist reality needs to be examined (Mingione 1996, 36). Nevertheless, the ideals have defined 
the  reality  and  are  thus  worth  examining  more  closely.  This  socialist  urban  reality  varies  across 
countries, but common spatial types have still emerged.  
In fact, with very few exceptions, the ideal socialist city has not been comprehensively realised. Rather 
only a few urban elements have been markedly shaped by socialist urban procedure. A lot of policies 
were simply too expensive to implement. For example, especially in the 1950s and 1960s there was 
not enough housing in most CEE countries to guarantee everyone a comfortable and adequate living 
space (Frolic 1970, 681). The only examples where a fairly comprehensive set of socialist planning 
norms was realised were the "new socialist cities", which were built on previously empty land (Fisher 
1962, 255). In designing new towns the socialist planners actually had the chance to create drawing 
board cities and thus to physically implement a new socialist world order. Usually grand designs were 
envisioned in theory. In reality, many of these newly constructed towns lack a proper centre and are 22 
 
full of empty spaces because the envisioned projects were never built (Czepczynski 2008, 81). A big 
problem with new towns was that they were built to serve one purpose, usually to house labour of a 
certain  factory  or  to  function  as  regional  administrative  centre  (Fisher  1962,  255).  So  instead  of 
creating a new socialist society in these towns, planners just set up factory towns (Czepczynski 2008, 
81). Nowa Huta is the biggest and best known new town of socialist urban development. It was newly 
built in close proximity to Krakow with the aim of erecting a large steel mill. In Nowa Huta wide 
streets  lined  with  modernist  blocks  of  prefabricated  houses  radiate  from  a  central  square  (see 
Czepczynski 2008, 80). 
 Another socialist new town was Stalin City (Dunaújváros since 1961) in Hungary, which is located 
about 60 km south of Budapest on the banks of the Danube. Socialist planners first erected an iron 
works factory and then housing facilities. However, they ignored the fact that the loess ground was 
rather unsuitable for construction and they underestimated the population growth (see Kerékgyártó 
2010). Consequently, there was insufficient poor-quality housing and too few service facilities for the 
swelling population. 
4.3 The role of planning in the socialist city 
It  is  essential  to  understand  that  the  planning  in  the  socialist  and  capitalist  city  took  place  in  a 
completely different institutional framework.  
In a market driven society, the necessity for urban planning stems from the existence of externalities and the 
need to provide public goods. In a planned economy, urban planning is perceived as a tool to realize the 
socialist ideology of planned development and to ‘translate’ the goal of economic planning into urban space. 
(Yeh and Wu 1999, 169) 
Planning under socialism happened without private property. All investments were state controlled 
and decision-making was a centralised process and hierarchically executed (Häussermann 1996, 215). 
Capitalist  urban  development  by  contrast  has  happened  in  another  setting,  where  the  interests  of 
private owners and developers play the key role. Decision-making and urban planning has therefore 
been more complex. It has been led by “market competition, private property, real estate profitability, 
local decision-making, and physical planning on a city-by-city basis” (Enyedi 1996, 101). Hence, in 
theory,  central  planning  provided  superior  circumstances  for  urban  planning  than  in  a  market 
economy. Since socialist urban planning was normative and tried to create an urban environment as 
well as a society that cohere with socialist ideals, the socialist city should supposedly have turned out 
more coherent than the capitalist city (Bater 1977, 178). Yeh and Wu explain,  
It is claimed by socialist ideology that the superiority of socialism over capitalism is that through public 
ownership,  urban  development  could  be  better  organized  and  the  public  interest  can  be  maximally 
guaranteed.  Yet,  urban  development  in  the  case  of  pre-economic  reform  China  is  far  from  organized 
development, although the government did have overwhelming control over the urban space. State ownership 
can not [sic!] eliminate the fragmentation between government departments and their vast subordinate state 
work units. (Yeh and Wu 1999, 231) 
Planning  however  was  not  straightforward  at  all,  because  targets  and  priorities  tended  to  change 
(Boren and Gentile 2007, 99). Moreover, despite central planning, the approach to urban planning was 
very  compartmentalised.  One  reason  for  this  was  that  different  departments  and  ministries  were 23 
 
responsible for developing different zones in the city (Bater 1977, 198). In other words: "[...] the 
essence of a centrally planned system is that there is a plan - or rather countless plans [...]" (Boren and 
Gentile  2007,  98).  Planning  was  mostly  carried  out  as  sector  planning  where  each  ministry  was 
responsible for a different kind of industry or service sector. Planning in the socialist city therefore 
was a patchwork process rather than a centrally controlled mechanism (Enyedi 1996, 111). 
The socioeconomic aims of town planning in the socialist city include an economic and a social 
purpose in the wider context of socioeconomic development of the whole country (Ciborowski 1970, 
170). “Under "socialism" nationwide city planning, an integral part of regional planning, is concerned 
with the location and distribution of economic productive forces: Industry, power, and transportation” 
(Fisher 1962, 252). It is not an objective to create a city that is economically powerful in itself, but the 
urban agglomeration is part of creating greater wealth and progress throughout the country. Urban 
planning was a tool not only to improve city life, but also to strengthen the national economy. Both 
objectives were easy to unify since the centralised state administration controlled them.  
From a practical point of view, Bater argues that there are two imperatives for successful planning of 
the socialist city. Urban growth should be planned and the planning should be executed in a normative 
style (Bater 1977, 177). However, normative planning can be very difficult if there is not enough 
information, money and power in the hands of the planners: 
For a normative approach to town planning to be successful, it is imperative that there be reasonably accurate 
knowledge as to what the economic and demographic parameters of a city and its immediate hinterland are 
likely  to  be  within  a  specific  time  period,  that  there  be  the  power  to  influence  events  so  as  to  have 
developments conform reasonably well with plans and that there be the requisite financial resources to realize 
planned objectives. (Bater 1977, 181) 
Therein lay the difficulties of the success of the ideal socialist city. Planners were not able to either 
gather enough information, or did not have enough means or power to satisfactorily implement the 
normative plans. For instance, urban growth was not stemmed by restriction policies, because workers 
flocked to the city for employment opportunities and the number of people was unpredictable. 
To sum up, the structural characteristics of socialism have produced recognisable and predictable 
spatial patterns in cities under socialism. Yet, there is no blueprint socialist city, since every city is the 
result of many layers of history. Hence the socialist city is a framework of predictable spatial patterns, 
distinguishable  architectural  types  and  typified  land  use  dedications.  In  its  regional  variations, 
however it wears many guises.  
4.4 The role of ideology in socialist planning 
The political ideology of the ruling elite strongly influenced urban development, especially in a central 
planning system. “The landscape we now see is the result of present and past ideologies superimposed 
on urban tissue, and additionally modified by cultures, economies and societies” (Czepczynski 2008, 
59). Landscape therefore could be used as a medium to convey messages of power and ideology to its 
users, who are, in the case of a city, the inhabitants. Czepczynski argues: “Making socialist landscape 
significant and controlling that significance was one of the important tasks of the new communist 
regimes” (2008, 69). He further explains that ideology was implemented at different levels of the city, 
namely  the  typological  that  represents  function,  the  spatial  and  the  syntactic.  One  of  the  most 24 
 
important functions of the communist city was to house power. Representing culture was also an 
important function in the socialist city. Culture manifested itself in the form of cultural centres or 
museums. A fitting example of this is the Palace of Culture and Science in Warsaw (Czepczynski 
2008, 72).  
Fisher stresses two general ideological objectives that socialist city planning hoped to achieve:  
(1) to correct the ills inherited from the era of capitalism; (2) to develop a new pattern for the city which will 
indicate clearly the inherent unity of the people, the classlessness of the society. The spatial manifestation of 
the new socialist relations among men is, at the same time, to conform to the stated ideals of each country’s 
national revolution. (Fisher 1962, 252)  
Point one refers to prioritising the needs of the central state over the needs of the individual city, 
whereas point two stresses the importance of realising the ideological goal of an egalitarian socialist 
society. The last sentence is also interesting, because it shows that even in the 1960s it was clear that 
socialism was not the same in every country. Consequently, urban planning was understood as an 
instrument of the communist revolution in each country. 
“Socialist theory of urban transformation is an expression of the idealistic aspirations of politically 
oriented socialist planning” (Fischer 1962, 251). Several ideological underpinnings were premises for 
the actual planning process and shaped the fabric of the socialist city. The urban fabric was changed 
"due to the socially (and spatially) revolutionizing ambitions of the system itself" (Boren and Gentile 
2007, 97). The key themes are:  
•  Central planning and public ownership. Since central planning existed under socialism, 
everything was inadvertently planned by central authorities. Urban planning was accordingly 
inherent to the system and also centrally organised. Moreover, since there was no private 
property, all land was public and available for development. In terms of institutions, urban 
planning under socialism was an urban planner's paradise. 
•  Modernisation through Industrialisation. The aim of socialist planners and ideologues was to 
transform the city from a place of consumption to a place of production (Lo 1980, 132). Cities 
were part of the overall modernisation process, which was to be achieved through the built up 
of heavy industry. Industrialisation with the emphasis on heavy industry was the driving force 
for developing the socialist city (Fisher 1962, 251). Since the extensive industrialisation 
programme of socialist regimes was very costly planners economised on ‘non-productive’ 
investments such as social services (Szelenyi 1996, 296). This meant that planners were bound 
to give industrial projects, which were important for national modernisation, precedence over 
others. Sjöberg referred to the spatial outcome of this practice as "landscapes of priority" 
(Sjöberg 1999, 2224). 
•  Equality and collectivism. Under Marxist-Leninist doctrine, in theory, all citizens were equal, 
thus the city should reflect social equality. The socialist urban environment should encourage 
a sense of collective identity. 
The role of ideology changed over the course of the socialist decades in SU. Boren and Gentile 
identify two main paradigms of planning in the SU (Boren and Gentile 2007, 101). The first paradigm 
spans  the  ideology-driven  Stalin  era  (1929−1953).  The  Stalinist  era  was  politically  rigid  and 25 
 
emphasised unyielding planning concepts, which were heavily influenced by ideological aims (Fisher 
1962, 265). Fisher describes the role of the planner in the Stalinist era as follows: “It is the planner's 
desire  to  express  tangibly  in  the  brick  and  mortar  of  his  cities  the  philosophical  aspirations  of 
Marxism-Leninism” (Fisher 1962, 252). Stalinist urban planning had two distinct development aims. 
On the one hand it prioritised the industrialisation of the city, while on the other hand it put a focus on 
prestige projects that glorified socialism and gave cities a sort of grandeur. This resulted in a land-use 
pattern in which the heavy and defence industry enjoyed prime access to urban infrastructure (Boren 
and Gentile 2007, 98). The second paradigm gained foothold after Stalin's death. The party leadership 
became more pragmatic and the planning paradigm shifted to cheap mass-housing developments.  
4.5 The role of architecture in the socialist city 
Socialist ideology was most vividly expressed by architecture. Socialist land use patterns may be very 
distinct, but they do not appear to the casual visitor, unless he or she sits down and studies a map. This 
chapter therefore describes the various trends in socialist architecture in the SU. In the case study 
section, we will see that the Soviet architectural style was exported both to China and Vietnam. 
Edmund Goldzamt, a polish architect, wrote: “ Die Große Sozialistische Oktoberrevolution befreite 
die Architektur aus ihrer Abhängigkeit vom <<Geldsack>> und stellte Sie in den Dienst des Volkes” 
(Goldzamt 1967, 206). Under a central planning economy, public officials finally had the means to 
construct grand and splendid buildings. Besides that, architecture, as stipulated by Lenin, was seen as 
an art form that was meant to educate the proletariat.  
Bezeichnend ist das Bestreben der revolutionären Macht, mit der Kultur- und Kunstpropaganda den Massen 
des  Volkes  entgegenzukommen,  diese  Propaganda  mit  einem  gesellschaftlich  fortschrittlichen  Inhalt  zu 
erfüllen und für sozialistische Erziehung zu nutzen. (Goldzamt 1967, 207)  
Landscaping and architecture were tools of empowerment for the communist leaders, because the 
message was transmitted on a grand and visible scale. According to Czepczynski the socialist city is 
defined by the ideological implications behind each building that was constructed. There were no 
arbitrary building projects, but rather all fit into the ideological canon of the concerned communist 
parties (Czepczynski 2008, 107). Usually it was fairly easy to understand the meaning of a building or 
other spatial arrangements (Czepczynski 2008, 63). Many buildings essentially became propaganda 
tools, which by no means degraded their functionality. A good example with an easy message is the 
Berlin wall. 
The  role  of  architects,  as  well  as  planners,  was  to  satisfy  the  party’s  wishes  for  educational 
propaganda. Therefore, in some cases socialist planners and architects tried to deliberately break with 
existing  urban  forms.  Yet,  in  other  cases,  baroque  and  renaissance  like  elements  were  used  on 
buildings in order to link socialism to already existing architectural heritage (Czepczynski 2008, 79). 
Sometimes local culture and architectural tradition were expressed on the outside of the heavy and 
symbolic buildings. Even historic decorative designs were borrowed from national heritage. Scenes 
from the Medieval Cloth Hall in Krakow for example were used to decorate the Palace of Science and 
Culture  (French  and  Hamilton  1979,  15).  The  Lenin  Museum  in  Tashkent,  which  is  a  culturally 
distinct place from other cities in CEE, was also built in grand white socialist style, but the traditional 
technique of filigree design was used to adapt the building to local context (Figure 4.1).  26 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Lenin Museum Tashkent (The Great Mirror 2013) 
Socialist  building  practices  in  Soviet  countries  can  be  divided  into  three  phases:  (1)  Stalinist 
classicism, (2) modernist international style, and (3) late Soviet individualistic style (Czepczynski 
2008,  88).  The  first  phase  is  marked  with  ideological  consolidation  and  monumental  propaganda 
buildings.  Stalin  especially  influenced  this  early  phase.  The  buildings  that  represented  the  new 
political order had to be grander than all the buildings before. Early skyscrapers in Moscow such as 
the Ukraina Hotel are examples for Stalinesque classicism (French and Hamilton 1979, 15). A lot of 
the buildings were white and symmetrical and drew on historical stylisation. The architects borrowed 
neo-classical decor and built large, imposing buildings with several storeys and layers, usually covered 
with ideological statues, mural paintings and carvings. This design of the Stalinist era is also known as 
the Soviet "wedding cake" design of socialist realism (Fisher 1962, 257). Other good examples are the 
Lomonosov Moscow State University, the Largo in Sofia, the Hotel International in Prague and the 
Ceausescu Palace (nowadays Palace of the Parliament) in Bucharest (see Figure 4.2).  
 
Figure 4.2 (left to right) Lomosonov State University, Moscow (Wikipedia 2012); Ceausescu Palace, Bucharest (The 
Telegraph 2010); Hotel International, Prague (Open buildings n.d.) 
Most of the Soviet architecture in the 1940s and 1950s was influenced by historical styles dictated 
from Moscow. Characteristic housing types from the classical era were blocks of flats built along the 
lines of neo-classicism. "Blocks of flats of the same period appear virtually indistinguishable, whether 
at the Kaluga Gates in Moscow, on the Miners' Prospekt in Prokop'yevsk, in Mokotów in Warsaw, 
along  Karl-Marx-Allee  in  Berlin,  or  in  central  Nowa  Huta,  Eisenhüttenstadt,  [...]"  (French  and 
Hamilton 1979, 15). 
The most megalomaniac example for a Stalin-era neo-classical building project is the never completed 
Palace of the Soviets project. The Palace of the Soviets was meant to house government agencies, 27 
 
entertainment facilities and so on. It was to be the highest building in the world, topped with a huge 
statue of V.I. Lenin. Its design was important to convey the power of the communist regime in the 
Soviet Union and therefore an architecture competition was held. Out of 160 entries, the Russian 
architect Boris Iofan’s neo-classical design was chosen (see Figure 4.3). For its construction near the 
Kremlin, the Church of Christ the Saviour, which was the largest church in Russia, was torn down. In 
1939 its foundations were laid. However, due to the invasion of Russia by German forces, construction 
came to a halt and the building materials, especially the steel beams, were used in the defence of 
Moscow  (Hoisington  2003,  65).  The  project  was  abandoned  after  the  war  and  the  remaining 
foundation structure was flooded in 1958 and became the world largest outdoor swimming pool. After 
the end of the SU, the originally destroyed Church of Christ the Saviour was rebuilt in its original 
form in 1995 (see Hoisington 2003).  
 
Figure 4.3 Palace of the Soviets, Design by Boris Iofan (SkyscraperPage Forum 2008) 
After Stalin’s death, socialist building practices followed the modernist international style, which is 
the  second  phase  of  Soviet  building  style.  Monumental  construction  was  abandoned  in favour  of 
modernist and more practical housing developments (Häussermann 1996, 217). Architects became 
more  pragmatic  and  less  dramatic  in  their  development  choices.  The  modernist,  functional 
international style was influenced by the Swiss architect Le Corbusier as well as the founder of the 
Bauhaus school Walter Gropius. Modernist architecture was widely used in non-socialist and socialist 
countries, but its origins lie in Western countries. Ornaments were mostly banned and functionality 
triumphed over form. Grand blocks of prefabricated flat estates became the new paradigm, especially 
when  erecting  new  towns  (Czepczynski  2008,  95).  New  standardised  building  techniques  further 
allowed for more efficiency and uniformity. The dominant shape of buildings was 'the block' with 
clear,  straight  lines.  Le  Corbusier  had  popularised  the  view  that  block  and  line  shapes  represent 
equality and balance the chaotic individualism of capitalist cities. This concept of equality in housing 
and other buildings greatly appealed to the communist party (Czepczynski 2008, 97). The blocks of 28 
 
flats were plain, but large, and thus had to be located outside the existing urban core in peripheral 
areas where there was enough undeveloped space.  
 
Figure 4.4 Pre-fabricated housing estates. (left) Plattenbausiedlung Mahrzahn Berlin (Bundesarchiv 1987); (right) 
Panelák  of Petržalka, Bratislava (Wikipedia 2005) 
Public transport was planned to connect them with the city centre, albeit it was not always sufficiently 
implemented. The standardised prefabricated housing blocks were of much better quality than the 
crowded and derelict remnants of inner city housing. Thus in the beginning the block flats were more 
desirable to live in. Between the 1950s and 1970s buildings remained functional with little symbolic 
value  or  identification  possibilities.  The  prefabricated  housing  had  various  colloquial  names 
throughout Eastern Europe. In German they are called Plattenbau and in Czech and Slovak they were 
known as panelák (see Figure 4.4). The block flat constructions were appealing to communist leaders 
because on the one hand they were cheap to build and on the other hand they were rather uniform.  
These characteristics were expected to create a collective identity among the citizens (Czepczynski 
2008, 99). However, due to their lack of recreational and socialising space, the residents could not 
really identify with their home or bond with their neighbours. There was little sense of place and 
connection to other parts of the city. 
 
Figure 4.5 Late Soviet individualism. (left) Ministry of Highways and Transportation, 1979, Tbilisi, Georgia (Rota 
n.d.);  (right)  Residential  Building  on  Minskaya  Street,  1980s,  Bobrujsk,  Belarus  (Belorussian  State  Archive  of 
Scientific-Technical Documentation n.d.) 
The third phase of Soviet architecture is the late Soviet individualistic style. It is characterised by the 
loss of faith in ideological representation of the urban fabric in the 1980s. Efforts to create a new 
society  by  altering  urban  form,  had  thus  far  been  unsatisfactory.  Therefore  urban  planning  and 
architecture became more individualistic across countries (see Figure 4.5). Some leaders even returned 29 
 
to  Stalinist forms.  One  excellent  example  of  such  a  case is  Ceausescu’s  Palace  of the  People  in 
Bucharest. During the late period tourism also increased which led to the building of spa towns and 
hotels in huge numbers (Czepczynski 2008, 102f).  
4.6 Planning norms in the socialist city  
In contrast to the capitalist city, the socialist city had a set of Marxist-inspired and formulated norms 
that it wanted to achieve. In socialist countries the "[...] solutions to urban problems are sought within 
a philosophical framework of Marxist doctrine and mostly within a practical, decision-taking structure 
of a command economy" (French and Hamilton 1979, 1). The following section will highlight how the 
ideological underpinnings of socialism translated into universal planning norms as defined by Soviet 
urban planners. The main recurring norms in socialist planning that were necessary to achieve these 
ideological objectives among others were: (1) equality of citizens, (2) standardisation, (3) controlling 
urban growth, (4) land use segregation, (5) integration of work and residential areas, (6) administrative 
and cultural city centre. 
Equality of citizens 
Modernisation  of  the  economy  and  an  equal  society  were  among  the  most  important  mantras  of 
socialist planners. The basic idea of socialism was that everybody should be equal. The city had to 
reflect  the  equality  and  unity  of  all  citizens,  since  the  socialist  society  was  supposedly  classless. 
Therefore the basic aim of the socialist city was to create and perpetuate equality because there should 
be uniform living conditions for all (Ciborowksi 1956, 24).  
No  part  of  the  city  should  ideally  attract  or  repel  certain  classes—wealthy  people  living  in  exclusive 
residences, the poor in low-rent burned-out industrial areas. All parts of the city of socialist man will be 
composed, in theory, of all people—a truly classless potpourri. (Fisher 1962, 252) 
After  the  various  communist  parties  had  taken  over  in  the  CEE  states  after  the  2
nd  World  War, 
capitalist homeowners were removed from their homes. These newly vacant buildings were fitted with 
apartments  and  filled  with  residents  formerly  belonging  to  different  social  classes.  However, 
throughout most cities people that shared an occupation would still live in the same area (Fisher 1962, 
259). Equality of all citizens also included that consumers have equal access to goods and services 
(Bater 1977, 192). This was problematic, because new housing was constructed in the first periphery 
of the city and usually service development occurred long after people settled into the housing estates. 
Furthermore, service quality greatly varied across the city, with some districts privileged due to their 
location or the occupation of its inhabitants (Smith 1996, 77). 
While equality was a leitmotiv in planning the socialist city, it was poorly executed in regard to social 
affairs.  The  ideologically  desired  mix  of  classes  and  the  hence  classless  society  was  never 
accomplished in reality. This was particularly obvious since the communist party elite had settled 
down in the prime residential areas (Fisher 1962, 259). Social equality was to a limited extend present 
in new industrial towns where almost all inhabitants were employed as workers in a huge public 
factory (French and Hamilton 1979, 16). Nonetheless, all cities managed to acquire a fair degree of 
spatial  uniformity  by  setting  up  standardised  housing  blocks  and  giving  the  city  a  homogeneous 
architecture in some districts. Also some professions were more valued than others, so that workers in 
heavy industry usually had more living space and better apartments. People from the upper level such 30 
 
as bureaucrats, party officials, military officers or academics even occupied special buildings with 
access to better service facilities (Smith 1996, 80). Socio-spatial segregation was thus no longer based 
on income and economic power, but rather on occupation. Altogether researchers, however, agree that 
there was less social segregation in the socialist city when compared to the capitalist city. Socialist 
society nonetheless was far from the sought-after collective lifestyle (Smith 1996, 96). Ethnic and 
class  distinctions  were  produced  and  reproduced  despite  all  egalitarian  principles (Szelenyi  1996, 
303). To put it briefly, urban social equality under socialism was an important ideological goal, but in 
reality it was not widely applied. 
Standardisation  
Since people were moving to the cities to find work in the new industrial plants, most socialist cities 
faced  a  housing  shortage.  This  was  eventually  ameliorated  by  the  introduction  of  standardised, 
prefabricated housing blocks, which were cheap and easy to build (Fisher 1962, 263). The quality of 
housing varied. The initial Stalinesque housing was of good quality, because the buildings were meant 
to look grand and durable. Also financial problems were not an issue yet. Prefabricated estates that 
were constructed towards the end of the 1950s to alleviate the housing crisis were often cheap and 
substandard  buildings.  Cost-efficiency  remained  the  main  mantra  in  construction  for  socialist 
governments during the 1960s. Later high-rises from the 1970s greatly improved in quality (Smith 
1996, 78). 
The standardised prefabricated housing units were meant to create a more uniform living environment 
where everyone would be the same. In order to achieve the desired housing equality, flat size in newly 
built apartments was regulated to 50 m² -71 m² (Fisher 1962, 253). However, instead of creating a 
collective community spirit, most residents hardly knew their neighbours (Frolic 1970, 682). Social 
uniformity across the whole city proofed to be difficult, because the large, new housing areas usually 
accommodated people from the same occupational group, for instance workers from a nearby plant. 
Therefore in reality the egalitarian social mix and the desired collective identity did not arise. Even if a 
neighbourhood unit was more mixed, the individual houses were still mostly inhabited by people with 
similar background (Smith 1996, 82).  
Controlling urban growth 
Another important objective of socialist planners was controlling town growth. The ideal socialist city 
was supposed to have between 50.000 and 100.000 inhabitants. Everything exceeding this size was to 
be  built  as  satellite  towns  (French  and  Hamilton  1979,  11).  This  size  was  considered  to  foster 
community spirit and it was manageable in terms of easy delivery of goods and services, because 
providing social services and infrastructure for big cities was very costly. Moreover, cities should be 
turned from consumer to producer cities and become economically self-sufficient (Forbes and Thrift 
1987, 10). In order to stymie urban growth, mobility restrictions on rural-to-urban migration were 
imposed and strictly controlled through the use of internal passports (Boren and Gentile 2007, 101). 
For  some  time,  immigration  to  some  cities  was  completely  shut  down  in  order to  cope  with  the 
swelling population. In 1970, 15 Soviet cities had closed populations. Among them were Moscow, 
Kiev and Leningrad (Frolic 1970, 684). Despite these measures, growth in the big urban centres could 
not be controlled. As a result of rapid industrialisation, migration increased drastically and hence 31 
 
planners were even less able to restrain urban growth according to formulated goals. Keeping cities 
small was hopelessly utopian. Eventually planners conceded to reality and the concept of the 'right' 
city size was largely abandoned. 
Land use planning and segregation 
Land use functions in socialist cities were similar to those in capitalist cities. However, land use 
segregation was much more distinctive in socialist cities, because of centralised decision-making and 
the public ownership of land (Häussermann 1996, 218). A large area of land could be dedicated to one 
purpose, such as industry, housing or recreation, in order to make the city more efficient. This meant 
that  there  were  large  residential  districts,  agglomerations  of  administrative  buildings  as  well  as 
industrial zones. In the SU defence considerations and the location of defence related industry was 
important in shaping the urban fabric as well (Boren and Gentile 2007, 100). In urban Russia during 
the Cold War, military areas occupied large territories and restricted urban growth in its surroundings, 
which does not apply to all socialist cities. In general, however, military strategy did influence the 
location of boulevards, subway stations and even the distance between buildings. Wide avenues were 
easier to block and defend than small winding streets. The socialist planners were inspired by the 
grandeur  created  by  the  architect  Haussmann  in  Paris  who  restructured  the  French  capital  under 
Napoleon III. An example for such a boulevard created under socialist influence is the Karl Marx 
Allee (formerly Stalinallee) in former East Berlin. See Figure 4.6. 
 
Figure 4.6 Karl Marx Allee, Berlin (Wikipedia 2004) 
The main reason for the distinct land use patterns in the socialist city was the central allocation of land 
and the absence of a land market. Like all goods in a central planning economy, land was a scarce 
resource allocated through the central authorities and rationed accordingly. All investment decisions 
were made by the bureaucracy without land markets (Bertaud and Renaud 1997, 137). This meant 
enterprises or other entities did not have to pay rent for land, but simply wait until a free plot was 
allocated to them. Land had to be divided between productive urban elements, such as industry and 
enterprises, and non-productive ones, such as residential and service facilities. Naturally, industrial 
projects usually got prioritised or as Boren and Gentile put it: "[...] industry had first choice, while the 
town planner was near the bottom of the food chain [...]" (2007, 99). This means that industry got a 32 
 
fair share of valuable inner city land. Since there was no market competition, state firms did not really 
need to be profitable and successful. For that reason, there were no better or worse locations for 
industry within the city (Ciborowski 1956, 22). Consequently, industry was scattered all over the 
urban area, which is a distinctive difference to the capitalist city, where industrial areas are usually 
located close to good infrastructure and mainly on cheap land plots. Furthermore, land was often 
allocated to an enterprise very liberally and then frozen for future use. This resulted in ineffective 
allocation  and  waste  of  land.  Subsequently,  unused  patches  of  land  emerged  and  undermined 
comprehensive  planning  efforts  (Boren  and  Gentile  2007,  99).  In  general,  a  lot  of  intended 
developments  were  not  realised  (Bater  1977,  199).  Socialist  cities  were  riddled  with  unfinished 
building projects, sometimes because of plan changes, budget constraints, or even because materials 
vanished and were sold on the black market by the construction crew (Boren and Gentile 2007, 100). 
Another flaw in socialist land use planning was that the state postponed investment in projects that 
were in non-priority sectors as long as possible. 'Unproductive' structures, such as housing or health 
care facilities, were deferred until the social costs were no longer tolerable. This investment pattern 
resulted in a non-systematic pattern of land use allocation. Urban land development in the socialist city 
was in some respect crisis management, rather than planning for the future (Tang 1994, 407).  
The urban fabric of the socialist city is less dense than that of the capitalist one. Again the reason for 
this was the absence of a land market. All land was publicly owned and therefore planners did not 
need to economise with space. As a consequence, space was rather luxuriously used in many central 
locations of socialist cities (Szelenyi 1996, 301). One such example is Alexanderplatz in Berlin. Open 
space was politically important, because propaganda ceremonies and parades needed to be conducted 
in spacious squares. This allowed for a large amount of spectators. Czepczynski refers to them as 
“anti-agoras”, because they were not used for democratic purposes but rather for rallies to support the 
communist party’s regime (2008, 72). The urban fabric of the socialist city is also less dense, because 
the incentive to recycle abandoned land was low. Since there was no land market, land had no value. It 
was thus more costly to tear down existing structures on abandoned land, than to build on a fresh plot. 
"Land prices exert a powerful influence to recycle land in the inner rings when the type and intensity 
of the existing use is too different from the land's optimum economic use" (Bertaud and Renaud 1997, 
139). Moreover, derelict areas were left to themselves, since no one had to pay land rent. If planners 
wanted to build something new, they would simply allocate a new stretch of land on the undeveloped 
outskirts. Derelict areas in the inner city were rarely redeveloped, even despite their prime location. 
The central land allocation process thus encouraged distinct patterns of inner city rust-belts.  
Interesting in this context is that although the central areas in the socialist city were less built up than 
the centre in the capitalist one, they were often more densely populated. This is because people had to 
share and sublet flats as a consequence of acute housing shortages in the 1950s and 1960s. The city 
outskirts, however, were compactly built up with large housing estates and generally showed a more 
dense urban fabric (Boren and Gentile 2007, 99). In comparison, the capitalist city becomes less dense 
the farther one moves away from the city centre, because private single family residences form a 
formidable mattress of urban sprawl. There is no fuzzy suburban fringe in the socialist city since the 
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In  conclusion,  the  central  allocation  of  publicly  owned  land,  absence  of  land  markets  and  the 
prioritisation industry and defence have imprinted recognisable land use patterns upon the socialist 
city. Due to prestige buildings and deliberate open spaces as well as to derelict or vacant industrial 
land, the socialist city is more open in the city centre. Towards its periphery it becomes more built up, 
due to the housing projects. 
Integration of workplace and residential area 
The socialist city was meant to be organised into decentralised neighbourhood units called micro-
district or mikrorayon. These units were to be built close to industrial areas and provide services to its 
residents, thus effectively economising on the distance that needs to be overcome to access everyday 
services (Frolic 1970, 681). This idea was inspired by several Soviet and international scholars. One of 
the early conceptions of what a socialist city could look like was the linear city by Miliutin in the 
1920s  (Bater  1977,  196).  He  stressed  the  advantage  of  the  proximity  of  workplace  and  private 
residence. Short work journeys would benefit the workers leisure time and relief public transport. 
Between work and home there was to be a green belt as a buffer zone. Miliutin's linear city scheme 
was not very popular, but its core idea of placing industry and residential areas in near proximity and 
separating them with a green belt nevertheless remained popular (French and Hamiltion 1979, 9). At 
the beginning of the 1960s, Strumilin envisioned socialist urban living as communal living, where 
each commune is its own mikrorayon. The micro-district concept was also used and developed by 
modernist international planners and architects in non-socialist countries. An example is the famous 
Swiss architect Le Corbusier's plan for Chandigarh in India.  
The mikrorayon is a self-contained spatial planning unit that includes residential buildings, communal 
recreation and eating space, basic services such as kindergartens, schools, medical facilities and staple 
shops.  Each  micro-district  is  ideally  located  in  close  proximity  to  an  industrial  plant,  where  the 
inhabitants will work. The mikrorayon never took the all-encompassing shape outlined above in Soviet 
cities, but it became a basic planning instrument for housing development. However, instead of the 
integrated  micro-district,  only  huge  residential  zones  were  developed,  which  lacked  the  adequate 
neighbourhood  services.  Industry  was  frequently  not  spatially  connected  with  these  large  scale 
neighbourhoods (French and Hamilton 1979, 11).  
Despite the articulated goal of keeping distances to a minimum, work travel constantly increased as 
socialist cities grew. Public transportation was well developed in the central areas of large urban 
agglomerations, but became infrequent in the suburbs. However, maintaining public transport for large 
cities at affordable price levels was very costly for the state (French and Hamilton 1979, 17). Public 
transport was not able to serve the fast-growing housing estates. Thus the mikrorayony were not 
properly connected to the workplaces of their inhabitants.  
Administrative and cultural city centre 
“The distinctive character of the socialist conception of the city’s centre is that it functions not as an 
area  of  retail  concentration  but  as  the  political-cultural-administrative  centre”  (Fisher  1962,  253). 
Fisher argues that this is in stark opposition with the capitalist city centre that often functions as the 
central business district. This norm was quite comprehensively achieved in socialist urban planning. 
The  few  commercial  entities  around  the  centre  of  the  socialist  city  were  usually  designed  for 34 
 
international guests and tourists. Although there might have been one department store, a restaurant or 
a coffee shop, other forms of leisure or consumer outlets were the exception in the city centre.  
The  city  centre  most  certainly  was  the stage  for the  principal  socialist  monuments  and  buildings 
(Fisher 1962, 253). Often it was a sterile and unwelcoming place that projected the power of the state. 
Inhabitants  of  the  socialist  city  were  expected  to  go  to  the  centre  for  rarely  needed  specific 
administrative  services  or  national  celebrations.  In  capital  cities,  the  central  administrative  and 
political buildings were monumental buildings that were to attract nationwide, as well as international, 
attention. Since the socialist city centre conformed to its planning norms, more details are given in 
Chapter 4.8. 
4.7 The real socialist city 
As mentioned before there was a gap between the ideal socialist city and its reality. When a city was 
transformed according to socialist ideals it took on a different purpose. Since capitalist production was 
abolished,  several  buildings  lost  their  function  when  socialism  was introduced.  In  a  socialist  city 
residents do not have or ideally do not need access to various consumer services, such as a stock 
exchange,  fancy  department  stores  or  luxurious  hotels.  Therefore  the  state  planning  authorities 
repurposed these buildings with former capitalist usage for more practical uses such as offices, storage 
or housing (Czepczynski 2008, 83). Leisure facilities in contrast were often closed. The state kept only 
some hotels and spas open to house foreign visitors. 
Warsaw is a good example of how difficult it really was to apply the above mentioned norms and 
principles.  Since  the  Polish  capital  had  been  almost 
completely destroyed in the Second World War, socialist 
planners had the chance to remodel the city according to 
new  socialist  principles.  Adolf  Ciborowski,  one  of  the 
head planners of the reconstruction, writes that 81% of the 
city  had  been  hit  by  bombs  and  made  unusable.  The 
historic  centre  was  completely  obliterated  (Ciborowski 
1956, 13). The population of Warsaw had shrunk from 1.3 
million  in  1939  to  162,000  in  a  mere  six  years  (Smith 
1996,  85).  1945-Warsaw  was  to  be  largely  rebuilt 
according to socialist principles and made habitable again. 
The polish planners were instructed to prioritise building 
up industrial areas and the necessary transportation lines. 
Heavy industry and long distance travel access points were 
especially important. The inner city was designated as the 
core administrative area and the periphery was to serve as 
living quarters (Ciborowski 1956, 18). The plan to build 
grand  public  buildings  in  the  inner  city,  however,  was 
foiled by the public desire to restore the historic core. The 
historic centre of Warsaw was an important national symbol, because it represented the struggle of the 
polish nation (Fisher 1962, 257). Hence it was reconstructed in its original form, albeit the buildings 
Figure  4.7  Palace  of  Culture  and  Science  in 
Warsaw. View from Warsaw Financial Center 
(Wikipedia 2008) 35 
 
were mostly repurposed as housing. Apart from the centre, a lot of monuments and churches that did 
not fit into the new socialist ideological canon were displaced or dismantled (Ciborowski 1956, 46).  
The city centre's new desired cultural and public service functions were placed outside the historic 
core, around what is now Defilad Square (formerly called Stalin Square). The centrepiece of the 
culture and service redevelopment was the Palace of Science and Culture (Ciborowski 1956, 25). It 
(Figure  4.7)  is  a  multi-functional  building,  filled  with  cinemas,  theatres,  a  youth  centre,  sports 
facilities such as gym halls and swimming pools. It also houses the largest congress hall in Warsaw 
and is the seat of the Polish Academy of Science and the Museum of Technology.  
The real socialist city faced similar problems as the ones exemplified in the reconstruction of Warsaw. 
Just  like  in  many  socialist  cities,  the  socio-economic  restructuring  of  Warsaw  was  utopian.  The 
socialist  inspired  urban  regeneration  program  was  too  expensive  and  the  planners  lacked  the 
experience.  A  few  years  into  the  rebuilding  process  state  finances  dried  up.  Rebuilding  was 
reorganised in collectives, members of which had to spend their private savings to buy construction 
progress (Smith 1996, 85). The planners working on Warsaw lacked the experience to effectively push 
through their desired program. What is more, the city did not have enough money for costly iconic 
buildings  and  a  completely  new  urban  pattern  (Ciborowski  1956,  20).  City  growth  could  not  be 
contained the way it was planned. The overall territory of the city expanded rapidly due to the building 
of new residential areas and the significant expansion of urban industrial activities. Public transport 
development could not keep up with the rapid city growth and the urban fringe became partly isolated 
(Smith 1996, 85). The reconstruction of Warsaw started out with socialist goals in mind, but as many 
others failed to superimpose the utopian socialist urban planning norms.  
Despite the fact that there rarely is a blueprint socialist city, it can be summarized that a good amount 
of the socialist ideals of city planning have at least been partially implemented in existing cities as 
well as new towns. They make up what I will later refer to as 'socialist legacy'. I will now take a look 
at some of the most common architecture and planning elements that were realised in most socialist 
towns and cities of CEE. 
4.8 Common physical elements in the real socialist city 
Some of the socialist city norms have in fact been realised in many places with varying degrees and 
directly translate into the architectural heritage or socialist legacy in these towns. The best area to 
examine socialist legacy in the urban environment is the inner city, because of the complete absence of 
a land market under socialism. For my analysis of post-socialist Beijing and Hanoi to work, it has to 
be established whether they were socialist cities. In order to make a qualified statement, whether a city 
has socialist legacy or not, five urban structural elements that have distinct forms and functions in the 
socialist city will be examined. In other words these five elements have been quite comprehensively 
realised through urban areas under socialism. The elements are (1) the city centre, (2) industrial areas, 
(3) the micro-district, (4) residential buildings, (5) architectural heritage. Their form, function and 
location  in  socialist  urbanism  will  be  described  in  more  detail  in  the  following  section.  This 
categorisation will later build the basis for the analysis of Beijing and Hanoi.  36 
 
City centre 
The inner city was a very sterile place that was only used for administrative and cultural functions. 
There is no conventional CBD in the socialist city (Boren and Gentile 2007, 99). Commercial and 
service functions were executed by the state firms and the state bureaucracy.  
In addition to reflecting the central functions of the city, the function of the centre was to embody 
what Czepczynski calls the "socialist myth". He compares the socialist system with its celebrations 
and rituals to a cult (2008, 65). The city centre was a special place of worship erected to transport the 
dogmatic messages of the communist party to the population. "The monumentalism of the space and 
the rituals conducted in them were designed to create feelings of security, permanence and pride 
among the people and their rulers" (Andrusz 1996, 65). Important architectural manifestations of the 
socialist cult for example are the Lenin Mausoleum on the Red Square in Moscow and the copy of the 
Liebknecht  balcony  in  Berlin.  "Socialist  ritual"  and  ideological  celebrations  such  as  marches, 
manifestations, speeches or parades were carried out in the large city centre squares. Central squares in 
socialist  cities  usually  were  grand  open  spaces  with  the  purpose  of  accommodating  oversized 
celebrations. Squares and boulevards were the principle staging ground for socialist “mass spectacles” 
(Czepczynski 2008, 65). The communist authorities often built central administrative and cultural 
functions near the central square. The most famous one is the Red Square in Moscow. 
The  city  centre  was  usually  functional  and  adhered  to  socialist  aesthetics  (Bater  1977,  198).  Its 
structure usually followed a clear order. It was mostly artistically designed to assert dominance over 
the rest of the urban region. Often a skyscraper monumentalised the socialist victory (Häussermann 
1996,  216).  Government  buildings,  museums,  revolutionary  statues  and  mausoleums  lined  the 
principle squares and boulevards. In most places in the SU the historic city centre was kept or rebuilt 
as in Warsaw.  
Industrial sites 
Socialist cities have an especially high share of inner city industrial land. Moscow’s industrial sites, 
for instance, covered 31 percent of the built up area in 1992. When contrasted with 6 percent in Seoul 
and 5 percent in both Paris and Hongkong, this was rather high (Bertaud and Renaud 1997, 144). Such 
inefficient industrial land use patterns are a consequence of the prioritisation of the construction of 
heavy industry. Enterprises were built as closely to the city centre as possible because they needed 
administrative  infrastructure.  Public  transport  provision  usually  lagged  behind  construction  and 
workers could not easily reach remote industrial locations. Socialist industrial sites were also larger 
than their counterparts in capitalist cities. Due to the shortage economy, plant managers had to store a 
lot of input materials in case they ran out at a particular time. Storage space therefore took up a large 
part of any industrial site. This resulted in a low ratio of jobs to land (Bertaud and Renaud 1997, 144). 
Furthermore, the technological input was fairly low and therefore a lot of space and workers were 
needed. For the most part, industrial sites were spread out evenly across the socialist city, because land 
was free and centrally allocated by the state. In capitalist cities, in contrast, industry settled on cheap 
land close to transport facilities (French and Hamilton 1979, 16). Still, key industries belonging to 
important ministries tended to get prime sites under socialism. 37 
 
As already explained, there was little incentive for land recycling. Consequently the large industrial 
sites in good, central locations often turned into brownfields, when they went out of use (Boren and 
Gentile 2007, 97). Brownfields are abandoned factory sites that are left undeveloped and useless. 
Essentially, new factories never replaced old ones, but instead were set up on new land. 
The micro-district or neighbourhood unit 
The mikrorayon or micro-district was a residential unit, which on average encompassed about 8,000 to 
12,000 inhabitants. It comprised of several smaller housing units with each between 1000 and 1500 
residents.  The  idea  was  that  these  districts  provided  essential  services  to  their  residents,  such  as 
educational, health, shopping and entertainment facilities. These service amenities were located in the 
neighbourhood centre, which was in a central position in the mikrorayon (Fisher 1962, 263). Moreover 
there were pedestrian areas connecting all the service facilities. 
The basic idea of the micro-district was that it is located close to industrial workplaces in order to 
minimise journey-to-work distances: 
[…]  the  development  of  the  mikrorayon  is  premised  on  at  least  a  sizeable  proportion  of  the  potential 
workforce being employed nearby […] this has not generally worked out in practice and with the increasing 
redevelopment of the central cities, which includes the dispersal of nonconforming industries […]. (Bater 
1977, 196) 
As Bater remarks it was not always possible to plan micro-districts and industrial sites together. The 
distance a worker travelled to work constantly increased, as cities grew and industrial sites spread out.  
 
Figure 4.8. Micro-district in Warsaw, Poland. Population 7,000 (Fisher 1962, 254) 
Four to five micro-districts comprised a residential district, which provided more specialised services. 
The micro-district essentially was the lowest level of service provision in the administrative hierarchy. 
Neighbourhood unit planning was widely applied in Moscow and Warsaw (Smith 1996, 75). Figure 
4.8 shows the layout of an average-sized micro-district in Warsaw. The self-contained neighbourhood 38 
 
unit was an easy building block for planners. Fisher called the neighbourhood unit: “The basic tool of 
socialist urban planners in their attempt to create “urban uniformity””(Fisher 1962, 253). Socialist 
planners in the early 1960s had largely abandoned other forms of spatially dividing the city in favour 
of the mikrorayon. This means that the city became fairly homogenous, because neighbourhoods were 
not specialised in any kind of service or industrial production anymore. Instead each micro-district 
theoretically  provided  all  types  of  basic  services.  In  reality,  many  micro-districts  were  only  an 
assembly of apartment blocks, as service provision lagged behind housing construction.  
The micro-district concept was pervasive throughout the SU. Bater estimated in 1977 that about half 
the urban population in Soviet cities lived in some form of mikrorayon. Albeit the level of service 
provision in most of them was inadequate for the number of residents (Bater 1977, 193). Sit agreed 
that when socialism came to an end, roughly half the population of the SU was still living in a micro-
district housing complex (Sit 1995, 203). The micro-district, although universally acknowledged as a 
planning instrument, did not take the exact same shape in all socialist countries. In some, like former 
Yugoslavia  and  China,  it  had  extensive  administrative  functions  and  was  to  some  extend  a  self-
managing  unit  that  micromanaged  local  affairs  (Fisher  1962,  255).  The  unit  was  managed  by  a 
'Neighbourhood Unit Council', a form of organisation that still exists in Chinese and Vietnamese urban 
administration.  
The neighbourhood unit was designed so that "each unit would be a microcosm of Soviet society" 
(Frolic 1970, 682). It was intended to achieve the desired social cohesion and sense of place, and a 
feeling of community among the residents. People, however, did not choose to arrange their lives 
around their place of residence. Few residents knew their neighbours (Frolic 1970, 682).  
Residential buildings  
Soviet housing policy was influenced by the socialist principles of state-ownership, planned residential 
areas, spatial equality for collective services and short journey to work distances (Sit 1995, 201). 
Hence, housing had to be cheap, easily accessible and close to industrial areas.  
The early socialist cities faced a massive housing shortage which resulted from already overcrowded 
inner city housing, as well as the tide of immigrants from rural areas that were coming to work in 
urban industrial plants. In order to solve the shortage created by the build-up of industry, the state 
invested heavily in affordable public housing schemes. Since construction needed to be as cheap as 
possible, the standardisation and industrial production of prefabricated units helped alleviate the crisis 
considerably  (Bater  1977,  193).  The  cheap  price,  however,  created  a  drop  in  quality.  Soviet-
manufactured materials were often of shoddy quality due to a lack of control and the imperative to 
meet  production  targets.  Hence,  buildings  were  often  constructed  with  sub-standard  material  and 
deteriorated quickly (Boren and Gentile 2007, 98). 
New mass-housing developments are the most obvious common form of socialist cities. Prefabricated 
housing in the 1960s was mostly five-storey walk-up buildings and only in the 1970s housing blocks 
became high-rises (French and Hamilton 1979, 15). Fifteen storey houses were already considered a 
high-rise  building.  Indeed,  most  public  housing  blocks  ranged  between  5  and  15  storeys.  Most 
prefabricated apartment blocks were clustered in the above mentioned micro-districts. Szelenyi calls 
these grand-scale housing developments “the most socialist phenomenon” of a socialist city (Szelenyi 39 
 
1996, 288). A lot of them are still in existence and are visual reminders of the cities' socialist past. The 
homogenous  mesh  of  the  prefabricated  estates  rendered  the  peripheral  suburbs  of  socialist  towns 
almost indistinguishable from one another (Myers 1994, 455).  
Architectural heritage 
Cultural heritage (or just heritage, since every heritage is cultural), is the legacy of physical and mental 
artefacts and intangible attributes of a group or a society that are inherited from past generations, maintained 
in the present and bestowed for the benefit of future generations. (Czepczynski 2008, 54) 
The  communist  leadership  in  various  countries  treated  historic  heritage  differently,  sometimes 
preservation was necessary to protect socialist ideals, sometimes demolition was required to break 
with the capitalist past. Socialist building activity included eliminating buildings that were considered 
to belong to a wrong historical canon. Symbols of capitalism or religion, such as temples and shrines 
as well as bourgeois housing needed to be either altered or eliminated from the new socialist cultural 
landscape  (Czepczynski  2008,  81).  In  order  to  break  with  the  capitalist  past,  some  architectural 
heritage’s  function  was  transformed.  For  example  churches  were  turned into storage  facilities.  In 
Hungary the communist party removed several monuments and statues that reminded of the former 
monarchy  and  replaced  them  with  socialist  ones.  In  order  not  to  incite  the  population  these 
reconfigurations and demolitions were justified as necessities for economic development. However, 
not all cultural heritage was deemed inappropriate. As long as it served the ideological goals of the 
communist  party,  it  was  acceptable.  The  reconstruction  of  inner  city  Warsaw,  for  example,  was 
essential to safeguard the national sovereignty of Poland. However, the CP changed the narrative 
slightly. Post-war rebuilding of historical city centres in Poland, including Warsaw Old Town, omitted 
the previously existent German architectural elements on purpose, especially in Gdansk and Wroclaw 
(Czepczynski 2008, 82). It can therefore be concluded that heritage was important as long as it served 
the communist leaders’ interests. In other cases old buildings were demolished to make room for new 
projects. After the October Revolution in Russia in 1917, the communists and urban planners felt that 
they could remove historic buildings and exchange them for new socialist prestige buildings. A prime 
example is the demolition of the Christ the Saviour Cathedral in Moscow ordered by Stalin, so as to 
make room for the Palace of the Soviets project. 
While the party often repurposed monuments, historic housing was often neglected and not restored. 
Most inner city housing was nationalised, but some of it was in bad shape due to war damages or 
simply crippled from age. Since maintaining the old buildings was often more costly than tearing them 
down  and  building  new  ones,  a  lot  were  demolished  and  replaced  with  modernist  prefabricated 
housing estates (Bater 1977, 193). The rest was left to the tenants in poor state. Since rents had to be 
kept low, most old inner city buildings fell into disrepair, despite being state-owned (Szelenyi 1996, 
304). The old city was also often neglected for ideological reasons, because it was meant to be a 
reminder of a capitalist past (Häussermann 1996, 219). 
To sum up, depending on the previous purpose and function of the architectural heritage, it was either 
dedicated to new purposes or demolished. In some cases, when a monument served a nationalistic 
purpose, it was conserved under the communists. In essence, socialist urban planning had a very 
unsentimental and practical approach to the conservation of heritage.  40 
 
The five elements described in this section will be used as analytical categories for the comparison of 
Beijing and Hanoi. The following chapter explains the debate about the post-socialist city.  
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5. The post-socialist city: legacies 
5.1 The debate: Is there a distinct post-socialist city? 
Post-socialist city research is a recent area of study for two reasons: One, the end of socialism in CEE 
was only two decades ago. Two, physical changes in urban structure occur more slowly than economic 
and political reforms, as socialist-built urban legacy needs some time to transform. 
The demise of Soviet-type central planning and the urge to reform felt in many ailing socialist economy have 
stimulated considerable interest in the process of urbanisation in former and existing socialist societies. [...] 
this  is  an  outcome  of  the  improved  understanding  of,  and  access  to,  previously  closed  or  semi-closed 
societies. (Sjöberg 1999, 2217)  
Research mostly exists in the form of comprehensive case study efforts in CEE cities (see Stanilov 
2007, Andrusz, Harloe and Szelenyi 1996, Kliems and Dmitrieva 2010, Tsenkova and Nedovic-Budic 
2006). Andrusz and colleagues (1996) und Stanilov (2007) are two prominent edited works. Both 
assembled case studies from different European countries looking into change in urban governance, 
the built urban environment and urban sociology. Most of the literature examines either: (1) urban 
governance and management, (2) social changes, or (3) changes in urban morphology and land use. A 
lot of researchers have tried to find universal patterns of post-socialist change. In spite of regional 
variations among cities, some shared land-use change patterns have evolved from the specific socialist 
history. Despite the "regional guise", the patterns are distinguishable (Boren and Gentile 2007, 96). 
Like  in  the  case  of the  socialist  city,  there  is  also  a  debate  whether  specifically  researching  and 
defining the concept of a post-socialist city is viable. Comparative urban research is tricky because of 
the impact of local context on spatial outcomes. Yet, researchers agree that common patterns in land 
use and urban morphology emerge in post-socialist cities: 
Twenty years after the political ruptures of 1989/91, there seems to be a certain amount of common ground in 
the  transformation  process  of  urban,  post-socialist  space—despite  all  the  cultural,  political  and  social 
differences between the cities in question and despite their divergent conditions and traditions. This common 
ground is created if nothing else by the necessary response to the rupture in the image of the city and the clash 
between the socialist legacy and post-socialist appropriation, transformation and upheaval. (Dmitrieva and 
Kliems 2010, 12) 
The  extent  to  which  these  commonalities  are  constructive  is  however  disputed.  Wasserstrom 
underlines the usefulness of post-socialist urban research with regard to drawing conclusion for future 
urban development:   
The "legacy of the past" can provide more than "just ruins" for a city. Passing through socialism can give a 
special harshness as well as a special sense of relief to a capitalist present of rising inequalities and increasing 
excitement, but it can also give tools to those looking to create a more humane urban future. (Wasserstrom 
2007, 234) 
Wu (2003, 1337) agrees that “transitional cities can provide a valuable experiment site for generating 
theories and illuminating the path towards a better understanding of changing human settlements.” 
Nevertheless, he is against strictly defining a rigid theory of the post-socialist city because for him the 
post-socialist city is simply a variation of the path that capitalist cities in general are taking. Wiest 
warns against the assumption that the development of post-socialist cities is going to converge with 
capitalist cities. This would preclude that there is a norm towards which all cities are moving (Wiest 42 
 
2012, 834). However, theories arguing in favour of convergence run the risk of ignoring underlying, 
local internal and external factors. This means that while an urban development in city A may have the 
same result as in city B, the reason behind the outcome could be very different. When analysing the 
post-socialist city, it is viable to keep in mind that urban development in both capitalist and formerly 
socialist cities is shaped by global trends as well as historical and geographical background.  
Change and development in an urban area can have many reasons, and the change from a central 
command economy to a market system is not the sole catalyst of change in a post-socialist city. 
Recently most industrial cities in economically more developed countries have undergone a set of 
changes that is called the transition from a Fordist to a post-Fordist city. The Fordist city was a place 
of production, whereas the post-Fordist city thrives on the knowledge economy and the tertiary sector. 
Since industrial production has shifted to low income countries, cities in economically more developed 
countries have started to attract businesses in the service industry. The post-Fordist global order means 
that  cities  are  increasingly  becoming  places  of  consumption.  "With  the  proliferation  of  thematic 
shopping complexes, festival marketplaces, convention centres, theme parks, and downtown consumer 
paradises, urbanity itself was redefined as a consumption experience" (Broudehoux 2004, 4).  
 
Figure 5 The double transition in post-socialist cities (Wu 2003, 1332) 
Post-socialist cities are no exception to this transition. In fact, as Wu points out in Figure 5.1, they are 
undergoing a double transition: the shift from Fordist to post-Fordist as well as the transition to post-
socialist  cities.  Both  influence  urban  development  (Boren  and  Gentile  2007,  95).  Therefore  it  is 
difficult to clearly attribute changes in the urban fabric just to one transition force. Nevertheless, since 
post-socialist cities undergo the post-Fordist transformation as well, the comparability among cities is 
still feasible. It is important to keep this double transition in mind. This research paper explicitly looks 
at how the regime transitions have affected socialist urban legacy in land use and morphology. A lot of 
the  discovered  spatial  outcomes  may  also  be  found  in  post-Fordist  cities  that  have  never  been 
influenced by socialism.  
It has also been argued that post-socialist cities are interesting research objects because they magnify 
how globalisation dynamics affect an urban environment (Wiest 2012, 835). This is because socialist 
cities were more isolated from international economic exchanges than capitalist cities. Post-socialist 
cities  in  contrast  are  subjected  to  globalisation  as  much  as  capitalist  cities.  Globalisation  and 
international pressures at present imprint cities with new international functions (Boren and Gentile 43 
 
2007, 96). For CEE cities this is less relevant. Most were connected with other CEE cities at the 
European level  before  their communist era  and  at  some  level  also during  it. In  East  Asian  post-
socialist cities this is however more interesting. Cities in China and Vietnam have been fairly isolated 
during  and  before  their  socialist  periods.  Moreover,  they  are  still  undergoing  rapid  urbanisation. 
Hence, they experience developments, which took several decades in Western capitalist cities, in just 
one or two decades. Friedmann expresses his admiration of urbanisation in Asia and especially in 
China  and  Vietnam  as  “an  epic  drama  unprecedented  in  both  scale  and  transformative  power” 
(Friedmann  2011,  426). This  makes  the  post-socialist  urban  research  in  China  and Vietnam  very 
compelling. 
The debate over the feasibility of post-socialist city studies has another major angle. Wiest asks the 
question of how much longer the label “post-socialist city” can still add to the comparison of cities in 
CEE (Wiest 2012, 830). Socialist urban elements cannot shape modern urban outcomes for many more 
decades, since at some point the former socialist elements will have been twisted into new forms and 
imbued with new functions. Thus their origin is not eternally relevant to their practical application. 
Since  the  urban  environment  is  changing  slowly  and  socialist  legacy  remains  in  many  urban 
environments, post socialist city research is still relevant. 
To sum up, due to the complexities and the many dimensions of change in any given city, there is no 
single reason or phenomenon to explain all changes satisfactorily. However, the post-socialist city 
may be grasped more easily, if the socialist legacy that is present in land use patterns and in the urban 
morphology is adopted as the departure point for further inquiry. Therefore a post-socialist city is 
defined by socialist legacy in its urban fabric.  
5.2 Spatial change in post-socialist cities: an introduction to CEE countries 
Since a lot of research on post-socialist cities in CEE countries has already been conducted, this 
chapter gives a short overview of the forces at work in post-socialist cities and their outcomes. The 
purpose of this introduction is to present the general direction of urban change in cities after socialism.  
As already mentioned, the socialist period of urbanisation has left a distinctive mark on its cities. Post-
socialist transition does not mean the eradication of socialist heritage, but rather adding on new layers 
and new functions to the already existing urban morphology (Boren and Gentile 2007, 97). In a way 
post-socialist cities are a combination of socialist and post-socialist urban elements (Wiest 2012, 834). 
The economic and political changes are transforming society and the urban environment. In other 
words, the socialist layers are confronted with a new reality of globalised market requirements. In 
order  to  be  successful  in  accumulating  wealth  and  content  citizens,  post-socialist  cities  and  their 
administrations need to adapt. Post-socialist cities experience many transformations at the same time, 
including gentrification, the commoditisation of urban space, demographic change and post-industrial 
economic transition (Czaplicka, Gelazis and Ruble 2009, 1).  
On the economic side, reforms such as privatisation, real estate development, foreign investment and 
so forth changed not only the urban form and function, but all life in the city (Gaubatz 1999, 1496). 
The introduction of political and economic choice has led to more colourful city environments than 
offered by the grey housing blocks stereotypically associated with the socialist era in Eastern Europe 44 
 
(Czaplicka, Gelazis and Ruble 2009, 9). Reforms in CEE countries have also created room for new 
problems, such as social stratification: 
The end of strict one-party control has meant the re-emergence of suppressed ethnic and social identities, be 
they cultural, religious, or class-based. Often, these identities are conflicting and contradictive. Seeking to 
straddle  old  and  new  realities.  […]  These  economic  differences  translate  into  new  cultural  and  social 
divisions,  both  spatially-  most  visibly  within  the  cities-  and  socially,  such  as  between  the  generations. 
(Herrschel 2007, 15) 
Social stratification is also visible in unattractively ageing urban areas (Stanilov 2007, 11). Other 
derelict areas are former socialist industrial zones. Large industrial zones used to make up about a 
third of the urban fabric in socialist towns. Cities in transition therefore have a lot of abandoned 
industrial zones, which are like dead and unusable tissue in the urban fabric (Stanilov 2007, 10). Ever 
more extensive brownfields are created by the ongoing process of de-industrialisation in CEE cities. 
Recently,  under  market  pressure,  these  valuable  inner  city  plots  are  being  rediscovered  and 
regenerated more efficiently. Many are turned into spaces for the cultural and creative industries.  
Urban  planning  has  also  changed.  Comprehensive  planning  was  abandoned  due  to  both  a  deep 
mistrust among the population concerning anything that was centrally planned or coordinated as well 
as a lack of funds to execute any plans (Stanilov 2007, 10). This has mostly left the reshaping of cities 
to private investors and developers.  
Indeed,  one  of  the  most  defining  characteristics  of  post-socialist  city  transition  is  privatisation 
(Stanilov, 2007, 7). Many assets such as housing, services, transportation and public space have been 
transferred from public to private players. Therefore the individual choices have multiplied in terms of 
shopping and leisure opportunities, types of housing or work place environments. More individual 
choice supplied by private investors was tailed by a trade-off: the state no longer provides all welfare 
benefits, services or eternal employment. These changes in society are slowly manifesting itself in the 
post-socialist space. More individuality was often paid by a loss of community facilities (Stanilov 
2007,  11).  A  lot  of  newly  built  suburbs  lack  public  services  and  open  recreational  spaces,  like 
playgrounds or sports tracks.  
In the cities of CEE, many governments were deliberately breaking with the past and effectively 
dismantled urban socialist heritage (Czaplicka, Gelazis and Ruble 2009, 9). Many city authorities are 
restoring the often derelict historic inner city architectural heritage. Thus in most urban areas the inner 
city is being slowly gentrified and renovated (Boren and Gentile 2007, 97). Local heritage helps create 
a unique local identity, which in turn supports the international image of a city and gives it an edge 
over other cities (Broudehoux 2004, 5). The desire to conserve cultural heritage arises from different 
factors including the economic potential attached to it, the psychological value in creating a sense of 
place and local specificity and the educational value that push people to preserve heritage (ADB 2008, 
10-11). Increasingly, however, the socialist legacy is being acknowledged as a part of the historic 
legacy of the formerly socialist countries. There are spaces of "communist nostalgia" emerging in 
many CEE cities, and communist heritage tourism is evolving (Boren and Gentile 2007, 102). In 
general, post-socialist cities have become increasingly entrepreneurial in promoting their cultural and 
economic assets in order to attract international investment, tourists and attention.  45 
 
These are just a few impacts that economic and political reforms have had on the urban environment 
of former socialist cities in CEE. There are many varieties of these spatial changes across different 
cities.  Part II of this thesis will describe the method how the socialist legacies in Beijing and Hanoi 
will be analysed.   46 
 
PART II:   ANALYSIS 
6. Method 
6.1 Comparative case study approach 
The previously described debates over the concepts of the socialist and post-socialist city have already 
touched  upon  the  complexities  of  drawing  international  comparisons  between  cities.  Comparing 
different cities is difficult, mainly because of historic context. However, it can be very useful to draw 
conclusions from the analysis of one city and formulate implications for other cities in similar context 
(Gough 2012, 865).  
Decades ago French and Hamilton (1979, 3) pointed out that CEE and Asian socialist countries are 
difficult to compare when it comes to urbanisation. Asian countries had a much lower starting point in 
their level of urbanisation when they entered their periods of socialism. Moreover, they claimed that 
the  culture  is  very  distinct,  whereas  the  culture  across  CEE  countries  has  common  origins. 
Additionally, strong ideological campaigns such as the Cultural Revolution in China and wars, like the 
Vietnam War further distorted urban development. It is clear that there are many differences in East 
Asian and CEE cities, because as already established, local context matters in respect to how a city is 
envisioned  and  produced.  Nevertheless,  due  to  Soviet  aid  there  definitely  has  been  international 
academic and hands-on exchange and the ideas of how to build a city according to socialist principles 
have spread. Hence, elements of the socialist city can also be found in East and Southeast Asian cities.  
Comparative post-socialist city research has been successfully executed in CEE countries. Therefore 
comparing two culturally not too distant countries in East and Southeast Asia seemed feasible. In 
particular, I wanted to analyse whether there are common post-socialist urban patterns in cities in East 
and Southeast Asia. There are several countries in the Far East that have socialist legacy in their cities, 
such as China, Vietnam, Mongolia, Laos and Cambodia. Laos and Cambodia have experienced short 
and tumultuous periods of socialism, in which there was little room for comprehensive urban socialist 
development. Mongolia was socialist for a longer period and under direct influence from Moscow, but 
its post-socialist reforms neither resemble the ones of China nor Vietnam. Moreover, Ulaanbaatar is a 
small city and there is little research available on its urban development.  
I have eventually decided to analyse China and Vietnam, because they share cultural roots and their 
approach to economic reforms has been similar. Both countries have tried to alter their political system 
as little as possible, while still introducing market reforms. The communist parties in each country are 
holding  on  to  power  by  decentralising  decision-making  and  encouraging  economic  growth. 
Furthermore,  in  imperial  times  Vietnam  adopted  concepts  of  urban  growth  from  its  northern 
neighbour. Several scholars have already compared urban development in China and Vietnam, due to 
the shared past and similar approach on reform.  
6.2 Comparing China and Vietnam 
Some comparisons between urbanisation in China and Vietnam already exist. For example, Mc Gee 
(2009) used his expertise of Chinese urbanisation to analyse how cities are developing in Vietnam. He 47 
 
argued  that  "allowing  for  the  cultural  and  historical  differences  between  the  two  societies,  the 
similarities  in  how  urbanisation  processes  in  the  two  countries  have  occurred  far  exceed  the 
differences" (McGee 2009, 241). He further emphasises that both countries have been substantially 
influenced by socialist legacy.
2  
Turley and Womack (1998) are comparing Guangzhou and Ho Chi Minh City on a  more policy 
oriented level. They claim that China and Vietnam are very similar, but still different in specific 
aspects of reforms and development and are therefore ideal for comparison: 
No country is more similar to China than Vietnam in terms of traditional society, revolutionary experience 
and post-revolutionary government. Yet it is equally obvious that China is not only much larger in population 
and territory; it is considerably more advanced economically today, and its state structure has had more time 
to develop organizational complexity and managerial capability. China also started the move towards a more 
open, competitive market economy earlier and from a stronger base, and it has experienced the most rapid 
economic growth in the world during the past fifteen years. All these differences together create a contextual 
disparity in which similar policies in the two countries can have different effects [...]. (Turley and Womack 
1998, 95) 
Furthermore,  historically  Vietnamese  cities  have  been  influenced  by  Chinese  urban  planning  and 
architecture. The Vietnamese and Chinese cultures are similar, because there was always a strong 
Chinese influence in Vietnam, which was a tribute state to the Chinese emperor for a long time. 
The  shared  past  and  similar  approach  on  reform  has  lead  several  scholars  to  compare  urban 
development in China and Vietnam. John Friedmann, for instance, compares peri-urban dynamics in 
China  and  Vietnam.  He  points  out  other  similarities  between  the  two  countries:  "Both  states  are 
dominated  by  communist  parties,  both  have  large  coastal  cities  surrounded  by  densely  populated 
agricultural areas, and both are undergoing rapid industrialization" (Friedmann 2011, 426). Moreover, 
the short time span and pace of urbanisation in China and Vietnam are fascinating. In 1949 only 10 
percent of the population of the PRC lived in cities (Leaf 2011, 529). While by 2011 this number had 
jumped to 45 percent and is expected to grow to 60 percent in the next two decades. Vietnam's 
urbanisation rate in comparison is lower at 30 percent, but is estimated to increase 3 percent annually 
(CIA World Factbook n.d.). McGee argues that although Vietnam's process of urbanisation has not 
been  as  fast  as  China's,  the  government  nevertheless  has  recognised  the  importance  of  urban 
development for international integration and economic progress (McGee 2009, 238).  
In short, by comparing urban China and Vietnam I am following a path that was already deemed 
viable of investigation. 
Comparing Beijing and Hanoi 
Beijing and Hanoi are good subjects for comparison with regard to Asian post-socialist cities for 
several reasons. First, both Beijing and Hanoi were little developed cities when the communists took 
power. The two cities received help from the SU in form of engineers, planners and other advisors that 
greatly influenced the local urban planning practices. 
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Second, I have also picked Beijing and Hanoi, because both cities are capital cities of their respective 
countries. They have a similar history in serving as their nation's capital. Since they are both capital 
cities their architecture was representing an entire nation and therefore is more pronounced than in less 
important cities.  
Third, neither city is the main economic driving force of the country, but both are important regional 
economic hubs.  
Fourth, Beijing under socialism is interesting to analyse, because it had been hardly influenced by 
Western ideas of commercialisation and architectural style before 1949 (Sit 1995, 82; Broudehoux 
2004, 16). Modern Chinese port cities that traded with European powers or were occupied by them 
received  more  foreign  influence.  For  example  global  capitalist  ideas  had  already  transformed 
Shanghai, Guangzhou and Nanjing (Sit 1995, 83). Shanghai got the British-inspired Bund and the 
French Quarter. Since Beijing experienced relatively little international influence before the 1949, 
Soviet ideas of the socialist city transformed the city tremendously. This fact combined with its status 
as symbolic capital city makes Beijing an ideal place to analyse socialist city planning elements.  
Fifth, Hanoi is the best socialist city to analyse in Vietnam, because the period of socialism lasted 
longer in Northern Vietnam than it did in the South. When the South reunited with the north, the 
political ideology had barely time to penetrate the political institutions much less the built environment 
in the southern cities before the doi moi reforms were introduced
3. In addition, unified Vietnam had to 
concentrate on curing wartime ills left in the economy. Hanoi therefore is a preferable example over 
Ho Chi Minh City. 
Sixth, the research for this thesis is based on secondary literature and a lot of visual material in the 
form of photographs and maps. Beijing has been more widely covered by urban researchers, than any 
other Chinese city, except maybe Shanghai. Materials about Hanoi were more sparse, but sufficiently 
available. 
Local Point of Departure- pre-communist Beijing and Hanoi 
The following section is a brief overview of the urban development in Beijing and Hanoi up to the 
communist  revolutions.  This  will  establish  a  baseline  of  different  local  pre-conditions  for  the 
development of the socialist city.  
Beijing Overview 
Like any city, Beijing is the product of many layers of history, which still influence the later functions 
and layout of the city. Some of the principles that are specific to traditional Chinese urban planning 
influenced how the Chinese city was imagined under socialism and how it still is today.  
Beijing is located in a strategic position on the edge of the North China Plain. It has been an important 
political centre since the Warring States period from 453-221 B.C, because it has access to agricultural 
resources and population living in the Eastern lowlands (Gaubautz 1995, 79). Moreover it was always 
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an important military base in the defence against the northern barbarians who frequently invaded the 
Chinese empire. Beijing like other Chinese cities was planned and built according to ancient Chinese 
city planning principles, which were based on the Confucian and Dao comprehension of the universe. 
The Chinese city represented a model of the ordered cosmos (Lo 1980, 143). It was an expression of 
Chinese culture, in which the emperor was the mediator between heaven and earth. Chinese cities 
were laid out in a rectangular form in which the main palace which was slightly north of the centre 
was facing south. The north-south axis was particularly important in Chinese cosmology. Traditionally 
the Chinese city was the seat of the bureaucratic administration. The rural-urban divide was much less 
pronounced than in Western culture (Sit 1995, 6). The urban centres were marked by grandeur that 
represented  the  cosmic  power  of  the  emperor.  Especially  the  capital  radiated  the  spectacular 
(Broudehoux 2004, 36). The palace was the seat of the administration and symbolised the emperor’s 
heavenly mandate. In contrast to European cities, the Chinese city was less important as a place of 
commerce than as a seat of administration. The importance of a city was determined by the rank of the 
bureaucratic official residing there (Sit 1995, 28). In this spirit, Beijing had never been a commercial 
centre. On the contrary, its infrastructure mostly served administrative and ceremonious purposes. Yet, 
imperial Beijing was highly specialised and functional zones for trade, craftsmanship and industry 
existed (Sit 1995, 24). 
Pre-1949 Beijing essentially consisted of palaces, temples, gardens and residential areas. The city was 
divided into neighbourhoods, which were made up of courtyard houses (Lo 1980, 131). The courtyard 
houses were made for a single family and surrounded by a wall. The importance of walls in imperial 
China is striking. They divided the countryside from the city and family from public areas (Gaubatz 
1999,  1497).  The  hutong,  which  are  narrow  alleyways,  separated  the  walls  of  the  courtyard 
compounds and snaked through the residential wards. Some hutong still exist today. The Imperial 
Palace and the Qianmen-Dazhalan market date back to Ming times, whereas the commercial and 
shopping area east of the palace and the university district in the North West were established under 
Qing rule. Quite a few of the uses and historical buildings survive until today (Gaubatz 1995, 80). 
Beijing's role as the political and administrative centre was reaffirmed in 1949, when the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) made it the capital city again (Sit 1995, 85). As the national capital of China, 
Beijing received more attention in its urban reconstruction than less important cities (Lo 1980, 133). 
According to Chinese thought, the capital city had to lead the country in all aspects of urban life. 
Hanoi Overview 
Contemporary Hanoi is the product of its time as an imperial capital, as a flourishing trading city, as 
the colonial capital of French Indochina, as a city under distress in several decades of war, as a 
socialist  development  project,  as  an  incubator  of  economic  reforms  and  more  recently  as  a 
battleground of globalisation.  
Geographically, Hanoi is situated in the Red River (Song Hong) delta. It has many waterways and 
lakes, hence some areas are prone to flooding. The most important lakes are Ho Tay (West Lake), Ho 
Guom or Hoan Kiem Lake. Horen argues that Hoan Kiem lake is the "spiritual centre" of Hanoi (van 
Horen 2005, 165). According to legend a fisherman caught a sword in the lake, which he later used to 
defeat invading Chinese troupes. He became king and returned the holy sword to the lake, where it 50 
 
transformed into a jade dragon. Hoan Kiem Lake hence is the "Lake of the returned sword". Many 
festivities and ceremonies are held on the spaces around the lake.  
The city of Hanoi is the oldest commercial centre of Vietnam. It was founded about 500 AD as a 
Chinese  military  camp.  Due  to  Chinese  occupation,  Vietnamese  culture  has  been  influenced  by 
Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism. This is still evident in the numerous temples, pagodas and 
shrines  all  over  Hanoi  and  other  cities  and  especially  around  the  lake  areas  (Horen  2005,  164). 
Furthermore education, architecture and urban planning in Vietnam are based on Chinese practices 
(Waibel 2001, 68). 
200 years after its founding day, it was named the capital of the Chinese protectorate Annam. Then the 
Ly dynasty made it the capital city of the Dai Viet (Great Viet) state around 1010 AD,  a position it has 
retained until today, albeit with short breaks. In 1802 the capital was moved to Hue by the Nyguyen 
dynasty. Subsequently, Hanoi's political role ceased and the structures of the imperial city were scaled 
back. In 1873, Hanoi was captured by the French and 14 years later, was made capital of the Indochina 
Union (Kurfürst 2012, 37). During World War II the Japanese occupied Hanoi. On September 2
nd 
1945, Ho Chi Minh proclaimed the independence of Vietnam on Ba Dinh Square. However, the war of 
independence from the French continued until the division of North and South Vietnam in 1954.  
Whereas Beijing was designed as a classical cosmological Chinese city, the changing powers that have 
ruled in Hanoi have always imposed their own vision and symbols on the urban environment. Kurfürst 
writes: “[...] power over the urban landscape of Thang Long-Ha Noi always lies with the state, first the 
monarchy, then the colonial regime, and finally the party-state” (Kurfürst 2012, 36). Central Hanoi is 
hence made up of three distinct historical parts that clearly show how different eras and cultural 
influences have shaped the city on the Red River: (1) the Ancient Quarter, (2) the French Quarter and 
(3) Ba Dinh area.  
The Ancient Quarter is an area around Hoan Kiem Lake that has been continuously developed for a 
thousand years. It is the historic core of the city and was the commercial and residential area that 
developed outside the palace walls (Surborg 2006, 243). The streets are narrow and winding and used 
to be occupied by different artisan guilds. Originally each street belonged to a different guild of 
traders, merchants or craftsmen, similar to European cities in the Middle Age (Waibel 2001, 62). The 
street names have not been changed and still reflect the guilds and their activities. Each guild even had 
its own place of worship. Some temples and pagodas truly date back to the eleventh and twelfth 
centuries, whereas most residential buildings where constructed after 1870 and already show some 
European decorative elements (Logan 1995, 329). A lot of houses are younger than that, because the 
Ancient Quarter was badly damaged in revolts against the French occupation. Moreover, the French 
administration  added  to  the  existing  infrastructure  of  the  Ancient  Quarter.  In  some  places  the 
traditional tube houses were rebuilt, roads widened and sidewalks added. The French also drained the 
whole area, thus the Ancient Quarter lost its characteristic waterways (Waibel 2001, 87). Merely, the 
street pattern was kept similar. 
Contrary  to  Beijing,  which  had  been  isolated  from  Western  urban  ideas,  Hanoi  experienced  the 
influence of the French colonial rule, under which it was an important administrative centre. Hanoi 
was a "consumer city" and trade centre under French occupation (Quang and Kammeier 2002, 377). 51 
 
Industry  was  limited  to  a  few  manufacturing  plants,  mostly  for  food  and  textile  production.  The 
French-built houses and boulevards to the south of the Ancient Quarter are referred to as French 
Quarter. Its main characteristics are wide tree-lined boulevards and spacious, neoclassical villas with 
gardens  (see  Figure  6.1).  The  neat  grid-shaped  street  pattern  and  many  buildings  still  evoke  the 
colonial influence. Examples of French architecture are the Grand Opera house, which was modelled 
after the opera house in Paris, or the Presidential Palace, which used to be the Palace of the Governor-
General of French Indochina (both in Figure 6.1). French engineers and architects also improved 
Hanoi's infrastructure by cleaning up the swamps and forming Hanoi's lakes to their present shape 
(Logan 1995, 330). 
 
Figure 6.1 French colonial architecture in Hanoi (Horen 2005, 167; Hanoi Today Blog)
4 
The third historic area that makes up central Hanoi is the citadel or Ba Dinh area. The ancient citadel 
was built in 1014 AD according to geomantic principles, similar to Chinese palaces and cities (Logan 
1995, 331). It was the seat of the Vietnamese rulers. When the capital moved to Hue, the Hanoi citadel 
only had military value and the emperor Gia Long replaced the earthen walls with Vauban stone. The 
French tore down the remains of the imperial citadel, in order to rebuild the area in a European fashion 
with the Governor General's Palace and other administrative buildings. The former location of the 
citadel is still visible in today's street pattern. 
                                                       
4 (top left). Colonial villa in the French Quarter, Hanoi Today Blog, posted by Simon Kutcher, 21 June 2010.  
(top right) Metropole, Hanoi Today Blog, posted by Simon Kutcher, 9 March 2012 
(bottom left) Horen 2005, 167 
(bottom right) Colonial building in the diplomatic quarter, Hanoi Today Blog , posted by Simon Kutcher, 26 August 2012 
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As  can  be  seen  from  this  analysis  Beijing  and  Hanoi  were  fairly  different  when  they  fell  under 
socialist influence. 
6.3 Geographical area of analysis 
Due to the sheer size of the urban agglomerations of Beijing and Hanoi, the geographical research area 
has been restricted to the modern inner city or urban core. The inner city usually refers to the city 
centre and a first, dense peripheral ring development. If we take the case of Vienna as an example, the 
inner city area would be everything located inside the Gürtel.   
The inner city is a good area of reference for two reasons: (1) it restricts the area of analysis to a 
manageable territory, and (2) the socialist city was meant to be compact, therefore most development 
was planned around the centre. Thus less socialist legacy can be found in the outer urban districts.  
The inner cities of Beijing and Hanoi are shown in Figure 6.2. 
 
Figure 6.2 The inner city areas of Beijing (left) and Hanoi (right) (Google Maps 2013, own modifications) 
Beijing  municipality  contains  19.6  million  inhabitants,  is  divided  into  16  urban  districts  and  two 
counties. It spans 16, 410 km² which is about half the Island of Taiwan. Beijing's urban structure is 
shaped  by  circular  ring  roads  from  the  second  to  the  sixth  which  connects  the  outlying  towns. 
Currently, the fourth ring road is the boundary between urban and peri-urban areas (Yang et al. 2011, 
1). The area within the second ring road is the Old City (marked white in Figure 6.2), as the second 
ring road roughly follows the now demolished city wall. For the purpose of this paper, I assumed Sit's 
definition that delineates the modern inner city as the area of 158 km² within the third ring road (the 
area in black including Old City area in white in Figure 6.2), which is 7.5 km from the city centre (Sit 
1995, 132; Ding 2013, 486). Quite some construction happened within this area from 1949 to 1978, 
beyond it was mostly agricultural land. Tiananmen is considered the actual city centre. Ding argues 
that  most  urban  infrastructure  is  centred  around  Tiananmen  area,  it  is  politically,  culturally  and 
commercially important (Ding 2013, 487).  
Hanoi  is  the  second  largest  urban  agglomeration  after  Ho  Chi  Minh  City  in  Vietnam.  After  an 
enormous  extension  to  the  west  in  2008,  which  incorporated  parts  of  other  provinces,  Hanoi 
municipality spans an area of 3328.9 km² and has 6.7 million inhabitants (GSOV 2012). The urban 
core area incorporates about 2.6 million people (VNO n.d.). Modern Hanoi can be divided into seven 53 
 
urban and five sub-urban districts. Ba Dinh, Dong Da, Hai Ba Trung and Hoan Kiem are the urban 
core (Horen 2005, 165). They make up what is referred to as inner city in this paper. Cau Giauy, Than 
Xuan and Thay Ho are the peripheral urban districts, beyond that are the sub-urban areas.  
6.4 Categories of analysis 
In the chapter on the socialist city, I have worked out five structural elements that have been realised 
in socialist cities. These five elements are the research categories. Their key features are summarised 
in Figure 6.3.  
Table 6.3 Summary of research categories and their general features in socialist 
cities 
City centre  
•  one centre 
•  political, administrative and cultural functions 
•  a large open space and wide streets for ceremonial purposes 
•  only little state-approved commercial activity 
Industrial sites 
•  sites often located on inner city land 
•  industrial zones  
•  spread out over the whole city 
•  abandoned sites were not recycled, but left as brownfields 
Micro-district 
•  planning unit 
•  self-reliant residential community provided basic services to residents 
•  close to workplace 
•  undifferentiated by functions 
Residential buildings 
•  standardised, prefabricated buildings 
•  modernist block design 
•  built in the periphery of historic city cores 
•  cheap quality materials 
•  5-15 storeys 
Architectural heritage 
•  mostly abandoned, demolished 
•  only embraced when it fit with political ideology 
•  no funds for maintenance 
•  dedicated to new functions 
 
The aim of my analysis is first to find out whether these elements were present in Beijing and Hanoi 
under socialism and in what form. Then in the next step I am going to analyse their status after the 
reforms in both countries. Finally, in Part III I am going to compare the post-socialist spatial outcomes 
in the two cities.   54 
 
7. Case A: Beijing, PRC 
This chapter will first outline the socialist transformation of Beijing between 1949 and 1978. The time 
span is sometimes also referred to as Maoist era. The transformation of the five inner city elements 
that have been described in previous chapters is the core part of the analysis of socialist Beijing. The 
second section of this chapter deals with changes in Chinese urban planning since 1978. The five inner 
city elements are then examined in their post-reform state.  
7.1 Socialist transformation of Beijing 1949−1978 
Chinese cities were thoroughly underdeveloped in 1949. Years of unrest had crippled the national 
economy, the population was poor and urban infrastructure could not remotely meet the needs of the 
urban population. Therefore the CCP wanted to modernise its cities as fast as possible.  
When the communists took power in 1949, the Chinese government viewed most cities as "consumer 
cities”. Much like their Soviet colleagues, the CCP made it its mission to transform urban China into 
“producer cities”, meaning that they devoted most of their attention to industrial development. This 
came at the expense of non-productive elements such as infrastructure and housing (Forbes and Thrift 
1987, 14). The classification of cities into consumer and producer cities underlined the importance of 
the national industrialisation project (Lo 1980, 132). The CCP distinguished between cities with no 
previous industry, cities with a modern industrial layout, and such cities with a moderate industrial 
base. Beijing and Xian belonged to the first category with almost no industrial activities whatsoever. 
Shanghai was an example for the second and Hangzhou an example for the third category. Cities like 
Beijing, which belonged to the first category, received the biggest make-over during the Mao era in 
China. Chinese socialist urban planners changed land use patterns dramatically, altered the physical 
form  and  function  of  buildings,  modified  infrastructure,  widened  roads  and  destroyed  historic 
structures such as the city walls (Lo 1980, 133). Beijing maintained its grid-like street pattern and the 
old city gates determined the main transport routes. Most of the urban morphology, however, was 
transformed according to socialist city guidelines. Obvious, visible elements such as street and square 
names were changed and new monuments that represented and supported the communist reign were 
set up across the city (Sit 1995, 85). 
7.1.1 Specificities of Chinese socialism that impacted urban development  
As  already  established,  socialism  varied  across  countries.  Therefore  depending  on  local  needs, 
governments implemented different development agendas. Some of the special features of a nation’s 
socialist doctrine impacted the urban policy making. China pursued rural-urban equality a lot more 
than states in the SU (Sit 1995, 86). This was in part due to the fact that in the 1930s and 1940s China 
was  mostly  rural  and  that  the  communist  revolution  was  based  on  peasants  rather  than  on  the 
bourgeoisie. This basic difference in the Chinese and Russian communist revolution had an indirect 
influence on urban policy-making in socialist China. 
In fact, 1949-China was a developing country that strongly depended on agriculture; subsequently 
food production became an essential component of urban development under socialism. Hence, the 
Maoist  development  strategy  was  largely  based  on  rural  industrial  development  and  agricultural 
collectivisation (Forbes and Thrift 1987, 10). The CCP invested in rural industry projects in order to 55 
 
minimise  the  distinctions  between  rural  and  urban  areas.  Urban  industry  partly  supported  the 
agricultural  activities  of  the  countryside  nearby  by  producing  agricultural  machinery  or  by 
manufacturing fertiliser (Lo 1980, 146). Furthermore, a large portion of agricultural land in Chinese 
cities produced vegetables and mixed crops (Lo 1980, 152). The city was, ideologically speaking, not 
the single most important production unit. The countryside was equally important, especially with 
regard to agricultural production. In sum, however, socialist planning affected towns in China in a 
similar  way  than  Soviet  ones.  Heavy  industry  and  more  extensive  manufacturing  were  also 
concentrated in urban areas. Thus Chinese cities still carried the modernisation process.  
In general, urban planning in socialist China followed economic planning, which was disrupted by 
several economic and political crises. Xie and Costa described the role of urban planning in China as 
follows, "[…] it is an instrument for implementing the nation's economic development programme" 
(Xie and Costa 1993, 104). Pre-1978 urban development in Beijing can be roughly divided into three 
phases (Sit 1995, 92):  
1)  1949−1957: Soviet advisors helped shape a new vision modelled after Moscow. Housing the 
new administration and starting to build up heavy industry was most important.  
2)  1958−1965: A period of explosive industrialisation followed. The Soviet experts were still 
vital in drawing up the 1958 general plan that influenced Beijing's development in this phase. 
The city was planned for up to six million residents. In the meantime economic hardship 
wrecked the countryside. 
3)  1966−1976: During the Cultural Revolution urban planning was anarchic. 
The urban planning phases in Beijing roughly followed general economic planning, which was laid 
out in the Five-Year Plans. The first Five-Year Plan (1953-57) stipulated that the labour force in old 
cities be employed in newly built industrial facilities. The existing physical structures should be used 
as  housing  and  public  service  amenities  (Lo  1980,  133).  Essentially,  just  like  in  CEE  countries, 
buildings were converted to fit socialist ideals.  
The second Five-Year Plan (1958-62) marked the beginning of the Great Leap Forward, which was a 
radical Maoist modernisation campaign designed to boost economic output. Economic development 
became  the  foremost  priority.  The  Great  Leap  Forward  aimed  to  eliminate  social  contradictions 
between rural and urban areas, between industry and agriculture, as well as between manual and 
mental labour. In short, the state wanted to create a wealthier and more equal China. During the Great 
Leap Forward, the government introduced people’s communes in Beijing to make it more socially 
equal and self-sufficient (Sit 1995, 97). The government abolished the specialisation of districts and 
Beijing's neighbourhoods were expected to be self-sufficient in food supply as well as in services. The 
expectation to be self-reliant in food production was a radical Chinese characteristic, not found in 
Soviet urban theory. Beijing's green space was turned into gardens, and the peripheral urban zone 
outside the newly built factories and residential buildings was used for farming (Sit 1995, 98). In the 
meanwhile, the rest of the country was stricken with economic and political chaos during the Great 
Leap Forward. Food output decreased and millions of Chinese people starved to death.  
General economic planning was disbanded until the third Five-Year Plan of 1966. In 1966, however, 
the Cultural Revolution brought more political turmoil. The Cultural Revolution was a notorious anti-56 
 
urban campaign during which Mao tried to create an egalitarian society by sending the young urban 
population to the countryside to turn them into humble farmers. At the same time, the revolutionary 
authorities  practically  abandoned  urban  planning  and  development.  At  the  height  of  the  Cultural 
Revolution in 1968, the Urban Planning and Administration Bureau in Beijing was even abolished, but 
reinstated four years later. As a consequence of the radical Maoist policy making, the revolutionaries 
sent  economists  and  planners  to  the  countryside  and  replaced  them  by  revolutionary  municipal 
officials who had no expertise in planning, economics or politics (Xie and Costa 1993, 104). There 
was no formal planning process during the Cultural Revolution, instead lay people applied anarchic 
substandard building methods and developers simply filled in gaps in the existing urban fabric (Sit 
1995, 101). 
The  political  and  economic  consequences  of  Maoist  policy-making  impacted  Chinese  urban 
development  to  a  great  extent.  Mao's  tumultuous  revolutionary  policies  also  created  interesting 
specificities in Chinese urban development. Chinese planners and architects did not have to bow to 
Stalinist ideas, but Maoism enabled them to construct more revolutionary spaces than in the SU (Bray 
2005, 124). The most striking consequence was that urbanisation in China occurred even slower than 
in other socialist countries, because it was disrupted by the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution from 
1966 to 1976. This is evident from the estimated rate of urbanisation in the 1960s and 1970s. Until 
1960,  people  moved  to  the  cities  to  find  work  and  the  percentage  of  China's  urban  population 
increased  to  19.7  percent.  During  the  Cultural  Revolution,  city  inhabitants  were  relocated  to  the 
countryside,  resulting  in  a  decline  in  urban  population  to  17.3  percent  (Friedmann  2005,  11). 
Moreover the CCP tried to limit rural to urban migration through the hukou or household registration 
system. Every citizen was assigned a hukou, which determined his or her place of work, residence and 
social services. Therefore peasants could not choose to migrate to any city without specific permission 
from the state, because they would not be able to work there. Essentially, the Chinese government did 
not allow moving around China to find a better place to live. Since workers were needed in the coastal 
cities, the Household Responsibility System was gradually relaxed in the last decades and migration 
was more or less quietly accepted by the authorities. Surplus rural labour hence migrated to the cities 
(Yang et al. 2011, 3). 
7.1.2 Soviet influence 
Beijing  in  1949  was  wrecked  by  years  of  turmoil  starting  with  the  warlord  period,  the  Japanese 
occupation and the following civil war. When it was declared capital city of China again in 1949, it 
was clear that it needed to be renovated and rebuild. However, according to Sit there were only about 
15 resident architects in the city. In order to fill this enormous skill gap, Soviet advisors, architects, 
planners  and  engineers  came  to  China  from  all  over  the  SU.  As  a  consequence,  Chinese  urban 
planning principles were largely adopted from Soviet practice (Sit 1995, 88). The early Soviet cities 
served as models for the reconstruction of urban China. In some ways Beijing is a more socialist city 
than  many  Russian  ones,  because  the  principles  were  applied  more  strictly  and  erased  previous 
practices more efficiently. Especially the linear city concept, the idea of concentric growth, limiting 
city size, land use zoning and the micro-district took root in Chinese planning (Sit 1995, 93).  57 
 
Soviet  influence  ended  in  1959,  when  political  relations  between  China  and the  SU  turned  sour. 
Moscow suddenly pulled around 1200 advisors out of China. However, their ideas still influenced 
Chinese planning until the 1980s and early 1990s (Sit 1995, 97). 
7.1.3 Urban planning in the Mao era 
Urban  planning  in  China,  like  in  other  socialist  countries,  was  clearly  driven  by  the  strategy  for 
industrial  progress  (Lo  1980,  143).  Tang  argues  that  due  to  a  less  centralised  planning  system 
compared to the SU, China’s planning investments tended to be more chaotic and overlapping (Tang 
1994, 398). Also a lot of projects were implemented outside the plan. Like in most socialist cities the 
form and function of Beijing’s physical environment were highly generalised, which meant that there 
was little specialisation of districts. Still, certain areas performed specific general functions, such as 
the government district or industrial areas. Yet, the city was in fact much less specialised than it had 
been before 1949 (Gaubatz 1995, 81). Other factors that influenced the urban planning process in 
Maoist China were the allocation and distribution of land, shared responsibilities between ministries, 
the administrative landscape and Maoist ideology.  
The Chinese socialist planners, influenced by Soviet and Maoist ideas, deliberately broke with ancient 
Chinese  planning  traditions.  The  Mao  era  urban  planners  were  especially  dissatisfied  with  the 
Confucian idea that nature dominated over man and man needed to conform, which forms the basis for 
the traditional cosmic Chinese city layout (Lo 1980, 144). They preferred the idea that man could 
conquer nature, which was rooted in the Legalist School. As a consequence of this philosophical rift, 
planners started to consider realistic geographic factors such as natural resources and availability of 
water. Hence, cities did not conform to symmetric symbolisations of the universe anymore (Lo 1980, 
144). Another ideological feature was the special regard for the capital city Beijing. Sit remarks that it 
was important to the CCP that Beijing, as the capital city, was the leading city in all aspects of urban 
life: industry, education, infrastructure, monuments and culture. Beijing obtained strong support from 
the central government (Yang et al. 2011, 3). 
The CCP coordinated its efforts in modernising China through the Five-Year Plans. A lot of internal 
reorganisation  was  needed  to  achieve  what  Friedman  describes  as  follows:  "Cities  would  be 
transformed  into  engines  of  production,  rather  than  remain  as  sites  of  decadent  consumption" 
(Friedmann 2005, 11). Industries were organised into work units called danwei. The danwei housed 
workers and factories and served as administrative entities as well as basic units in spatial construction 
in Maoist society. The danwei were "a collection of self-contained and spatially defined communities" 
and gave the Chinese city a special character (Bray 2005, 124). 
It is essential to understand how land is acquired and developed when discussing urban planning. 
Urban planning in socialist China, like in other socialist economies, was influenced by the shortage 
economy. Unsurprisingly, the communist ideology dictated public ownership. Land was a short-in-
stock good and thus needed to be equally allocated. State-owned land could only be used by the party 
that had been granted usage rights, and after the land was not needed anymore it had to be returned to 
the state. The user enjoyed no rights of alienation, such as renting to third parties (Tang 1994, 402). 
However, not all users needed the land that they owned usage rights to and thus resold the usage 
rights.  For  these  reasons  a  black  market  developed,  providing  an  alternative  channel  of  land 58 
 
acquisition  (Tang  1994,  404).  China,  like  most  centrally  planned  economies,  suffered  a  land 
inflexibility problem during the socialist era, because some developers started hoarding land that they 
did not use immediately. 
Another problem with urban planning and land development in China was that it included many 
stakeholders such as the central planning authority, the material allocation authority, the investment 
quota allocation authority, the land administration organisation, the construction unit, the municipal 
engineering department, private enterprises and the peasants (Tang 1994, 395). A high degree of 
confusion stemmed from the problem of shared responsibility between different institutions. Of course 
not all stakeholders were equal −ministries largely pursued their own agendas and the municipality 
had little say in the overall plan (Sit 1995, 90). The responsibility for the water supply, for example, 
was divided between the Ministry of Water Resources and Electrical Power that was responsible for 
water  conservancy.  Yet,  responsibility  for  purification  fell  to  the  public  utility  department  of  the 
respective city and the municipal engineering department maintained the pipes. All those institutions 
had separate year plans, which made coordination difficult (Tang 1994, 399).  
The  state  was  not  interested  in  comprehensive  city  development.  The  economy  was 
compartmentalised  into  various  ministries  and  institutions  which  controlled  plan  and  investment 
targets. The city itself was irrelevant, because it was the sum-total of individual state plans that were 
aimed at raising the economy. 
The state is interested in the city as a place to facilitate the discipline of enterprises. The city as an entity, the 
reproducibility of which requires separate attention and scientific analysis, never appears on the agenda of the 
state. As a corollary, the state prefers a system of land control mechanisms that allows it to discipline the 
enterprises – to administratively allocate and reallocate the right of use to meet all the requirements of various 
designated investment plans. Whether the city can accommodate all the stipulated land requirements and can 
continue functioning properly is never a consideration in the system. (Tang 1994, 405) 
Despite this laissez-faire attitude in planning, Chinese cities used to have an Urban Planning and 
Administration  Bureau.  This  institution,  however,  did  not  possess  the  power  to  coordinate  land 
development projects. Until the passing of the Land Requisition Law 1982 and the 1988 State Land 
Administration Law, there was no single entity in charge of land administration affairs. In contrast to 
industrial planning, Chinese land planning was not normative, meaning it did not have to meet targets. 
Therefore the agencies that controlled land allocation had no decision guidelines and reference points. 
Additionally,  land  was  practically  free  of  charge.  Only  if  it  was  clear  that  the  previous  owner 
depended on the land parcel for living and needed to find an alternate source of income, then a 
compensation fee had to be paid (Tang 1994, 406).  
To sum up, despite central planning, the overall land allocation and the use of land were leaning 
towards being anarchic (Tang 1994, 409). The next section will show how socialist city elements have 
been realised in Beijing in a more or less comprehensive way. 
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7.2 Analysis of inner city elements in the socialist era 
The following sections will show if and how the form and function of the five inner city elements that 
have been chosen were affected by socialist urban planning in Beijing. The areas of examination are 
the city centre, industrial sites, the micro-district, residential buildings and heritage conservation.  
7.2.1 City centre 
 
Figure 7.1 Map outlining Tiananmen Square, the Forbidden City and Wangfujing Street (eBeijing, n.d.) 
Imperial Beijing, as the capital city of China, was traditionally associated with administrative and 
political  functions,  which  were  always  more  important  than  its  commercial  ones  (Gaubatz  1999, 
1499). In imperial times the seat of the Emperor, which was the Forbidden City or Imperial Palace, 
used to be the spatial embodiment of this administrative and political power. It was surrounded by the 
Imperial  or  Old  City,  which  was  encircled  by  a  wall.  Under  socialism,  the  centre  remained  a 
monumental representation of power, but the canon was changed. In order to break with, but also to 
make use of the symbolism of the imperial past, the CCP built its own symbolic space of power. It 
constructed  Tiananmen  Square  immediately  south  of  the  Forbidden  City  (see  Figure  7.1).  The 
Tiananmen Gate, which is the southern entrance of the Forbidden City, had already become a symbol 
of the communist takeover since Mao had proclaimed the PRC from its balcony on October 1
st 1949. 
By using the historic gate, the CCP established itself as new ruling dynasty (Braester 2010, 156). 
Hence, it created both a break and continuance with the imperial past.  
Beijing’s  city  centre  under  Mao  had  a  distinct  Soviet  touch.  Tiananmen  Square  was  extended 
according to a plan of Soviet advisors, who argued that building within the Old Town instead of on a 
new site would save resources and money
5. Essentially, Tiananmen Square was enlarged and built to 
resemble the Red Square in Moscow (Gaubatz 1995, 81). The CCP erected the Great Hall of the 
People, the Museum of the Chinese Revolution and the Museum of Chinese History on both sides of 
the square. The buildings around the square were part of the spectacle of communist triumph and most 
                                                       
5 The debate surrounding the redevelopment of Tiananmen is discussed in more detail in the section on architectural heritage. 60 
 
were completed for the 10-year anniversary of the PRC in 1959 (Broudehoux 2004, 229).The wide 
monumental streets and boulevards that still cross the city centre are another distinctly socialist feature 
(Gaubatz 1995, 80). The CCP extended most of their widths to suit their parade needs. Changan Street, 
which separates Tiananmen Square from the Forbidden City, was dubbed the nation's most important 
street and was used for lots of parades.  
Tiananmen Square was a monumental space that existed outside the rest of the urban fabric. Officially 
its layout was only changed once after 1959, when the Mao Mausoleum was erected on its south side 
in 1977. The restoration of some elements of Tiananmen Gate in 1970 was even kept secret for 35 
years, so as not to disturb the continuance of power (Braester 2010, 152). The Tiananmen Square 
arrangement  fits  the  purpose  of  a  socialist  city  centre  since  it  houses  cultural,  political  and 
administrative buildings and monuments (Lo 1980, 134). The main government buildings were located 
near Tiananmen Square between the Forbidden City and the 2
ndring road. Especially the west of the 
Old City was repurposed as government buildings and housing for high political figures (Gaubatz 
1995,  81).  The  party  headquarters  and  other  administrative  buildings  were  located  around  the 
Zhongnanhai  Lake  area  west  of  the  Forbidden  City.  Tiananmen  Square  and  its  surroundings 
functioned as state and administration centre. Its form radiated power and socialist spectacle.  
The rest of Beijing’s central area held some hotels and state-approved commercial entities. Some very 
large hotels and embassies for foreign dignitaries, originally intended for Soviet advisors, were located 
in the East of the Imperial Palace (Gaubatz 1995, 91). The only commercial areas in central Beijing 
were Dongdan-Wangfujing and Xidan, which extended east and west from Tiananmen Square. Their 
primary  function  was  to  attract  domestic  tourists  and  be  a  sign  of  splendour  and  wealth  under 
communism (Yang et al. 2011, 3). Especially Wangfujing shopping street had been one of the most 
modern  streets  and  the  cosmopolitan  shopping  area in  Beijing  before  1949. The  popular  Dongan 
market, which was the main amusement centre in Beijing in the 1920s and 1930s, was located there. In 
1949 Wangfujing Street underwent a dramatic change. With the CCP in power foreign goods were no 
longer sold and gradually stores went out of business. Slowly state approved stores, which only sold 
staple goods, replaced them. Wangfujing remained an exemplary commercial area, albeit a socialist 
one. The first Chinese shopping mall opened there in 1955 and became a major tourist attraction. In 
1956 the Dongan market too was nationalised. Wangfujing area was ideologically whitewashed and 
even renamed into People's Street or in Chinese renminlu (Broudehoux 2004, 105). Yet, it is important 
to note that it remained in essence a commercial centre. The CCP did not break with the traditional use 
of the area. 
7.2.2 Industrial sites 
Beijing was a city with little industry in 1949. Only four percent of the total 1.4 million inhabitants 
were employed in industrial activities—a very low ratio for that time (Sit 1995, 91). As mentioned 
earlier, according to CCP thinking, the capital city needed to be the frontrunner in all aspects of urban 
life, which included industrial output. Therefore, in order to turn Beijing into a producer city, a lot of 
industry needed to be built. The first Five-Year Plan concentrated on starting an industrial base in 
Beijing, in which especially heavy industry was nurtured. In accordance with the plan, some large and 
some  super-large  SOEs  such  as  the  Shougang  Group  for  Iron  and  Steel  and  the  Yanshan 
Petrochemical Company, which both employed over 100,000 people, were erected (Yang et al. 2011, 61 
 
3). During the Great Leap Forward little attention was paid to the pollution aspect of factories. Thus 
harmful  factories  were  built  right  beside  residential  neighbourhoods  without  the  green  space  to 
separate  them.  By  1960  Beijing  had  already  been  turned  into  a  major  industrial  base  (Sit  1995, 
98).Industrial development stymied during the Cultural Revolution. While during the initial Five-Year 
Plans ten industrial districts were built in Beijing, only one new petrochemical complex was added to 
Beijing's landscape between 1966 and 1976 (Sit 1995, 166).  
The  allocation  of  industrial  land  determined  the  rest  of  the  urban  layout  to  great  extent  because 
industry needed a lot of land and residential areas were generally built nearby (Yang et al. 2011, 3). 
Influenced by the linear city concept, industry and housing was built side-by-side and separated with 
green space (Sit 1995, 93). The work-units were the project basis for industrial development, hence 
they were an integral part of running and acquiring industrial sites (Bray 2005, 143). 
[...] the industrial location trend in the 1949-1976 period in China's cities was to disperse industry widely 
throughout the city in order to foster the work-unit ideal by achieving integration of housing and factories and 
urban and district level-self-sufficiency. (Gaubatz 1999, 1503) 
However, because differentiated land use functions existed in Chinese cities, industrial complexes 
were not built at random (Yan et al. 2002, 42). This meant that planners designated tentative zones for 
industry, commerce and housing. Most of the industry in the 1950s was located in the then suburban 
areas beyond the second ring road. Today this area is part of the urban core. A lot of industry was 
grouped in the east and south of the Old City. This was done to minimise air pollution from the 
predominantly north and north-west winds (Lo 1980, 134). The Old City housed pollution neutral 
industries such as clothing, food or arts and crafts manufacturing. The radical period of the Cultural 
Revolution at the end of the 1960s brought forth a fair amount of industry in the historical areas, 
because everybody needed to engage in some form of productive activity (Sit 1995, 168).  
7.2.3 The micro-district or neighbourhood unit 
In  socialist  Beijing  the  spatial  micro-district  concept  was  implemented  on the  basis of the  work-
unit:"[...] spatial development was based on the concept of productive territorial complexes, to create 
manufacturing zones with work units (Danwei) attached to it" (Yang et al. 2011, 3). 
A danwei functioned as an administrative unit that provided employment, housing, welfare and health 
benefits as well as administrative services (Wang and Chai 2009, 30). Work and a place to live were 
thus always connected. Spatially the danwei was modelled after the micro-district. Each danwei unit 
enclosed about 30-60 hectares and 10,000-20,000 people (Sit 1995, 204). Yet, some resembled small 
independent cities with up to 140,000 people (Bray 2005, 146). The danwei compound was widely 
implemented  in  Beijing  with  the  1958  plan.  The  physical  danwei  unit  combined  enterprises, 
production facilities, dining halls, infirmaries and other basic services with housing. It was surrounded 
by a wall (Gaubatz 1995, 80). This is a Chinese specificity and has historic roots because walls in 
ancient  China  were  used  to  enclose  the  space  of  the  traditional  Confucian  family.  All  courtyard 
houses, palaces and similar structures were encircled by a wall, which delineated their realm (Bray 
2005, 145).  62 
 
 
Figure 7.2 Aerial view of a danwei in Beijing specialised in motorised tractor repairs (Bray 2005, 149) 
Figure 7.2 shows an example of a typical walled danwei compound in Beijing. This danwei unit was a 
motorised tractor repair station in Beijing. The open area consists of the repair workshop, tool sheds 
and other working space. The workers' dormitories are on the far right and front right side. The 
residential parts and working spaces are separated by a narrow strip of green recreational space. The 
black line encircling the complex is the danwei wall (Bray 2005, 149). 
Moreover, the danwei complex was closed to traffic (Sit 1995, 204). There was little expectation that 
residents needed to travel beyond their neighbourhood very often, as ideally their workplace and 
service needs would be met there (Gaubatz 1995, 80). The road network laid in socialist Beijing was 
based on this assumption and was not meant for heavy traffic (Gaubatz 1999, 1497). Several danwei 
compounds formed a higher hierarchical unit which was called 'residential district' and the unit above 
that was called the 'district'. The residential district and the district had shopping centres, theatres, 
cinemas and general hospitals (Sit 1995, 108). 
In short, socialist Beijing was theoretically divided into self-sufficient neighbourhood districts that 
each contributed to the overall productivity of the city. This is comparable to individually functioning 
cells that support a whole body. Metaphorically speaking, the city grew by adding new cells (Gaubatz 
1999,  1497).  All  work-unit  compounds  were  undifferentiated  by  service  functions,  however  the 
production facilities varied. Each danwei neighbourhood had to fulfil a different industrial task, so that 
essentially all production units were complementing each other (Lo 1980, 150). Even though the 
micro-district was supposed to foster community spirit, there was little sense of community or sense of 
place  in  the  rows  of  monotonous  apartments.  Residents  merely  used  the  shops  and  services  for 
convenience. 
In socialist Beijing, the micro-district was quite pervasive as a planning unit. It was applied mostly in 
new developments. Still, the danwei concept also existed in older parts of the city. Some used old 
courtyard houses to accommodate their workers. These older neighbourhoods were also governed by 
street committees and housed a few small production facilities (Gaubatz 1995, 80). An example for an 
early residential district in Beijing is Fengsheng neighbourhood which covered 1.5 km² and comprised 
of two main streets and 132 lanes. It encompassed 14,136 households and almost 53,000 people in 63 
 
1973. The neighbourhood was governed by the street residents committee who also oversaw seven 
factories, a household-service shop with eight branches, four kindergartens and a hospital (Lo 1980, 
149). Each district was supplied by a commercial service bureau and the danwei (Gaubatz 1995, 90). 
Another example of an early micro-district development is Sanlitun. It spanned 18 hectares, had a 
population of around 7,000 and an average building height of 4.7 floors (Sit 1995, 206).  
The Chinese danwei complex is a step further towards realising an equal socialist society than the 
Soviet mikrorayon concept, because it also has more administrative functions. Moreover, the danwei 
concept was very pervasive in Beijing and thus covered more people. It provided work and housing 
and was also supposed to be self-sufficient. The wall that divided the Chinese danwei complex from 
the rest of the city was a key difference in form to the Soviet micro-district. 
7.2.4 Residential buildings 
In 1949, Beijing was a large city in a developing country. It lacked electricity, clean water and sanitary 
facilities. Most houses were one-storey, single family Chinese-style courtyard houses (Sit 1995, 91). A 
lot of areas were slum-like. Many migrants from the countryside had erected self-built single storey 
make-shift  homes  and  sub-standard  housing  was  an  acute  problem  in  1949  (Gaubatz  1980,  85). 
Beijing under Mao suffered from a chronic undersupply of good quality housing.  
However, under socialism “[h]ousing was viewed as a right and a kind of welfare […]” (Zhu 2009, 
254). Therefore the state was responsible for accommodating most of the workers. Initially in the 
1950s a lot of housing remained privately owned and only rent controls were imposed by the state. In 
1958, all housing became publicly owned (Sit 1995, 203). Urban residents paid low rents that did not 
cover state expenses for housing maintenance during the socialist era. Subsequently the existing public 
housing fell into a poor state. Rapid population growth exacerbated the dire accommodation supply. In 
a misguided attempt to curb urban growth, apartment construction was deliberately slowed down in 
the  early  1960s  (Gaubatz  1995,  86).  Another  reason  for  the  dismal  housing  situation  was  the 
prioritisation of industry, because it caused a shortage of capital for housing construction. During the 
first Five-Year Plan the ratio between floor space for productive activities and residential uses was 
1:1.12, whereas from 1958–1976 it was at an average of 1:0.9 with the Great Leap Forward marking 
the lowest point at 1:0.64 (Sit 1995, 205). From 1949 to the early 1970s, about 20 million square 
metres of new housing were built in Beijing, which was twice as much as in Shanghai in the same 
period (Lo 1980, 147). Nevertheless, by the late 1970s, when people returned from the countryside 
after the Cultural Revolution, Beijing authorities were confronted with an even more serious housing 
shortage.  
Pre-1960s buildings were mostly three storeys or less. Exceptions were historical palaces and pagodas. 
New constructions in the early 1950s were made of wood and brick and mostly had one or two floors, 
because there was a lack of building materials and skilled labour to put up more permanent structures. 
The  situation  changed  after  1953  when  many  houses  became  standardised  concrete  apartment 
buildings and their height was raised (Sit 1995, 208). From then on most new residential units built 
under Mao looked remarkably similar. Government-built danwei housing compounds were physically 
uniform  and  “geometrically  repetitive”  (Gaubatz  1980,  87).  Most  Mao-era  buildings  were  cheap, 
rectangular  concrete  blocks  that  were  modelled  after  modernist  residential  buildings  in  the  SU 64 
 
(Gaubatz 1999, 1509). The average storey height in the 1960s was three to five. However in areas with 
adjacent  open  space  buildings  were  allowed  to  reach  up  to  ten  storeys.  Yet,  their  height  mostly 
averaged around seven or eight floors (Sit 1995, 94). 
Most new buildings were erected in a dense ring around the old city core. The western part was 
developed first, so as to house the many government workers that were employed in the administrative 
buildings nearby (Sit 1995, 208). Ideally the residential buildings were not only close to the factories, 
but also close to the communes on the city outskirts that cultivated the agricultural land and produced 
food (Lo 1980, 147). Workers’ dormitories were erected in the vicinity of factories —initially also 
around the historic city centre (Lo 1980, 136). This created a rather dense belt of housing and factories 
in the first periphery of the Old City. The dormitories were usually called workers' new villages or 
production villages and were part of the danwei complexes.  
7.2.5 Architectural heritage 
The conservation of historical heritage was not a priority of the CCP. Indeed, heritage was mostly 
neglected and abandoned due to a lack of funds for restoration and redevelopment. However, when it 
suited propaganda needs, cultural heritage was appropriated into the ideological canon. 
Especially interesting is the case of Tiananmen Square, which is used to be a forbidden space. As 
already discussed, Tiananmen Square was the new symbolic location of the power of the CCP and also 
the core political and administrative centre of Beijing. In 1950 there was a harsh debate between 
Soviet planners and the few Chinese architects living in Beijing, which were led by Mr. Liang and Mr. 
Chen (Sit 1995, 244). The Chinese architects argued for complete preservation of the old Imperial City 
within its walls, which ran along what is now the second ring road. They wanted to protect Beijing as 
a good example of a traditional Chinese city for future generations. According to Mr. Chen and Mr. 
Liang’s plan, the new administrative headquarters were to be established outside the western wall of 
the Old City on empty land. The Soviet planners, in contrast, argued that it would be more cost-
efficient and faster to repurpose some buildings in the Old City as offices for the new administration. 
In their opinion the old parts of the city needed to be modernised. Actually the Soviet planners literally 
considered "extreme respect for old architecture" a "major danger" to the modern urban development 
of Beijing in their formulation of the 1954 general plan (Sit 1995, 94). They suggested building the 
new offices and monumental buildings right outside the Imperial Palace, to the south and southwest of 
Tiananmen Gate. Mao decided to embrace the Soviet concept, which was modelled after the Red 
Square in Moscow. In extending the Tiananmen Square, the CCP disregarded the traditional Chinese 
city planning principles and clearly superimposed a Soviet concept−foremost because there were no 
huge principle squares or wide roads in the traditional Chinese city. Tiananmen was redeveloped from 
1954–1960 and embodied the new power of the CCP and diverted attention from the Imperial Palace 
(Sit 1995, 247). Changan Road and the new square were henceforth used for rallies and parades. The 
buildings  lining  the  square  were  designed  in  mixed  Soviet  and  Chinese  style,  but  very  strongly 
reminded of monumental Stalinist architecture in the SU. The pinnacle of socialist architecture in 
Beijing is the Hall of the People (Figure 7.3). The Mao Mausoleum, added at the south end of the 




Figure 7.3 (left) Tiananmen Square with the Memorial of the People's Heroes and the Mao Mausoleum; (right) Great 
Hall of the People (Beijingholiday 2012a) 
 Still, not all traditional Chinese customs were abandoned in the redevelopment. The traditional north-
south axis in Chinese city planning was kept intact with the design of the square. The Memorial of the 
People's Heroes marks the cosmic axis (see Figure 7.4). The memorial however was deliberately 
designed to be higher than the throne hall of the palace complex (Sit 1995, 247). Chaoyang Gate and 
the Jinlou archery tower were also preserved, whereas the rest of the historic buildings surrounding the 
square were demolished for new developments.  
 
Figure 7.4 Sketch of the Tiananmen Square redevelopment in the 1950s (Sit 1995, 248) 
With the exception of the huge Mao portrait hung from Tiananmen, the Imperial Palace remained 
more or less intact. Chinese preservationists were also successful in keeping the height profile in the 
Old City low. In the 1980s, a regulation on building height within the historic central area of the city 
was introduced to preserve its character (Sit 1995, 250). Therefore today Beijing has a bowl-shaped 
high rise profile, with the highest skyscrapers clustering around the second ring road.  
The socialist urban planners paid little attention to the conservation of non-monumental architecture 
such as traditional housing or the city wall. Practicality was prioritised over heritage and often the 
function of structures was changed. Old courtyard houses, which were customarily meant for one 
family, were subdivided and used as housing for workers. One such house could suddenly contain 40 
families. The distribution and upkeep was handled by the danwei administration. The houses were not 
only subdivided but also a lot of courtyards were filled in, so that even more people could fit into one 66 
 
compound. This practice destroyed many of the historical houses (Gaubatz 1980, 86). Sometimes even 
structures that formerly bore no residential use like temples and pagodas were converted into multi-
family homes (Gaubatz 1999, 1515). The ancient city wall encircling the Old City was torn down in 
order to make room for wider streets and to create a more coherent city landscape (Lo 1980, 134). 
Sometimes heritage was useful to the CCP's agenda. If that was the case, it was revived and used to 
lobby  for  the  communist  cause.  Thus  not  all  historical  functions  of  the  city  were  relegated.  For 
example  Dongtan  and  Xitan,  historic  commercial  areas,  remained  important  commercial  zones 
throughout the socialist period (Lo 1980, 150). An example for propagandistic use of heritage is the 
revival of the Yuanmingyuan site to the north of Beijing. Yuanmingyuan was the Old Summer Palace 
built under the Qing dynasty and was referred to as the Garden of Gardens. The vast garden-palace 
complex  was  looted  and burned down  in  1860  by  invading  European  soldiers.  In  1951  the  CCP 
invoked this tragic historic event in order to raise anti-imperialist sentiment to support the Korean 
War. There was, however, no money for restoration and the site was left to itself. During the Cultural 
Revolution it was occupied by communes that tore down the ruins and felled the ancient trees for 
building materials (Broudehoux 2004, 64). Only after the economic reforms started Yuanmingyuan 
was declared a national heritage park and turned into a major tourist attraction.  
7.3 Post-1979 transformation of socialist city elements  
7.3.1 Reform and Opening in Beijing 
The Third Plenum of the 11
th Central Committee 1978 marked a turning point for Chinese politics and 
paved the way for economic reforms and the transition to a market economy (Naughton 2007, 79). The 
last  radical  Maoists  had  been  brushed  aside  and  reformers  under  Deng  Xiaoping  rose  to  power. 
Reform and Opening (gaige kaifang) included gradual economic reforms and the slow transformation 
to a, in Chinese terms, socialist market economy, as well as the opening up of China to foreign 
investment.  The  Tiananmen  demonstrations  in  1989  and  the  ensuing  crack-down  stifled  global 
integration and economic development for a few years, but the wind of reforms picked up again in the 
early 1990s. 
Researchers speak of a two-part transition from a socialist to a market economy in China. First, the 
CCP introduced economic reforms gradually and loosened state control over resources. The gradual 
approach is in stark contrast to transition in some CEE countries that opted for a "big bang" transition, 
in which their policy-makers tried to abolish the whole socialist system in one big blow. China’s 
reform was slow-paced, which produced a hybrid system of socialist central planning and market 
reforms until 1996—a period, which is sometimes referred to as market socialism (Bramall 2009, 
550). Since then China has transformed into a market economy: 
[T]he  rhetoric  of  socialism  remains  and  the  brand  of  capitalism  which  China  has  established  is  better 
described as state capitalism than anything else; state intervention remains continues to pervade every corner 
of Chinese society. In reality, however, the language of socialism is being using to cloak the creation of a 
capitalist system as vicious and malevolent as anything that has been seen across the globe. (Bramall 2009, 
553) 
Naughton agrees that “the market is now the predominant economic institution in China” (Naughton 
2007, 5). He further claims that China therefore does not face the hurdles of economic transition 67 
 
anymore, but instead the problems of a developing country. Despite being predominantly a market 
economy, the state continues to meddle in some economic policies, which strongly resembles the 
notion of the “developmental state” that originated in reference to Japan (Wu, Xu and Yeh 2007, 11). 
The  state  prioritises  certain  branches  of  the  economy  in  order  to  strengthen  overall  economic 
development. 
The market economy is now the central element of the CCP regime. China is neither socialist in its 
economic policies—as the market is the dominant force, nor in its social policies. This has had direct 
consequences for Chinese society. In urban areas the state used to provide housing, health care and 
pension through the danwei system, a practice that was dubbed the ‘iron-rice-bowl’. As the state was 
shrinking after Reform and Opening, the state-owned-enterprises had to carry the major burden of that 
service provision which made them inefficient (Zhu 2009, 253). Consequently, a lot of enterprises 
decreased their social service spending and the iron-rice-bowl came to an end. This scaling back of 
social services and welfare provision, as well as in further consequence evicting people from their 
homes is against the socialist principle of the egalitarian society. "People now talk of the three new 
mountains which now rest on the shoulders of the Chinese people. Housing, hospital fees and school 
tuition are no longer covered by the government" (Broudehoux 2004, 141). Accordingly, the CCP has 
increasingly defined itself over nationalist rather than socialist values. Socialist rhetoric of equality is 
still  in  place,  but  modern  CCP  policy-making  is  predominantly  guided  by  market  principles. 
Moreover, consumerism is an important tool for distancing the population from politics and keeping 
them content and occupied (Broudehoux 2004, 10).  
Due  to  the  many  facets  of  the  reforms  and  their  multiple  social  outcomes,  Chinese  cities  have 
undergone a lot of changes simultaneously. The re-emergence of commerce  had the most instant 
impact on city life in Beijing. Little street traders emerged; stalls were built in work-unit walls and 
empty spaces. However, they had to move on as soon as construction started and the space was more 
permanently  redeveloped  (Gaubatz  1995,  90).  Beijing  was  awoken  from  its  monotonous  socialist 
existence at the end of the 1970s. Broudehoux describes the visual changes as follows: 
The  austere  landscape  of  the  socialist  era  with  its  quiet  vernacular  neighbourhoods,  starkly  utilitarian 
apartment  blocks,  and  horizontal  skyline  punctuated  by  fuming  smokestacks  was  turned  into  a  bustling 
metropolis, teeming with sleek corporate towers, sparkling shopping malls, and notorious traffic jams. On 
street corners, busy entrepreneurs clutching cell phones have replaced unhurried model workers gripping the 
once ubiquitous 'little red book'. (Broudehoux 2004, 2) 
The transition to a market-based economy has brought new wealth to Chinese citizens, which in turn 
has  created  new  discernible  patterns  in  the  arrangement  of  urban  space.  One  of  them  is 
suburbanisation (Yan et al. 2002, 41). Although in general the population is still rising in Chinese 
cities, there is a definite trend towards less people living in the metropolitan centres. In 1992 the 
population density in central Beijing was 28,360 persons/ km², whereas in 2009 it had sunk to 22,800 
persons/ km². At the same time, however, in most other parts of the city the population density has 
increased (Yang et al. 2011, 5). People have been moving to the suburbs because the environmental 
quality is better. The city centres became over-crowded and infrastructure and housing quality is poor. 
Some  residents  have  been  relocated  because  of  new  non-residential  developments  in  the  centres 
(Gaubatz 1980, 87). Since 1999 residents have also been offered financial compensation instead of just 
being allocated a new apartment (Broudehoux 2004, 130).  68 
 
Beijing’s suburbanisation was enabled through the increased use of cars. People who could afford a 
car did not have to live near public transport hubs anymore (Wu, Xu and Yeh 2007, 296). The use of 
private cars has created an enormous traffic problem in Beijing (Gaubatz 1995, 92). The subway and 
the ring road system, where most motor-vehicle transport runs, have given some relief. The second 
ring road was opened in 1987 and follows the old city wall. The fifth ring road, constructed in 2003, 
connected the key suburban areas and the sixth ring road, built in 2010, linked the main towns in the 
outer municipality (Yang et al. 2011, 5). Still, traffic in Beijing has remained terrible. 
The re-commercialisation of Beijing’s economy has created the need to build new spaces for business. 
Subsequently, there were massive redevelopments in the inner city. Albeit socialist Beijing was far 
from being an egalitarian city, social segregation is becoming an apparent problem. According to an 
interview that Broudehoux made with a resident, Beijing is becoming segregated again like in a pre-
communist saying: "'Dongfu, Xigui, Nanluan, Beiqiong' (the East is for the rich, the West for the 
nobles, the South is for the depraved and the North is for the poor)" (Broudehoux 2004, 133). The 
redevelopments in the inner city are pushing the poorer people into the suburban areas where they are 
farther  away  from  their  social  networks  and  workplaces.  Inner  city  redevelopment  mostly  profits 
people  with  money.  Especially  foreign  investors  have  a  lot  of  power  in  urban  development 
decisions—certainly more than the Chinese public. Despite socialist rhetoric it is clear that “[...] the 
Chinese state has ultimately privileged capital over the people” (Broudehoux 2004, 143). 
In  addition  to  the  internal  dynamics  of  reform,  external,  global  factors  have  been  impacting  the 
Chinese economy. In the 1980s and especially 1990s globalisation hit China like a tidal wave.  
After decades of international isolation, economic hardship, and ideological struggle, Chinese society was 
suddenly thrown into the maelstrom of world capitalism and exposed to new technologies, novel forms of 
consumption, fresh flows of ideas, and unique hopes and possibilities. (Broudehoux 2004, 8)  
Besides its move towards a market economy, there has also been a transition within the Chinese 
economy  from  a  secondary  to  a  tertiary  economy.  "Since  the  1980s,  in  an  attempt  to  meet  the 
opportunities offered by market reform and globalisation, China’s global cities have been undergoing 
a profound transformation from industrial to post-industrial cities" (Zhao 2010, 87). This means that 
knowledge-based  and  creative  industries  have  become  more  important.  The  service  industry  is 
booming, which is especially noticeable in China’s urban centres (Yan et al. 2002, 37). Beijing is 
competing with other large international cities in the global city hierarchy. 
7.3.2 Planning in post-1979 Beijing 
The  institutional  restructuring  brought  on  by  market  reforms  such  as  de-collectivisation  of  land, 
privatisation  and  the  establishment  of  a  property  market  and  land  use  rights,  have  changed  the 
dynamics of urban development in China. Planning has become a more interactive process with many 
stakeholders and investors, which is in contrast to the linear hierarchical structure of pre-1979 urban 
planning (Yang et al. 2011, 3). Nonetheless, the legacy of state socialism still provides the local 
authorities with a convenient system to interfere in market transactions (Wu, Xu and Yeh 2007, 16). 
Yet, urban planning has become more decentralised. Municipal authorities and local governments 
have  more  power  over  urban  development  than  they  used  to  and  therefore  development  is  not 
comprehensive  but  disorganised.  Currently  economic  motivation  is  still  high  on  urban  planning 69 
 
agendas, whereas cultural and environmental aspects are often neglected (Yan et al. 2002, 46-47). The 
added complexities have created new challenges to contemporary urban planning in China. The three 
main problems with urban planning according to Yan and colleagues are: (a) the heavy influence of 
multiple  decision-makers,  instead  of  planning  agencies;  (b)  planners  pay  little  attention  to  socio-
economic needs, but rather focus on physical planning; (c) the public has very little say in the planning 
process, so that public demands and the realities of planning do not match (Yan et al. 2002, 54). For 
example  danwei  and  other  administration  units  will  resist  inner  city  redevelopment  if  their  built 
environment is threatened (Tang 1994, 410). 
Indeed, when looking at new planning mechanisms, it is important to review the structure of land 
ownership in China. All land still belongs to the state and private users can only buy land use rights for 
up to 99 years. The land use rights however may be sold, rented or leased to third parties. Otherwise 
land transactions now conform to market bidding. Since the mid-1990s real estate business has been 
booming in Beijing (Yang et al. 2011, 3). 
Beijing city planners had to reinvent themselves and their approach to development after the reforms, 
because market-oriented development posed new challenges to the urban environment. Post-reform 
urban planning is not based on Soviet principles anymore and instead has found inspiration in Western 
planning traditions and strategies (Gaubatz 1995, 95; Ding 2013, 486). Planners have become more 
pragmatic and adopted a polycentric planning approach for Beijing’s vast urban area (Yang et al. 
2011, 15). Dedicated development zone planning has also become a popular planning tool in Chinese 
cities (Gaubatz 1999, 1505). Subsequently Beijing has been divided into spatial and functional zones, 
for instance an area devoted to function as CBD and special zones dedicated to industrial clusters.  
As already established, Chinese urban planning has reoriented itself according to market needs. In the 
1982 general plan, Beijing was newly defined as a cultural and political centre, yet not as an economic 
powerhouse anymore. The notion of retaining a high level of industrialisation in and around the city 
was  abandoned  for  the  first  time,  because  the  environment  had  suffered  too  much.  Social  order, 
cleanliness, education, technology, culture and economic prosperity dominated the new agenda (Sit 
1995, 102). This revised attitude is a big break with the previous doctrine that Beijing needed to 
occupy  first  rank  in  all  aspects  of  urban  life  including  industry.  City  authorities  and  the  central 
government yielded to practical evidence and acknowledged that Beijing and its environment were 
unsuitable for excessive industrial development. The 1982 general plan also indicated a shift away 
from  prioritising  heavy  industry.  The  1991−2010  master  plan  aimed  at  turning  Beijing  into  an 
international city with an emphasis on globalisation and preservation (Braester 2010, 286). The 2008 
Olympic Games were an important marker in this period. Beijing reinvented itself, in order to present 
the world with a spectacle and to showcase the city internationally (Braester 2010, 281). The current 
master plan 2004−2020 stresses sustainability and efficient infrastructure (Beijing Municipal Institute 
of City Planning and Design, n.d.). 
7.4 Analysis of inner city elements in the reform era 
The following section will take a closer look at what has happened to the form and function of the five 
city elements, which were analysed for their features under socialism in the previous section. 70 
 
7.4.1 City centre 
Before Reform and Opening, Beijing had one administrative centre, which was also the political and 
cultural  centre:  Tiananmen  Square  and  its  surroundings.  Besides  that,  the  neighbourhood  units 
provided everyday services. After Reform and Opening the situation changed dramatically. Nowadays 
there  are  several  financial  and  commercial  hubs  around  the  inner  city.  Beijing  has  become  a 
polycentric city (Gaubatz 1999, 1498). 
Nevertheless the central area, around Tiananmen and the Forbidden City, is still the civic and cultural 
centre of China. National and municipal government buildings and historically significant buildings 
occupy almost 90 percent of the area within the second ring road (Yang et al. 2011, 7). Despite it 
being located in the very centre of the city, Tiananmen Square has not become the economic or 
commercial heart of Beijing.  It remains, however, the symbolic centre of power and exists fairly 
detached from the bustling redevelopment in other parts of the city. It is still a monumental space that 
represents the eternal power of the CCP (Braester 2010, 152). Thus it cannot easily be altered. Since 
2004, Tiananmen is even an urban district in its own right. Braester reports that its police station was 
dubbed “[...] “the No.1 Precinct Station under Heaven” (Tianxiadiyipaichusuo)” (Braester 2010, 153). 
Nonetheless, not even Tiananmen Square has remained entirely untouched by the commercialisation 
of Beijing; it too is now lined with shops like McDonalds, KFC and advertising billboards. For the 50
th 
anniversary of the PRC in 1999, which was a big televised celebration, both Tiananmen Square and 
Changan road were tidied up. Hence all billboards were removed; trees and flowers planted; lights, 
statues and benches placed, buildings and pavements were renewed in order to project an orderly 
socialist image to domestic and international viewership (Broudehoux 2004, 164). While Tiananmen 
on the one hand represents power, it is on the other hand also a space of protest and resistance to the 
CCP regime (Braester 2010, 167). The best example for this is the 1989 Tiananmen protest. Besides 
being a politically contested space, the square is nowadays also used as an apolitical public space, 
where  children  fly  kites and  people  practice sports (Braester  2010,  175).  Finally,  Tiananmen  has 
turned into a significant tourist landmark in its own right.  
Tiananmen’s  form  is  fairly  static  and  there  has  been  little  change  in  the  general  political  and 
administrative function of the city centre. What certainly has changed in the city centre is the now 
unwavering presence of commercial entities and symbols of consumption. Many different kinds of 
commercial areas are required in Beijing’s market economy such as retail and office space. Especially 
between the second and third ring road, numerous new buildings for business activities have been 
established  (Ding  2013,  487).  Commercial  activity  is  also  reflected  by  billboards  overshadowing 
Tiananmen and Changan Street. Little booths and market stalls selling food and trinkets have returned 
commercial life to previously solemn government districts.  71 
 
 
Figure 7.5 Modern-day Wangfujing pedestrian shopping area (Beijingholiday 2012b) 
Wangfujing, Qianmen and Xidan, which are three pre-1949 commercial areas, located just outside of 
the traditional city gates, have been revitalised and sell all kinds of consumer goods (Gaubatz 1995, 
90).  Particularly  Wangfujing  commercial  area,  which  is  west  of  the  Forbidden  City,  changed 
dramatically after Reform and Opening. It retrieved some of its pre-communist commercial glory and 
became a tourist area full of hotels and little shops. In the 1992 master plan of Beijing it was partially 
redeveloped as a CBD (Broudehoux 2004, 106-109). However the renovation of Wangfujing into a 
CBD destroyed the informal commercial structures that were in place since the late 1970s.  
Renovation gave the street the sanitized air of postmodern shopping and entertainment districts now found 
around the world, whose sedate environment is engineered to create the best conditions for people to focus 
their energy on consumption. (Broudehoux 2004, 110)  
In the last two decades, downtown Beijing has been turned into a sterile CBD and mall environment 
by foreign capital. Street carts and temporary stalls or even the chaotic, outdated courtyard housing 
have given way to clean and tidy offices, huge commercial centres, luxury apartments and hotel blocks 
(Broudehoux 2004, 134). 
7.4.2 Industrial sites 
In order to meet market needs, Beijing has been de-industrialised, which has created spaces that are 
now often filled by knowledge-intensive and cultural industries (Zhao 2010, 73). Manufacturing is still 
strong in Beijing, but has shifted to ICT and high-tech manufacturing as well as to the pharmaceutical 
and automobile industries (Yang et al. 2011, 11). Aside from that, Beijing's days as a base for heavy 
industry are over. Instead of iron and steel works, knowledge-based services in finance, research and 
development, business, education and technological innovation are fuelling Beijing’s economy. Since 
the mid-1990s the booming service industry has needed a lot of new office buildings and space to 
expand. This newly arisen need is being satisfied by CBD developments. For example, the main banks 
and some financial services are located along the west of the second ring road on the Financial Street 
and the CBD in Chaoyang district, next to the eastern section of the third ring road, which spans 399 
hectares (Yang et al. 2011, 10).  72 
 
In order to boost recent industrial development, the government established designated specialised 
economic development zones to create positive synergies in agglomerating similar businesses (see 
Figure 7.6).  
The  zones  are  expanding  and  are  now  often 
called  economic  clusters. Not  only  have  they 
become  important  in  the  economic 
development of Beijing, but they also influence 
the spatial dynamics (Yan et al. 2002, 43). The 
success  of  the  economic  clusters  is  a 
combination of government incentives such as 
taxation, infrastructure and land as well as other 
financial  advantages  that  attract  firms  to 
produce  there  (Yang  et  al.  2011,  7). 
Development  zones  are  also  a  sign  of  heavy 
state  influence  in  planning.  Yang  and 
colleagues present an interesting argument that 
the concept of economic zones resembles the 
idea of the Soviet socialist productive industrial 
complex (Yang et al. 2011, 7). Although it is 
true  that  the  Soviet  city  was  planned  with 
specialised  zones  for  industrial  development, 
the important difference is that modern Chinese 
economic clusters are neither explicitly planned 
for  heavy  industry,  nor  with  adjacent  housing 
for  the  workers.  Now  the  issue  is  to  provide 
enough public transport and roads for the employees to reach the economic clusters (Yang et al. 2011, 
15). In Beijing, new industrial areas are developed in the south and southeast, particularly along the 
Beijing-Tianjin railway. Moreover the western suburbs are home to new industrial areas too. Early 
examples are the Shangdi Information Industry Base, Haidian Special Zone and the Fengtai Industrial 
Park  (Gaubatz  1999,  1506).  One  example  in  the  inner  city  is  Zhongguancun  Electric  Street, 
established in 1988 in Haidian district, which provides economic incentives for electronics retailers 
(Gaubatz 1995, 83). It has been expanded and is now renamed Zhonguancun Science Park (Yang et al. 
2011, 7). 
Post-reform urban planning has clearly departed from the idea that industry needs to be dispersed 
throughout the city. In effect, the location of industry in the inner city has had harmful effects on the 
environment. To counteract these problems, large-scale and toxic industries have been moved to the 
outskirts of the city. Electronics and motor vehicles have become the preferred industries because of 
their  lower  pollution  levels  (Sit  1995,  105).  Another  reason  why  industrial  plants  move  to  the 
periphery is the high value of inner city land plots (Sit 1995, 168). The share of industrial sites in inner 
city areas is in fact constantly decreasing. Industry is moving to the suburbs where the land rent is 
cheaper and more land is available to expand. “In 1980 the ratio of industrial landuse in the inner-city 
districts to that in the outer districts was 1:20.4, by 1989 it was 1:41.7” (Gaubatz 1995, 85). From 73 
 
these  numbers  it  is  clearly  deducible  that  industry  was  declining  in  inner  city  districts  and  new 
industry settled on the city borders. This was both achieved by relocation, but to a higher degree by the 
opening of new development sites (Gaubatz 1999, 1503). Moreover, when industry moves to shared 
locations in the suburbs, agglomeration synergies with other factories are generated (Yan et al. 2002, 
41). Despite deindustrialisation, some of the old industrial sites in the urban core area have been 
retained and gentrified. An example is the 798 Art District or Dashanzi Art District. The large 1950s 
military industry area was turned into a trendy space with galleries, studios, restaurants, cafés and 
other  cultural  industries  that  collectively  form  a  major  visitor  magnet  (Currier  2012,  184).  The 
industrial complex used to be one of the most modern socialist production facilities created under the 
first  Five-Year-Plan.  It  was  designed  by  East  German  architects  in  the  modernist  Bauhaus-style 
(Figure 7.7), and is thus now a historic landmark by itself (Currier 2012, 187). 798 Art District is also 
vital in the scheme of selling Beijing as an art-concerned global city (Currier 2012, 185).  
 
Figure 7.7 Gallery in the old factory buildings of 798 Art District (Phaidon 2012) 
7.4.3 The micro-district or neighbourhood unit 
The rather homogenous micro-district concept of the socialist era was broken up in the last decades. 
The planning focus is now on creating a city where different areas specialise in specific activities. 
Neighbourhoods or whole city areas are now specialised as CBDs, recreational or commercial zones. 
Nonetheless, the micro-district has persisted as a planning tool, albeit in a different form (Sit 1995, 
103).  Residential  developments  are  still  often  developed  as  residential  clusters,  now  called  small 
districts (xiaoqu) (Bray 2005, 176). An important difference is that their scale has gone up quite 
significantly. The big residential clusters can house 200,000 to 300,000 residents. Most of the large 
ones are constructed between the fourth and fifth ring roads, where space for large area developments 
still exists (Yang et al. 2011, 5). The difference to the pre-1978 danwei complexes is that commercial 
and service facilities are no longer community-oriented and concentrated in the centre of the district. 
Instead they are located at the entrances and exits thus creating an open service system that can also be 
used by non-residents. The existing danwei in the inner city have often transformed their enclosing 
walls into shopping areas by leasing space to private entrepreneurs (Bray 2005, 170). Residential and 74 
 
commercial uses are now mixed together to create adequate supply for the residents. Furthermore, 
industrial complexes are no longer integrated into these residential areas. Work and residence areas 
have  become  separated,  thus  creating  more  commuters  (Wang  and  Chai  2009,  38).  Commuting 
distances are often far because of the suburban character of these complexes. The socialist assumption 
that residents rarely need to travel beyond their own neighbourhood has proven to be the bane of post-
socialist Chinese cities because streets were not designed for the rambling amounts of private traffic.  
The danwei were still important as an administrative unit into the 1990s and in some cases still are 
today. Some have also remained major employers. Often businesses buy up apartments and then rent 
them to their employees, thus employment and a place to live remained tied together (Gaubatz 1995, 
88). However, the physical structures, meaning the enclosed compounds of the danwei have largely 
vanished from Beijing’s cityscape (Bray 2005, 176). Most walled work unit compounds have been 
demolished and replaced by modern high-rise apartment buildings.  
Quite often new housing communities are gated and protected by fences and security checks (Gaubatz 
1999,  1503;  Bray  2005,  177).  This  stems  from  the  fact  that  neighbourhoods  are  now  mostly 
economically differentiated (Gaubatz 1995, 93). Hence there is a perceived need to protect wealthier 
areas, which was not the case in a more or less equal city under socialism.  
7.4.4 Residential buildings 
As already mentioned, after Reform and Opening, Beijing faced a severe housing shortage at the end 
of  the  1970s.  Main  reasons  for  this  were  young  people  returning  from  their  Cultural  Revolution 
countryside banishments, increased rural-urban migration and children who had formerly lived with 
their parents had grown up, got married and needed their own homes (Gaubatz 1995, 86). Therefore a 
lot of new buildings had to be constructed. In the six years from 1977 to 1983, the newly constructed 
housing amounted to 46 percent of the stock built in the previous 27 years from 1949 to 1976 (Sit 
1995, 104). Between 1979 and 1981, 70 percent of all construction was dedicated to residential use 
(Sit 1995, 205). Often new residential areas were constructed in the form of large estates with houses 
in different shapes and price ranges. The problem of too little housing was also tackled by setting up a 
real estate market and selling public assets. In order to achieve this, the government set up a scheme 
called  housing  monetarisation.  “Housing  monetarization  refers  to  the  provision  of  direct  cash 
subsidies and allowances to urban residents by the government or work units in the place of in-kind 
housing distribution” (Zhu 2009, 256). There was also a secondary housing market for private flats 
and the number of private home owners increases steadily (Zhu 2009, 279). 75 
 
 
Figure 7.8 Old and new housing developments and the rising skyline in Beijing (Worldcrunch 2011) 
The  most  striking  difference  to the form  of  residential  buildings  in  the  Mao  era is  that they  are 
growing skywards (see Figure 7.8). High-rise structures (nine storeys or more) are replacing the old 
concrete five-storey apartment buildings, to make room for more living space. In the socialist era 
Beijing was the leading city in erecting skyscrapers, which seems odd when compared to present-day 
Shanghai. The first high rise with an elevator was already built in 1960 and about ten more were added 
until the early 1970s. In 1985, in contrast, one new high-rise was approved every 1.3 days (Sit 1995, 
216). Hence a new homogeneity of high-rise housing has been brought about by the development of 
new skyscraper neighbourhoods and the destruction of old ones (Yan et al. 2002, 44). Still, the high-
rise  development  took  time.  New  residential  buildings  in  the  mid-1980s  were  often  low-rise 
community-centred projects that tried to blend Western and Chinese architecture. The architecture was 
practical and box-like, but more varied than it had been in the monotonous work-unit compounds. 
Also, the apartments were equipped with running water, toilets and a kitchen, which had not been the 
norm before 1979 (Gaubatz 1995, 87). Recently, a lot of new developments in Beijing are mid- and 
high-rise projects with high population densities. In the suburbs, however, Western- or sometimes 
Chinese-style luxury villas have become popular (Gaubatz 1999, 1503). An example for an early inner 
city  apartment  complex  is  Fangzhuang  in  the  southeast  corner  within  the  third  ring  road.  The 
Fangzhuang site used to be agricultural land, which spanned 148 hectares and was occupied by about 
1000 farmers. It was redeveloped into a housing new town for 76,000 residents and covered with 
mixed housing styles ranging from two to 30 floors in height (Gaubatz 1999, 1503). 
Most structures today are high-rises and the buildings themselves are placed closer together, so as to 
achieve greater density in the urban fabric (Sit 1995, 214). In terms of distribution, the newly built 
housing  is  much  more  spread  out  through  the  city  and  not  just  concentrated  in  the  undeveloped 
periphery. Apartment buildings are not necessarily developed in a complex with others but also on 
their own, to fill gaps in the inner city. Despite that, overall project sizes for housing developments 
have increased. 
The trends in residential areas in modern day Beijing are densification of housing in the peripheral 
inner city, depopulation of the city centre to make room for office buildings, suburbanisation and the 76 
 
development  of  price-differentiated  housing. The  form  of  the  houses  is  architecturally  varied  and 
growing skywards. 
7.4.5 Architectural heritage 
Beijing's urban image and the collective identity of its citizens centre on the idea that Beijing is a 
traditional city. Especially tourists are lured to Beijing through the commodification of historic sites 
(Broudehoux 2004, 42). The importance of conservation and preservation of the environment and 
historical heritage in Beijing was written down in 1982 (Sit 1995, 102). The most important outcome 
of this early policy was a rigid building height restriction to preserve the low-rise skyline in the centre. 
Therefore Beijing has an unusual bowl-shaped height structure and a lower profile than other Chinese 
cities. Building height is restricted to 9 metres in an area of 6.8 km² that contains the Forbidden City 
and the Zhongnanhai central government buildings (Ding 2013, 486). However, it is economically 
unfeasible to restrict building height, because the lower holding capacities of buildings decrease the 
land value. Thus the city becomes less compact and more sprawled. Nevertheless, Beijing authorities 
have implemented these restrictions, because the conservation of the character of the Forbidden City 
and the traditional centre of Beijing is a national imperative.  
However, not all monuments and heritage areas are equally lucky. The preservation debate concerning 
less principle monuments only became more heated in the 1990s, when private developers started to 
commercialise cultural sites. One reason for this discussion is that heritage is primarily viewed as a 
source of potential economic value by both the state and private developers (Braester 2010, 117). 
Heritage  is  invaluable  when  promoting  international  events  in  Beijing.  For  example  the  Olympic 
Games, speeded up the commercialisation of heritage significantly. The urban restructuring for the 
2008-spectacle went hand in hand with cultural engineering (Braester 2010, 283). Gaubatz mentions 
that  conflicting  paradigms  and  priorities  plague  the  conservation  of  historic  architecture  in  urban 
China. On the one hand there is the will to preserve, protect and restore structures. On the other hand 
there is the financial pressure to redevelop areas in the inner city into more profitable neighbourhoods 
with high quality buildings (Gaubatz 1999, 1516). Yet, in reality historical architecture is mostly 
preserved when it serves the financial interests of the municipality. For example, the redevelopment of 
Wangfujing Street into a CBD required the destruction of several historic landmarks, such as elaborate 
mansions of the Manchu aristocracy, the Dong An Market and the Jixiang Theatre (Broudehoux 2004, 
123). Nonetheless according to Gaubatz, Beijing  municipality has been more sensitive to historic 
background of existing landscape when redeveloping than other cities (Gaubatz 1999, 1516). In spite 
of  this,  more  often  than  not,  the  fate  of  Beijing's  historic  land  marks  is  in  the  hands  of  private 
developers, because the municipality cannot afford to preserve them. Sometimes culturally significant 
sites are integrated into the new developments (Braester 2010, 134). In general, the restoration of 
individual landmarks has been prioritised over the preservation of entire historic areas (Braester 2010, 
112). One reason for this is that it is more cost-effective. Yet, the main reason among others is to make 
the city more compact by replacing low-rise historic structures with high-rises in order to densify the 
urban grid. 
Among the least lucky heritage areas are the hutong alleys and courtyard houses. Inner city land, 
especially around the Imperial Palace, has become so valuable that historic preservation was set aside. 
Some areas of old courtyard housing were designated for preservation, especially north of the Imperial 77 
 
City (Gaubatz 1995, 86). In 1989, an official survey estimated that 805 still intact courtyard houses 
were to be preserved. Conserving these justified the destruction of other historic houses (Braester 
2010, 112). Due to the extensive damage and the costly restoration of old courtyard housing, a lot of 
them were destroyed and replaced by new apartment buildings. The courtyard houses, which are still 
in one piece, often undergo far-reaching renovations. Rents rise and the original tenants cannot afford 
them anymore. The hutong and courtyard houses are a powerful instrument in city marketing, because 
people associate them with traditional Beijing. Braester underlines that as long as the courtyard house 
does not resist marketisation and modernisation, it will remain a symbol of Beijing (Braester 2010, 
115). In this spirit some areas have already been gentrified and turned into walk-in museums where 
the 'real imperial Beijing' can be explored (see Figure 7.9). An example is Shi Cha Hai hutong, which 
is one of the 25 hutong that are protected under the Conservation Plan for the Historic and Cultural 
City of Beijing 2002. Shi Cha Hai is now a popular area for leisure shopping and dining in historic 
atmosphere. Gentrification brought a level of homogeneity with other areas to cater for the needs of 
international and domestic tourists, thus it has lost its original character. "[...] almost each junction of 
alleyways  bears  an informative  notice  board  in  English  and  Mandarin,  the  walls  are  plastered  (a 
heritage of cleaning the area for the Olympic Games), the shop fronts display fashionable clothing and 
restaurants offer a variety of cuisines" (Gu and Ryan 2012, 27). 
 
Figure 7.9 (left) Redeveloped commercial street in Dashila and (right) undeveloped neighbouring hutong (Yang et al. 
2011, 11) 
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8. Case B: Hanoi, Vietnam 
8.1 Socialist transformation of Hanoi 1954−1985 
Vietnam was war-torn and divided when the communists defeated the French in 1954. The capital city 
Hanoi bore the typical bipolar character of a colonial city. On the one hand it had a quarter for the 
native population, which was the Ancient Quarter. On the other hand it had areas built up by the 
colonial power, which were the French Quarter and Ba Dinh area (Waibel 2001, 105). Hanoi's modern 
suburban areas were still very rural and the urban core was limited to these three historic areas. 
The initial Five-Year Plan for the development of North Vietnam included the building up of socialist 
infrastructure (Horen 2005, 163). Consequently, Hanoi was going to be changed according to socialist 
ideals as well and was supposed to be transformed into a producer city. Street traders were replaced by 
state outlets that were supplied by cooperative farms outside the city. The Vietnamese Communist 
Party (VCP) changed the colonial street names into Vietnamese ones. For example, the bustling Rue 
Paul Bert was renamed Trang Tien Street and transformed into a gloomier version as private shops and 
cafés vanished (Thomas 2002, 1613). In the 1950s, Hanoi had gradually started to transform into a 
characteristic socialist city. Its socialist modernisation path was, however, disrupted by war. 
8.1.1 Vietnamese specificities of socialism that impacted urban development 
Vietnamese socialism was heavily impacted by three decades of war from the mid-1940s to the mid-
1970s. For this reason the socialist urban development of Hanoi is characterised by wartime austerity, 
bombing campaigns and ensuing loss of population (Marr 2002, 326). The first decade of war that is 
significant for Vietnamese socialism is the First Indochina or French War (1945–1954). Although this 
war was fought before the separation of North and South Vietnam and the official period of socialism 
in Hanoi, it is vital to understanding urban development in Hanoi, because of the legacy it left in the 
urban  morphology.  During  the  years  1946–1947,  almost  30  percent  of  Hanoi's  buildings  were 
destroyed or partially damaged (Logan 1995, 337). The First Indochina War ended in 1954 and the 
country’s economy and infrastructure was in a bad state. Unfortunate for the development of Vietnam 
and Hanoi, the Second Indochina or American War started in 1955 shortly after the end of the First 
Indochina War. Vietnam was thus consumed by two more decades of war that lasted until 1975. Hanoi 
was frequently bombed during the American War.  
The  war  effort  created  many  peculiarities  in  urban  policy-making  in  Hanoi.  In  the  mid-1950s, 
especially after the end of the First Indochina War a lot of development efforts were focussed on 
rebuilding the war-tattered economy. In this context the VCP had an advantage, because Hanoi had 
already  had  a  useful legacy  of  colonial  infrastructure  that could  be revived.  Moreover,  when the 
French were defeated in 1954, all French citizens were expelled from Vietnam and their property was 
seized by state authorities. This brought the largest part of French-style villas in the colonial quarter 
under state administration (Waibel 2002, 129).  
The  VCP  also  had  to  be  pragmatic  and  consider  wartime  hardships  of  the  population  when  it 
collectivised land and housing. Often the acute needs of the population took precedence over socialist 
ideals. Between 1958 and 1960 most private property was turned into state property. Throughout the 
1960s almost all private land was transferred to collective ownership and allocated to cooperative 79 
 
factories  and  agricultural  production  units  (Quang  and  Kammeier  2002,  375).  The  formation  of 
cooperatives and collectivisation of land largely followed the Chinese model of socialism (Forbes and 
Thrift 1987, 105). In reality, however, some houses, land and small enterprises remained in private 
ownership. The reason for this was that due to war operations the state could not provide enough 
goods and services that the residents in Hanoi needed to survive. Hence, private entrepreneurship and 
property were tolerated on a small scale to service the population's needs (Quang and Kammeier 2002, 
379). The government turned a similarly blind eye, when turning private into public housing. In the 
Ancient and the French Colonial Quarter owners of houses were not expropriated if they exercised 
non-capitalist professions such as teachers, independent craftsmen or state employees. Yet, if they 
were in a more capitalist trade like shop owners, traders or pharmacists, at least parts of their houses 
were  seized  by  the  state.  Then  one  capitalist  family  had  to  share  its  house  with  other  families. 
Nevertheless, all people retained a part of the land use rights of their former house in their private 
possession (Waibel 2002, 121-122). The Vietnamese communists had to be fairly practical and lenient 
when expropriating private land- and homeowners, in order to keep the population motivated for the 
war effort of the Second Indochina War. 
As in many socialist countries, the VCP limited migration in order to restrict urban growth (Quang and 
Kammeier 2002, 380). The war was one reason for this was. Urbanisation and industrialisation rates 
were deliberately kept low during the American War, in order to avoid creating big agglomerations of 
industry and people that would be easy targets for bombs. As a result of US bombings, the North 
Vietnamese  government  decentralised its economy  and  moved  large  masses  of  inhabitants  out  of 
Hanoi, which actually lost population from 1965 to the end of the bomb raids in 1973. Between a third 
and a quarter of the population were evacuated and resettled in new industrial and residential areas 
about 40-60 km outside the city centre (Waibel 2002, 108). It is estimated that as many as 720,000 
people were evacuated from Hanoi in the early 1970s (Horen 2005, 163). However, as soon as the 
American War had ended, migrants from rural areas flooded the city in search of work and prosperity. 
Subsequently the population of Hanoi increased by 400 percent and severe overcrowding and housing 
shortages were the consequences (Logan 1995, 332).  
Regardless of the shocking number of evacuations and bombings, the Second Indochina War did not 
gravely damage Hanoi (Logan 1995, 331).  
Despite serious damages to the city infrastructure and economy, the bombing of 1965–1972 could not stop 
the economic development of Hanoi. The value of fixed assets of the material production sector in the 1966–
1972 period increased six times over the 1961–1965 period (HSO, 1984; 1989). (Quang and Kammeier 2002, 
378) 
The coastal port of Haiphong for example suffered a much grimmer fate. The most significant hit in 
central Hanoi was the railway station (Waibel 2002, 109). Only a few other major infrastructure points 
such as a radio station, the Bach Mai Hospital in the suburbs and the historic Long Bien Bridge were 
destroyed. Moreover, around 17,000 houses did not survive the bomb raids (Horen 2005, 163).  
Another peculiarity of Vietnamese socialism was that the northern and southern parts of Vietnam were 
on different levels of development. The American War ended with the fall of Saigon in 1975. After 
reunification there were major differences between the North and the South. The South’s industry was 
much  more  developed,  but  its  economy  had  depended  largely  on  American  aid,  which  had  been 80 
 
withdrawn.  Thus  the  VCP  prioritised  the  development  of  the  South  for  a  while.  This  included 
redeveloping the urban areas in southern Vietnam according to socialist ideals, in order to introduce 
socialist values to all Vietnamese people (Forbes and Thrift 1987, 122). Putting a socialist face on the 
former South was a labour-intensive task and many police and state employees were deployed from 
the North. As a consequence state control in Hanoi was more relaxed after reunification than during 
the war. Thus, private enterprise and the black market gained traction in Hanoi in the mid-1970s.  
Overall, Vietnam endured economic misery from 1976 to 1986. Especially between 1976 and 1980, 
the  government  focussed so  much  on  developing  heavy  industry  that  it  completely  neglected the 
agricultural sector, which led to severe food shortages (Waibel 2002, 124). Subsequently, due to the 
economic hardship of the country, most people needed to engage in private commercial activities to 
survive. It was estimated that right before the introduction of doi moi in the mid-1980s, roughly half of 
all commercial activities were conducted outside state channels (Waibel 2002, 126).  
8.1.2 Soviet influence in Hanoi 
Vietnam established strong linkages to the SU in the 1950s, which included economic aid and trade 
agreements, but also technology and knowledge transfers. The exchange waned during the American 
War. Despite having promised economic aid to Vietnam in the 1973 Paris Peace Agreement, the US 
did not deliver any help to the re-unified state. In 1978 the US government even imposed a trade and 
investment embargo upon Vietnam, which made economic recovery miserably difficult (Logan 2000, 
192). Moreover, Vietnam fell out with China over Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in 1978, which in 
response provoked a Chinese attack on Vietnam (Forbes and Thrift 1987, 111). For these reasons, 
Vietnam was inevitably pushed into the Soviet realm for development aid and international relations 
(Logan 1995, 332). In 1975 Vietnam and the SU signed the Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation, 
which re-established economic ties. Most Vietnamese scholars were educated in the SU –between 
1955 and 1990 the number of students amounted to around 22,700 people (Horen 2005, 163).  
In  addition  to  the  Vietnamese  planners  and  architects  educated  in  the  SU,  Soviet  planners  and 
architects shaped the urban form of Hanoi themselves. In 1965 the preliminary master plan for urban 
Hanoi was drawn up with the aid of Soviet experts (Waibel 2002, 119). Buildings such as the Soviet-
Vietnamese Friendship Cultural Palace close to the railway station, the State Assembly Building, the 
People's Committee Building, the Polytechnical Institute, the Hanoi railway station as well as the Ho 
Chi Minh Mausoleum and the Ho Chi Minh Museum were designed by Soviet architects and bear 
clear resemblance to monumental Soviet architecture (Horen 2005, 163). 81 
 
 
Figure 8.1 (left) Ho Chi Minh Museum (Geo Reisecommunity n.d.); (right) Hanoi Railway Station (TNH n.d. B) 
In 1965, the government adopted a master plan for Hanoi that had been worked out three years earlier 
by the Soviet architect Antyonov and a few Vietnamese planners (Logan 2000, 210). The plan meant 
to extend the city to the south, west and east, build new bridges across the Red River, and establish a 
new city centre between Hoan Kiem and the West Lake. However, its execution was disrupted by the 
bombings of Hanoi in 1965 and 1966 and the plan was largely abandoned soon after (Waibel 2002, 
119).  In  1973  a  new  master  plan  for  Hanoi  was  developed  abroad  by  the  Leningrad  Scientific 
Research  Centre  for  Urban  Planning  and  Construction.  The  Leningrad  Institute  had  previously 
designed successful plans for Siberia and Kazakhstan (Logan 2000, 211). This plan is also referred to 
as 'Leningrad Plan' (Surborg 2006, 244). It adhered closely to socialist principles of a vast and spread-
out  city  with  open  green  space,  public  transport,  specialised  industrial  areas  and  equal  access  to 
amenities. However, the city administration did not fully execute it because it failed to address the real 
problems of Hanoi that were lack of housing, lack of industrial facilities and infrastructure. Some 
details were realised, such as the airport that was built 65 km to the north of the city centre, which was 
unnecessarily far away for the spread of the urban area in the 1980s (Waibel 2002, 120). Furthermore, 
a lot of the Soviet-style housing estates and blocks, as well as large industrial zones were built in 
Hanoi's suburbs (Horen 2005, 165). 
Unfortunately both Soviet plans ignored the local specificities of Vietnamese culture and the needs of 
Hanoi’s residents and underestimated the available funds of the VCP (Horen 2005, 170). Hanoi simply 
was too poor to be turned into a thriving socialist metropolis. Soviet aid finally ended in 1991 with the 
dissolution of COMECON (Waibel 2002, 120). 
8.1.3 Planning in socialist Hanoi 
As already mentioned, urban planning was influenced by Soviet principles and disrupted by war. Like 
in most socialist cities planning in Hanoi also focussed on large-scale redevelopments. Most building 
projects were executed according to master plans that followed the overall economic agenda of the 
state to boost industrialisation. From 1954 to 1986 Hanoi's area tripled in size, although in a fairly 
uncoordinated fashion with little comprehensive planning (Waibel 2002, 120). 
According to the first master plan for Hanoi in 1962, a new centre around the West Lake with large 
radiating boulevards inspired by Haussmann's Paris was to be developed. Hanoi was meant to look 
like a fan, encircled by three ring roads that bore the brunt of the traffic. Yet, due to the American War 82 
 
the original form of the plan was never realised (Surborg 2006, 244). It was, however, the inspiration 
for future urban development in Hanoi. Its notion that the city centre should be kept between Hoan 
Kiem and the West Lake remained popular (Logan 2000, 210). The new centre was also supposed to 
incorporate Ba Dinh Square. The Leningrad master plan in 1973 was an entirely Soviet concept and 
hardly implemented. In short, it was too expensive and moreover it failed to address major problems in 
Hanoi, such as the tropical climate, flooding, overcrowding and the lack of financial means (Logan 
2000, 212).  
Planning  in  socialist  Vietnam  encompassed  five  stages  which  were  similar  to  Soviet  practices: 
“economic–technical feasibility study, general plan, development plan for a first stage, detailed plan, 
and execution plan” (Quang and Kammeier 2002, 377). They further explain: 
Given the cost and the time for the preparation of general plans, there was practically no detailed plan in 
urban areas. Urban planning often focused on new residential areas, neglecting the old city core and leading 
to dilapidation of old settlements. As private development was not recognized in the investment planning, 
neither land nor detailed plans were foreseen for privately built activities. During that period, city planners 
played an active role in the selection of factory sites, the functional division of urban land use, and the design 
of residential areas. In reality, urban planning often resulted in abstract plans without implementation (MOC, 
1995, p. 13). (Quang and Kammeier 2002, 377) 
Moreover,  the  issue  of  land  was  important  for  urban  planning.  In  theory,  after  the  Vietnamese 
reunification,  all  land  belonged  to  the  state.  Land  allocation  was  managed  through  a  central 
administrative body and “[u]rban land practically served as a free good” (Quang and Kammeier 2002, 
375).  
Urban  planning  in  Hanoi  during  the  war  was  sporadic.  Large-scale  industrial  and  residential 
developments were usually set far apart from each other in order not to create large areas that were 
possible bomb targets. Only after the end of the war urban planning became more comprehensive and 
sought to create a more socialist urban environment.  
8.2 Analysis of inner city elements in the socialist era 
The following sections will show how the five parts of the inner city that were selected as research 
objects of this thesis were affected by socialist urban planning in Hanoi. 
8.2.1 City centre 
Hanoi's city centre is not as easily determinable as Beijing's, because diverse political regimes have 
built different centres. The Ancient Quarter was the commercial and trading centre of Hanoi. The 
French colonial administration built itself a new centre in the French Quarter around the Opera house. 
The VCP decided to set up their political centre of power in the area of the old citadel in Ba Dinh (see 
Figure 8.2). 83 
 
 
Figure 8.2 Map of three central areas in Hanoi: Ba Dinh, the Ancient Quarter and the French Quarter (Google Maps 
2013, own modifications) 
The monumental city centre and historical seat of power was the area of Ba Dinh square to the east of 
the Ancient Quarter. The name Ba Dinh was selected by the mayor of Hanoi in 1945 to commemorate 
the defence against the French in 1886 and 1887. Prior to the socialist period Ba Dinh-area “was an 
uncultivated  plot  right  in  the  middle  of  the  French  administrative  district”  (Kurfürst  2012,  76). 
Originally, the space was occupied by the imperial Thang Long citadel which was the seat of the 
Vietnam's rulers until the French colonial troupes tore it down (Horen 2005, 166). The French built the 
Palace of the Governor General, the Finance Institution, the Registry Office and several ministries 
close to Ba Dinh Square, but did not actually develop the square. A plan to extend it, developed by 
Hébrard, a well-known French architect, was never realised (Kurfürst 2012, 76). 
The symbolic power of Ba Dinh Square stems from its historic significance for the VCP. It was in this 
spot that Ho Chi Minh proclaimed the independence of Vietnam from the French on September 2
nd 
1945 (Waibel 2001, 102). Indeed Ba Dinh Square was selected as the site of the declaration, because 
the square in front of the opera was deemed too small to hold the expected masses. Moreover, it was in 
the  heart  of  the  French  colonial  administration  quarter,  and  thus  served  as  an  act  of  "counter 
symbolism" to the old colonial regime (Kurfürst 2012, 77). Ba Dinh Square is thus irreversibly linked 
with the national independence in Vietnam. Nine years later in 1954, the state of North Vietnam was 
also inaugurated on Ba Dinh Square with Ho Chi Minh as its leader (Thomas 2002, 1617).  
After 1954 the square was redesigned according to socialist principles (Logan 2009, 88). Interestingly, 
the  socialist  government  took  over  the  east-west  axis  of the  French  colonial  administration. This 
represents a contrast to the classical geomantic north-south axis design, a practice derived from China 
that was common in traditional Vietnamese urban planning (Kurfürst 2012, 81). The VCP and Soviet 84 
 
planners redeveloped and veiled the square in socialist ideals. For example, a statue of Lenin was set 
up on one side of Ba Dinh Square. They also built Soviet-style architecture around it which included 
the  Ho  Chi  Minh  Mausoleum,  the  Ho  Chi  Minh  Museum,  the  offices  of  the  VCP,  the  National 
Assembly  and  State  Council  Buildings  as  well  as  the  State  Assembly  building.  “There  is  an 
overwhelming  sense  of  remoteness  and  formality  in  the  structures  [...]”,  according  to  Thomas’ 
description  of  the  square  (Thomas  2002,  1617).  The  square  itself  with  the  wide  boulevards  that 
surround it, was made to function as a space for large parades (Logan 1995, 331). At least 100,000 
people could fit onto the square (Kurfürst 2012, 81).  
 
Figure 8.3 Ho Chi Minh Mausoleum on Ba Dinh Square (van Horen 2005, 163) 
The Ho Chi Minh Mausoleum (see Figure 8.3), which was and still is the dominant structure of the 
square, was constructed between 1973 and 1975 and only completed after the end of the Second 
Indochina War. Yet, Ho Chi Minh had already died in 1969. However, because of the ongoing war, his 
proper  entombment  was  postponed. The  mausoleum  was  built  after  plans  by  the  Soviet architect 
Grigorievich Isakovich who used the Lenin Mausoleum in Moscow as inspiration (Kurfürst 2012, 39). 
However, traditional Vietnamese style-elements were also incorporated. The three-tier steps and three-
layer  roof  resembled  the  architectural  make-up  of  ancient  Vietnamese  residences  and  communal 
houses. Furthermore, the mausoleum was designed around the metaphor of a lotus flower, which was 
an ancient “symbol for beauty and purity” (Kurfürst 2012, 83).  
The VCP acknowledged the Ancient Quarter as the traditional and historic city centre (Surborg 2006, 
244). However, due to the nature of socialism, the Ancient Quarter lost its commercial influence and 
became primarily residential (Surborg 2006, 243). The traders were reorganised into collectives and 
then incorporated into state-owned stores for retail and food. Commercial activity was restricted to 
about 300 state and collective stores (Quang and Kammeier 2002, 380). Shops in better locations were 
turned into state outlets, whereas shops in less accessible locations were simply converted into living 
space (Waibel 2002, 121). Very few new buildings were erected in the old city centre during socialist 
times, with the exception of a small amount of structures for administrative purposes. 
8.2.2 Industrial sites 
Industrial development was financed through the state and foreign aid by the SU. The share of the 
industrial sector relative to the total economic output rose from 52 percent to 78 percent between 1960 
and 1978 (Quang and Kammeier 2002, 378).  85 
 
Starting in the 1960s, zones for heavy industry were built on the periphery of the old city. These zones 
revitalised North Vietnam’s industry and raised industrial output. Most zones were located along the 
main axial roads and their crossing with the ring road (see Figure 8.4). In general, industrial location 
was selected with regard to good access to transport routes, vacant land without tenants that needed to 
be resettled, and wind direction in order to avoid excessive pollution in the old city (Quang and 
Kammeier 2002, 379). 
 
Figure 8.4 Spatial distribution of industrial sites in Hanoi before doi moi (Quang and Kammeier 2002, 379) 
According to Soviet principles, each industrial zone was specialised in a certain industry. This is in 
contrast to Chinese industrial areas which tried to be self-sufficient and had workers live on site 
(Quang and Kammeier 2002, 379). Hanoi’s industrial zones were also a lot smaller than in Beijing, 
because large agglomerations of industry were easy bombing targets. The biggest zones reached about 
80 hectares. The industrial sites were dispersed all over the urban areas and the surrounding country-
side. Many were even located about 40 to 60 km outside the city centre, in order to be less easily 
detectable during bomb raids (Waibel 2002, 108).  
Eventually, in the 1970s and 1980s, after the end of the war, the VCP could finally devote all of its 
resources to developing the socialist economy. Investment in heavy industry was favoured. Post-war, 86 
 
pre-reform industrial development in Hanoi was carried out in nine large zones in the periphery of the 
old city quarters. Each comprised of about 150 factories (Quang and Kammeier 2002, 379).  
8.2.3 Micro-district or neighbourhood unit 
Similar to Beijing, the micro-district concept was also applied in Hanoi. Neighbourhood units were 
developed and located in close proximity to the factories (Quang and Kammeier 2002, 379). Thus the 
neighbourhood districts were also located in the periphery of the old city. The micro-district was, 
however, not very pervasive in Hanoi. The concept was very actively applied in the 'Leningrad Plan', 
which was never comprehensively realised (Surborg 2006, 244). Altogether only 15 micro-districts 
were realised in Hanoi. Yet, numerous smaller ensembles of residential apartment complexes were 
built in Soviet style as well (Waibel 2002, 118). The housing units of the micro-districts were grouped 
around  amenities  such  as  small  shops,  recreational  areas  and  educational  facilities  (Quang  and 
Kammeier 2002, 379). Most of Hanoi’s micro-districts were located near industrial sites in order to 
keep the travel time to the workplace to a minimum. Other residential areas, however, were often 
located far outside the city centre, which meant that residents had to travel long distances by bus. Not 
all areas were connected by public transport (Waibel 2002, 118). 
The  areas  where  the  Soviet  housing  dominated  were  south  and  east  of  Ba  Dinh  area.  The 
neighbourhoods were grouped together and connected with thin streets and alleys that were often too 
narrow for cars. The overall character of the areas was shaped by large and wide main streets or 
boulevards (Surborg 2006, 247). An early example for a micro-district in Hanoi is Kim Lien, about 4 
km south of the Ancient Quarter (see Figure 8.5). Other examples are Nguyen Cong Tr about 1.5 km 
south of the centre and built in 1963, Giang Vo in the west, Trung Tu to the north of Kim Lien and the 
district Than Xuan that was built between 1983 and 1990. Than Xuan was made up of prefabricated 
blocks and was meant for 17.600 residents (see Waibel 2002, 115-119).  
The implementations of the Soviet-textbook micro-districts in Hanoi lead to several problems. One 
was that the apartments were planned for nuclear families, rather than the extended family networks 
that were predominant in Vietnamese society in the 1970s and 1980s (Horen 2005, 168). The result 
was fierce overcrowding in the housing units. Other problems were caused by the building material 
and the way of construction. The prefabricated, concrete blocks were not designed for the hot and wet 
tropical climate, which caused early decay. Moreover, there was no money to restore and maintain the 
buildings on the side of the government, because of the low rent prices. Residents themselves were 
forbidden to make alterations or maintenance work (Waibel 2002, 118).  87 
 
 
Figure  8.5  Maps  of  Kim  Lien  micro-district.  (left)  Kim  Lien  Soviet  plan  of  1957,  (right)  reality  of  Kim  Lien 
construction (Marr 2002, 295f) 
The plan on the left in Figure 8.5 is the original design made by Soviet planners for the Kim Lien 
micro-district. The rows of houses are in orderly fashion. The white-striped areas represent green 
space,  the  grey  buildings  are  public buildings  and black  buildings  are  mostly  4  storey  apartment 
buildings.  The  numbered  buildings  are  public  facilities:  (1)  Primary  school,  (2)  kindergarten,  (3) 
restaurants and canteens, (4) hospital, (5) supermarket, (6) community and club house, (7) home for 
elderly. The plan on the right in Figure 8.5 depicts the actual materialisation of Kim Lien. The striking 
black areas correspond to unplanned densification through illegal squatter buildings and other make-
shift structures. The white-striped areas are also 4 storey apartment blocks. The crossed-white boxes 
on the right side are industrial buildings. The numbered buildings have different purposes than in the 
original  plan  as  well:  (1)  market,  (2)  clinic,  (3),  post  office,  (4)  bank,  (5)  hotel,  (6)  school,  (7) 
administrative services, (8) community and club house (Marr 2002, 295-296). The district that was 
actually built is much denser and the service facilities are not exclusively grouped in the central area 
of the micro-district. Moreover, there were industrial buildings integrated in the Kim Lien micro-
district. After its completion in 1976, Kim Lien suffered from severe over-crowding (Waibel 2002, 
116). 
8.2.4 Residential buildings 
Initially after the communist take-over of Hanoi, traditional one- or two-storey houses were erected. 
Only at the end of the 1950s the Soviet-style four- to five-storey walk-up buildings were adopted as 
preferred type of state housing. Prefabricated housing blocks only started to be used in Hanoi in the 
1970s, when the bombings had ceased and it was feasible to built high rise apartments again (Waibel 
2002, 116).  
Housing construction was generally financed through the state, but the government usually prioritised 
construction for military purposes over residential building (Waibel 2002, 111). Some people received 
subsidies for housing, in other cases enterprises or ministries provided housing for their employees. 
However, this was not commonplace like in Beijing. The provided housing was in accordance with 
socialist principles located as close as possible to the workplace (Quang and Kammeier 2002, 376).  88 
 
Despite some large-scale state housing projects, housing demand greatly exceeded supply in Hanoi's 
socialist period. Since there was not enough newly-built accommodation, the population density in the 
old areas rose drastically. Between 1954 and 1990 the average living space per capita dropped from 
6.7 m² to 4 m² (Quang and Kammeier 2002, 376). Hence, a lot of building went on illegally or 
privately. This practice was not encouraged, but tolerated out of necessity. In the French Quarter the 
wide spaces between villas and houses were filled in with make-shift buildings. Furthermore, the 
houses in the Ancient Quarter were often extended by a floor or subdivided into smaller units (Marr 
2002, 310).  
 
Figure 8.6 Soviet housing block in Hanoi (Horen 2005, 168) 
After  the  American  War  the  housing  situation  in  Hanoi  was  dire.  “Production  of  housing  was 
dominated by technical and economic considerations [...]” (Quang and Kammeier 2002, 376). With 
the help of the SU, the VCP built new prefabricated apartment blocks in the periphery of the urban 
core as public housing. In the old areas of Hanoi in contrast, hardly any new apartment buildings were 
erected  during  the  socialist  period  (Forbes  and  Thrift  1987,  126).  The  form  of  the  new,  cheap 
buildings was the block-like modernist style (see Figure 8.6). Most buildings were four- to five-storey 
walk-up buildings (Horen 2005, 168). Thus monotonous areas that looked like other urban residential 
areas in the  SU  or  China  emerged.  The  new  constructions  did alleviate the problem  of  too little 
housing  slightly,  but  soon  became  overcrowded  themselves  as  new  migrants  arrived  from  the 
countryside. Moreover, due to the poor quality of materials and building practices, most blocks soon 
became decrepit and unattractive (Logan 1995, 332). The housing blocks and their materials were not 
ideal for Hanoi’s climate, which led to more deterioration. Since rents were subsidised and thus below 
market value, the state had no revenue to sufficiently maintain them (Quang and Kammeier 2002, 
376). 
8.2.5 Architectural heritage 
The old city areas, the Ancient and French Quarter as well as Ba Dinh area, were disturbed very little 
by the socialist agenda of the VCP. The focus of urban development lay on advancing new residential 
and industrial areas in the periphery, rather than within the crowded old city. Hardly any land or 
structures in the old areas were changed, because the cost for the reallocation of the residents would 
have  been  too  high  for  the  state  to  pay  (Quang  and  Kammeier  2002,  380).  Moreover,  land  was 
available  and  practically  free  on  the  edges  of  the  city.  Nevertheless,  the  inner  city  architectural 
heritage suffered some consequences of the socialist regime.  89 
 
Like any new regime that comes to power, the VCP branded Hanoi with its own monuments and 
statues, to mould it into a socialist producer city. It tore down the colonial town hall east of Hoan 
Kiem  Lake  and  built  the  People's  Committee  Building  in  its  place  (Logan  1995,  340).  Another 
example is the Lenin Statue in a park on Dien Bien Phu Street. The statue replaced a monument that 
commemorated fallen soldiers of the French army (Kurfürst 2012, 39). The VCP also redefined the 
meaning  and  function  of  many  colonial  buildings.  The  Residence  Supérieure  was  changed  to  a 
government’s  guesthouse,  and  the  Bank  of  Indochina  was  turned  in  the  Vietnam  National  Bank 
(Kurfürst 2012, 41).  
Housing in the Ancient Quarter was and still is called tube housing, because the facade is only about 
two to four metres wide. Yet, the houses stretch to depths of 20 to 60 metres (Horen 2005, 165). Most 
houses are divided with one to three courtyards that bring light and ventilation into the house (Waibel 
2001, 65). Originally, they were designed for one extended family made up of different generations. 
However, in the aftermath of the First Indochina War, when people returned and migrated to Hanoi, 
four to five families lived in one house. In extreme up to nine families shared one such house. Hence, 
some of the inner courtyards were filled in, in order to provide more space (Waibel 2002, 127). As a 
consequence, the living conditions were bad and in some streets the living space per person had 
dropped to 1.5 m² (Waibel 2002, 127). Subsequently, the houses deteriorated quickly due to over-
occupation.  
Villas in the French Quarter suffered a similar fate. The state altered their function from single family 
residences to mass housing facilities that could hold around 120 people. The VCP had no money to 
maintain the buildings, thus their physical shape declined considerably (Quang and Kammeier 2002, 
381). The nicer villas were given to upper party-cadres who usually occupied one house per family. 
Some former residential buildings were used as administrative buildings. Only the function of those 
structures, which had been also used for socially beneficial purposes such as the military or education 
under French rule, was not changed (Waibel 2002, 130). 
The government had no means to maintain neither the tube houses in the Ancient Quarter nor the 
French villas. For this reason the old houses were not altered at all and remained in their original, 
albeit more dilapidated, state. “The survival of Hanoi's built heritage is one of the very few benefits to 
come out of this disastrous half century of economic depression, wars, crushing poverty, lack of 
foreign investment, and rigid, centralized government” (Logan 1995, 332). Since there was no foreign 
or domestic investment the government could not afford to replace still useful buildings with more 
modern  and  functional  block  high-rises.  Nonetheless,  a  lot  of  heritage  buildings  changed  their 
functions. For example temples and community houses were turned into kindergartens or cooperative 
workshops (Waibel 2002, 122). 
8.3 Post-1986 transformation of socialist city elements  
8.3.1 Doi moi in Hanoi 
At the end of the 1970s people were living below subsistence level and it was obvious that socialist 
modernisation did not bring the expected wealth and equality. Farmers thus started to set up private 
enterprises and produce less for the collectivised system (Kurfürst 2012, 45). These were at first 90 
 
tolerated experiments with market mechanisms. By the mid-1980s the poverty level in Vietnam was 
high, inflation rampant and economic conditions were worsening every year. Additionally the old 
revolutionary generation went into retirement and a reform-oriented leadership took charge of the 
VCP  (Horen  2005,  164).  Hence,  the  party  acknowledged  the  failure  of  the  socialist  system  by 
implementing the doi moi reform programme. Doi moi, which means renovation, was introduced at the 
Sixth Party Congress in Hanoi in 1986. It started with gradual economic reforms, but no real political 
change occurred. Private-sector development, opening the country to foreign investment and creating a 
strong export base were the main aims. The state allocation system was shrunk and thus a lot of state-
owned enterprises were closed and workers were laid off. However, some state-owned enterprises 
remained in business and are now often still state-owned or public-private partnerships. Land was de-
collectivised and redistributed according to market-oriented mechanisms. Price subsidies and controls 
were suddenly lifted in 1989. Essentially, market mechanisms largely replaced the socialist central 
planning  system.  Kurfürst  claims  that  the  reforms  were  a  sort  of  "state  initiated  capitalism"  and 
commenced the path to Vietnam's transition to a market economy (Kurfürst 2012, 45). On the political 
front, like in China, the party retained its monopoly. However, the party has been trying to create a 
sort of political plurality by incorporating the interests of many different population groups within its 
own factions (Kurfürst 2012, 43). 
Another consequence of doi moi was that political ties with the SU were cut and attention was directed 
towards other countries. The US-trade-embargo from 1979 was finally lifted in 1994 and allowed 
Vietnam's return to the international political sphere. Especially the integration with its Southeast 
Asian neighbour states was an important step for Vietnam’s economic development. Vietnam joined 
the ASEAN in 1995, which accelerated the opening up of its economy. Vietnam has also established 
special business zones where favourable tax and trade conditions apply in order to attract foreign 
investment (Painter 2006, 68). 
Modern day Hanoi is booming. It is one of the most dynamic cities in Asia and its economic growth 
rate  is  predicted  to  stay  around  7  percent  until  2025  (Waibel  2011,  48).  Currently,  industrial 
production  and  manufacturing  of  export  goods  are  still  the  main  pillars  of  Vietnam's  economic 
development;  however  the  service  sector  is  gaining  traction  and  is  increasingly  important  in 
supporting other primary and mainly secondary industries (Surborg 2006, 249). In order to boost the 
economy, Hanoi is orienting itself towards becoming a major export and service centre in Southeast 
Asia (Horen 2005, 170).  
The  reforms  also  had  important  social  consequences  that  have  substantially  influenced  the  urban 
environment of Hanoi (Kurfürst 2012, 47). First, the state lost its role as employer and provider of 
services and goods. Thus commercial entities flooded the streets to offer goods and services to the 
residents.  Market  reforms  brought  private  entrepreneurs,  small  shops,  street  vendors  and  trishaw 
drivers into Hanoi’s streets (Horen 2005, 164; Waibel 2001). However, the characteristic mobile street 
vendors are now again increasingly banned by the authorities (Turner and Schoenberger 2012, 1030). 
Second, due to more economic opportunities, not everybody was socially equal anymore. Instead, a 
very  wealthy  middle  class  emerged  and  thus  social  stratification  became  an  apparent  problem  in 
Hanoi. Moreover, a shift in national values occurred. Under socialism and especially during wartime, 
individual needs had been sidelined, as everybody needed to contribute to the collective effort of 91 
 
winning the war. After the introduction of doi moi and privatisation, individuality returned to Hanoi 
(Kurfürst 2012, 47). In addition to living this increased individuality, planers and architects have tried 
to tidy up and polish the Hanoi cityscape. Luxury buildings, five star hotels and gated residential 
complexes have been reflecting the increased prosperity in the city. Currently, there are also plans to 
redevelop Hanoi’s waterfront on the Red River into a glamorous international attraction (Logan 2009, 
92). Hanoi, like many large cities is trying to appear modern, clean, efficient and attractive to live in.  
The VCP has retained power in Vietnam, but had to adapt to the new market environment. The fact 
that Hanoi, at least in some places, is also symbolically changing supports this thesis. Until 1992, for 
example, a large portrait of Ho Chi Minh hung on the building of the State Bank in central Hanoi. It 
has been removed with the intention to acknowledge that capitalist values were the way to future 
economic development of Vietnam (Logan 2009, 88).  
8.3.2 Urban planning in post-doi moi Hanoi 
Around the introduction of doi moi the government realised that socialist central planning had become 
an  unfeasible  tool  to  develop  Vietnam’s  and  Hanoi’s  economy.  Slowly  the  practice  of  top-down 
master  planning  has  been  given  up  and  replaced  with  a  more  strategic  planning  approach. 
Furthermore, in hand with market reforms, the power of the central government has been diffused and 
local authorities as well as private actors have become increasingly important in decision-making 
processes (Horen 2005, 170). Initially, during the first years after doi moi, urban development was 
dominated by individual actors who sought to ameliorate their own living conditions. “With global 
integration and private sector development, a multitude of spatial producers entered the stage and each 
of  them  leaves  their  very  own  imprints  on  the  city's  landscape”  (Kurfürst  2012,  62).  Private 
entrepreneurs, the public, the government, and international investors all wanted to shape spaces in 
Hanoi  according  to  their  own  interests.  As  a  consequence,  in  spite  of  formulated  master  plans, 
planning was uncoordinated and authorities were overwhelmed (Waibel 2011, 50).  
An  important  factor  in  urban  planning  is  the  land  ownership  structure.  The  Vietnamese  land  is 
officially owned by the people and administered by the state, which in practice means that the state 
acts  as  land  owner.  The  ministries  of  Construction  and  Natural  Resources  thereby  control  the 
expansion and usage of urban land (Labbé 2011, 440). However, since 1992 land use rights can be 
bought, sold, mortgaged or leased to private entities (Quang and Kammeier 2002, 376). Land use 
rights are granted for either 20, 50 or 70 years depending on the use. After the lease time is up the user 
can apply for an extension (Law on Land, X-2908).  
Apart from the temporal restriction of the lease, Vietnamese land-use rights in fact are applied as if the 
land  were  privately  owned.  An  interesting  angle  in  Vietnam’s  land  market  is  that  the  state  still 
allocates the land or actually the land-use rights according to fixed prices. The owners of the land-use 
rights, however, can sell these according to market prices. “State allocation of the land to users is 
known as the primary land market, whilst the transfer of land among users forms the secondary land 
market” (Han and Vu 2008, 1105). This two-tier land pricing system has led to exorbitant speculation 
and skyrocketing land prices in Hanoi. Absurdly, land rents in the city centre of Hanoi are among the 
highest world-wide, due to extreme land scarcity. Rents in central locations are comparable with prices 92 
 
in Paris or London (ADB 2008, 34). Therefore developers choose to move their projects to the new 
western suburbs. 
Planners  have  to  cope  with  fast  growth  in  post-reform  Hanoi.  Due  to  the  increased  employment 
opportunities, a lot of people migrate to the cities from the countryside. “The urbanisation process has 
reflected the economic policy, resulting in rapid increases in urban population and urban built-up 
areas” (Han and Vu 2008, 1098). Cities are growing so fast in Vietnam that legislative and regulatory 
frameworks cannot keep up. Instead they tackle environmental problems only after they occur instead 
of preventing them (Forrest 2009, 293).  
Due to over-crowding in the urban core, Hanoi municipality annexed its neighbouring provinces in the 
West in 2008, which tripled the size of the urban area. Reasons behind this were cheap land prices in 
the urban fringe, scarcity of undeveloped land in the core urban area and better planning possibilities 
for the peripheral land. The authorities in Hanoi can now control and locate development projects 
more easily (Waibel 2011, 48). This means that a lot of former villages and rural communities are 
being swallowed by the city. Often the local residents have little choice but to adapt or relocate. Since 
land is state owned, every now and then issues concerning evictions of residents emerge. The state and 
developers often form coalitions against the residents. In contrast to China, where local authorities and 
residents frequently put up violent and highly publicised fights, Vietnamese evictions are generally 
less tumultuous (Han and Vu 2008, 1099). Moreover, since the early 1990s with modifications in 
2003, there are laws for compensation in which the residents get about 70 to 80 percent of the market 
value of their land (Han and Vu 2008, 1107). Breaking up and redeveloping Hanoi’s many urban 
villages into mixed use high-rise areas leads to increased social conflict with the population (see 
Labbé 2011).  
In  order  to  mitigate  Hanoi's  environmental  and  overcrowding  problems,  the  current  master  plan 
“Hanoi Capital Construction Master Plan to 2030 and vision to 2050” thus concentrates on sustainable 
development, relieving the crowded transport arteries and turning Hanoi into a “green city” (Dang 
2010). It focuses on relieving the crowded inner city by establishing development zones for residence 
and industry in the urban periphery (Waibel 2011, 51). Hanoi is aiming to become Southeast Asia’s 
first sustainable city.  
8.4 Analysis of inner city elements in the reform era 
The following section will take a closer look at what has happened to the form and function of the city 
elements that have already been analysed in socialist Hanoi in the previous chapter. 
8.4.1 City centre 
“Hanoi’s central area is fast becoming a dynamic scene of business activity, reducing its previous 
planned residential and administrative profile” (Quang and Kammeier 2002, 384). The central areas 
have certainly become more compact and densely built up since doi moi. In order to avoid human 
resettlement costs, foreign developers have filled in open spaces, converted former industrial lots or 
public buildings for new high-rise developments (Quang and Kammeier 2002, 384). Residential use is 
going down as rents become too expensive. Commercial floor space takes its place.  93 
 
Doi  moi  policies  have  revived  the  Ancient  Quarter  and  restored  its  original  commercial  function 
(Quang and Kammeier 2002, 384). It now attracts tourists and leisure seekers with small businesses, 
cheap hotels and artisan shops. The economic reforms have allowed citizens more autonomy and 
many have used it to set up informal buildings structures or house extensions in the central areas of the 
city, mostly for entrepreneurial purposes (Surborg 2006, 243). Altogether there is more individual 
choice than before. An obvious change in the Ancient Quarter is that many residents have become 
entrepreneurs and have converted their homes into small hotels with four or five storeys (Quang and 
Kammeier 2002, 384). Usually this has been done by illegally extending the houses. The downsides of 
the economic reforms in the Ancient Quarter are increased social stratification and the appearance of 
slums, due to over-crowding and poor housing maintenance. Population density in the Ancient Quarter 
had  risen  to  an  unbearable  1.5m²  per  inhabitant  in  the  mid-1980s,  leaving  municipal  authorities 
concerned (Horen 2005, 163). Since then however, many residents have moved into the less crowded 
suburbs. A recent development in Hanoi that affects the commercial bustle of the old areas is the 
cleaning up of the city's sidewalks. Street traders and little pavement shops are increasingly being 
banned by the municipal authorities, in order to transmit a modern and clean image of Hanoi to the 
world (Kurfürst 2012, 108).  
Ba Dinh Square is still the “politically symbolic center of the city” (Thomas 2002, 1617). Logan 
claims the fact that the Lenin statue is still standing in present-day Hanoi is a monument to the VCP’s 
unfaltering resistance to political change (Logan 2000, 198). The Vietnamese flag on the flagpole in 
the square is still hoisted every day at 6 am and lowered at 9 pm (Kurfürst 2012, 81). Moreover, Ba 
Dinh Square has remained a space of worship for Ho Chi Minh (Kurfürst 2012, 89). Besides that, it is 
still used to stage state spectacles. In this function it was the centre of attention at the 1000 year 
celebration  of  Hanoi's  history  in  2010.  Moreover,  with  its  mix  of  socialist  and  French-colonial 
architecture, it has become an attraction for visitors.  
Now, however, Ba Dinh Square is also used as an apolitical public space. According to Kurfürst, there 
is an apparent shift in the use of the square after doi moi, because the citizens of Hanoi increasingly 
appropriate the space for their own needs (Kurfürst 2012, 84). Ba Dinh Square is divided into a 
concrete-covered part and an area of 168 grass squares that are each separated by 1.4 metres wide 
lanes.  It  is forbidden to  step  on  the  grass  and  there  are  guards  to  ensure  this  rule is  not broken 
(Kurfürst 2012, 81). Since it is a flat, rather large open space, joggers, skaters, taichi practitioners and 
so forth make use of it for their pleasure, whereas in socialist times people simply came to celebrate 
the state (Thomas 2002, 1612). However, the leisurely use of the space is restricted during opening 
times  of  the  mausoleum  and  the  everyday  activities  of  visitors  are  disrupted  by  the  raising  and 
lowering of the flag in the morning and evening.  
Ba  Dinh  area  is  still  the most  important  administrative  and  political  space  in  the  city  and  many 
embassies and ministries are located there. Due to its lasting symbolic status as the seat of power of 
the VCP, Ba Dinh Square is a monument in itself and is fairly safe from redevelopment (Horen 2005, 
167). There was one exception in 2008, however, when the State Assembly or Ba Dinh Hall was torn 
down, in order to build a larger more modern building.  
Other parts of Hanoi besides Ba Dinh have experienced a commercial and entertainment facelift since 
doi moi. Hoan Kiem Lake area has been transformed into a fashionable recreational zone with many 94 
 
international restaurants (Surborg 2006, 245). The French Quarter too has been commercially revived 
and has turned into the most expensive area in the city (Quang and Kammeier 2002, 384). The French 
Quarter has attracted foreign investment and thus become the acting CBD of Hanoi. Particularly, the 
area around the Opera House is the core of the CDB-isation (Surborg 2006, 249). Many international 
companies  have  set  up  their  offices  and  headquarters  in  the  spacious  French-style  villas  and 
constructed new glitzy offices and international hotel chains in the rest of the French Quarter.  
Other areas of Hanoi have also adopted important CBD functions. Since there is little space in the 
central historic areas of the city, different urban centres are being built outside the historic urban core 
in convenient proximity to major transport arteries. Municipal authorities are planning to develop a 
new CBD area around the West Lake. Another example is a new political and administration centre 
with CBD properties around Keangnam Hanoi Landmark Tower. Existing structures there include the 
Hanoi  Museum,  the  National  Archive  and  the  National  Congress  Centre.  Luxury  hotels,  office 
buildings, sport and leisure facilities as well as large residential areas are situated there too. Moreover, 
the important Thang Long highway passes through, providing easy access. In the future, this new CBD 
area will slowly move towards the middle of Hanoi, due to the annexation of land in the West of 
Hanoi (Waibel 2011, 52). 
Hanoi is no longer centred on one area and future developments at least indicate that there will be 
more  centres.  Nonetheless,  Ba  Dinh  Square  still  is  the  point  of  political  power,  spectacle  and 
symbolism for the communist party. 
8.4.2 Industrial sites 
The general trend is that new industrial sites are now increasingly being located on the rural outskirts 
of Hanoi, where land is still cheap (Quang and Kammeier 2002, 381). Moreover, there is sufficient 
space to expand operations and pollution is not as big a problem as in the city centre.  
However,  old  factories  are  not  always  moving  out  of  the  inner  city  areas.  This  is  due  to  state 
intervention as the state still fixes the land prices at fairly low rates. Whereas once the government has 
leased the land to a user, the usage rights can then be resold at market prices. This creates a distorted 
real estate market. Factories have no incentive to move out of the city, because the land rent they pay 
to the state is still cheap and well below market value. This means that the state essentially subsidises 
a lot of factories. In 2002, 40 percent of all industries were still located on the edges of the inner city 
(Quang and Kammeier 2002, 382). Some factories subdivide their land and lease it in order to earn 
some  money.  “Many  state  companies  have  made  use  of  their  land  assets  by  restoring  and 
reconstructing their headquarters for commercial, tourist, or other economic activities” (Quang and 
Kammeier 2002, 384). Others, in contrast, continue to use it for industrial production. 
The government has realised that leaving too many industrial areas in the inner city is a problem. A lot 
of factories were causing unnecessary pollution in the inner city. Thus Hanoi city authorities have 
started to relocate approximately 1,000 older factories and similar facilities from high-value inner city 
locations to the suburbs, in order to free up more land for commercial activities, public works, parks or 
schools (ADB 2008, 35). Waibel states that a few industrial plots have also been redeveloped for 
cultural and creative purposes (Waibel 2011, 55). Industrial areas in the suburbs are often organised as 95 
 
industrial development zones (see Le and Vu 2008). While some have already been built, Hanoi 
municipal authorities are planning more zones to located new and old industry (Vietnam News 2012) 
In sum, industrial areas are slowly moving out of the inner city, but due to the ongoing cheap land 
leases provided by the government, factories have little incentive to vacate their current centrally 
located sites. Thus large industrial areas still unnecessarily occupy large plots of inner city land in 
Hanoi.  
8.4.3 Micro-district or neighbourhood unit 
The monotonous form of  industrial-residential linkages was abandoned after doi moi (Quang and 
Kammeier 2002, 381). Hence apartments were no longer required to be close to residents’ workplaces. 
The micro-district, which had never been widely used in Hanoi, has been abandoned as a planning 
unit. Still,  often new  residential  projects by  private  developers  are  built  as  large  compounds  and 
complexes. However, these large-scale residential developments, where houses fit together in terms of 
architectural style, have moved to the outskirts. A decade ago many were developed in the zone of 
about two to five kilometres from the centre (Quang and Kammeier 2002, 384). Nevertheless, since 
then construction projects have moved further out into the suburbs, especially to the West where rural 
land was more affordable.  
A current trend is the introduction of gated residential communities, which have replaced the socialist 
neighbourhoods. Especially, the middle and upper classes are moving into gated communities in the 
periphery (Forrest 2009, 296). When entering the city of Hanoi from the airport, any driver passes a 
pompous arc that looked like a relic from the French occupation, which is however the entrance to a 
newly constructed gated community called Ciputra (see Figure 8.7). 
 
Figure 8.7 The main gate to the Ciputra gated community with triumphant frolicking stallions (TNH Hanoi n.d. A) 
Many  remnants  of  the  micro-districts  and  similar  socialist  housing  developments  are  still  left  in 
Hanoi's urban morphology. The Soviet-style architecture has created a distinct impression particularly 96 
 
in the southern and south eastern part of inner city Hanoi. There modern Hanoi is still characterised by 
low-rise block apartments and some colonial structures. What has changed in the micro-districts and 
socialist neighbourhoods is that the grey utilitarian buildings are now dotted with restaurants and little 
stores  in  their  ground  floors.  Apart  from  little  details  such  as  antennas  and  air-conditioners,  the 
buildings have remained the same and some of them “could well be found in East Berlin or Warsaw” 
(Surborg 2006, 246).  
8.4.4 Residential buildings 
At the beginning of doi moi residential living space in Hanoi was scarce. Despite the scarcity, the state 
greatly scaled down public housing provision. Therefore people had to build and pay for their own 
accommodation. Between 1990 and 2000, 50 to 70 percent of the overall floor area dedicated to 
housing was self-built (Zhu 2012, 83). The state encouraged people to construct their own housing by 
commercialising the building materials industry and allowing rents to increase dramatically (Quang 
and Kammeier 2002, 376). Moreover, in 1991 the Ordinance on Housing was passed, which allowed 
people  to own  their  houses  (McGee  2009,  240).  Most large-scale  housing  projects are  no  longer 
subsidised or constructed by the state, but through private or semi-private developers. 
Hanoi municipality spent very little funds on social housing in the 1990s (Quang and Kammeier 2002, 
383). However, recently the municipal authorities have realised that housing provision is still a main 
problem in Hanoi and that private developers cannot meet the huge demand alone. Moreover, the 
houses constructed by private developers are usually aimed at the middle class or even wealthier 
clients.  Less  affluent  Hanoi  residents  cannot  afford  the  steep  rents.  Hence  since  the  turn  of  the 
millennium, in general more attention has been paid to public housing construction (McGee 2009, 
240). The authorities have devised another way to solve the problem by seizing some of the already 
existing housing stock. As there are too many residential building projects in Hanoi, 20 percent of 
most projects have to be dedicated as social housing (VietnamNet Bridge 2012b).  
Gaining access to land in Hanoi is difficult without the right connections to the government. Since 
land  prices  are  so  high  in  Hanoi,  real  estate  speculation  has  created  some  empty  and  unfinished 
housing projects for which buyers are desperately wanted (Waibel 2010, 12). Only in the last years 
several large construction projects have emerged that are funded from abroad (see Waibel 2011, 54). 
An example is the Ciputra West-Lake International City, which was developed by one of the largest 
Indonesian land developers, Ciputra Group. However, until 2005 it was the only joint venture that was 
largely financed through a foreign investor (Waibel 2011, 53). 
The form of buildings has moved away from standardised designs to more individualism. In a survey 
conducted in 1992, out of 170 newly constructed houses only 20 had actual building permits and 
hardly  anyone  adhered  to  the  existing  building  standards  and  height  restrictions  (Zhu  2012,  84). 
Hanoi's urban governance is rudimentary when it comes to implemented housing standards. As a 
consequence,  neighbourhoods  take  all  shapes  and  sizes  with  little  consideration  to  the  overall 
efficiency of the city. Quang and Kammeier characterised the housing developments as: “Spontaneous 
diversity and irregularity [...]” (Quang and Kammeier 2002, 383). Nonetheless some architectural 
designs are more popular than others. Many new houses are modelled after the elegant tube houses 97 
 
and French-style architectural elements are a common decorative theme (Waibel 2010, 11). French-
style houses are especially popular in the high-end, luxury housing sector (Han and Vu 2008, 1109).  
Hanoi's urban fabric is becoming denser in all areas of the city. Villages that were predominantly 
agricultural wards are redeveloped into high-rise packed housing areas, especially in the northern 
periphery (Horen 2005, 168). Single-storey housing in the inner city is also replaced by higher density 
buildings. In the suburbs, however, houses still range between two and five storeys (Horen 2005, 171). 
The  inner  city  is  becoming  increasingly  dense  with  new  expensive  housing.  High-end  luxury 
apartments in the inner city are especially valuable, because they can be leased to foreigners. 
8.4.5 Architectural heritage 
Already  since  the  1990  master  plan,  protection  of  the  city's  historic  areas  was  important  to  the 
municipality of Hanoi (Horen 2005, 170). In 1995, Hanoi authorities decided to protect and renovate 
the Ancient and French Quarter (Parenteau et al. 1995, 166). Currently, the conservation decisions are 
reported  to  the  Hanoi  People's  Committee,  which  is  the  highest  authority  in  Hanoi.  Hence, 
conservation  of  the  old  areas  is  a  priority  policy.  However,  the  conservation  process  is  difficult, 
because not all residents and private investors report to the conservation department (ADB 2008, 43).  
 
Figure 3.8 Ba Dinh Hall, the former National Assembly building, was demolished in 2008 (Wikipedia 2007) 
A good example of the importance of national heritage in Hanoi is Ba Dinh Hall or the State Assembly 
building (see Figure 8.8). The Soviet-style building was used for the National Assembly, but was 
demolished  in  2008,  to  make  room  for  a  larger  structure.  Due  to  archaeological  findings  on  the 
construction site, remains of the ancient Thang Long Palace, the project was delayed. The uncovered 
ruins are going to be embedded into a redesign of Ba Dinh Square (Logan 2009, 91). 
Most  renovation  and  conservation  is  going  on  in  connection  with  tourism  and  commercial 
development. With cooperation from private developers some areas in the old quarter have already 
undergone gentrification and space has been restored for commercial and tourist activities (ADB 2008, 
37). Especially areas close to Hoan Kiem Lake are becoming fashionable areas for shopping and 
dining among Hanoi residents and visitors (Horen 2005, 165). Logan notes that the Ancient Quarter is 
not an important heritage item because of the architecture, but rather because of the lifestyle (see 
Figure 8.9). Most of the original architecture was destroyed in 1870 or later in the 1940s, and the 98 
 
better  part  of  what  remains  was  built  after  the  1930s.  Instead,  the  Ancient  Quarter  is  a  bustling 
“cultural landscape” that needs to be preserved in order to maintain the charm of the area (Logan 
1995, 338).  
 
Figure 8.9 Ancient Quarter in modern Hanoi (Horen 2005, 167) 
Already in 1995 the Ancient Quarter has attracted foreign and domestic visitors, because of its brisk 
multi-purpose character. Local residents live, work and manufacture traditional goods there. Other 
researchers  agree  that  the  “community  structure  in  the  central  districts  is  seen  as  conductive  to 
tourism” (Parenteau et al. 1995, 163). Still, the character of the Ancient Quarter has already changed, 
due to the  informal construction and extensions  made  by  residents  and shop owners  (Quang  and 
Kammeier 2002, 384). The biggest threat to historic houses in old Hanoi are, in effect, eager and 
affluent residents who convert the buildings according to their own needs and profit interests (Logan 
1995, 335). Additionally, some of the tube houses are falling into disrepair, because of the ownership 
structure. Due to state-ownership the tenants are discouraged to finance the repair works that are 
necessary (Horen 2005, 165).  
Recently, more attention is being paid to boosting tourism in areas besides the Ancient Quarter. Craft 
villages around Hanoi are frequently turned into tourist attractions (VietnamNet Bridge 2012a). The 
master plan for Hanoi 2020 emphasises the potential of the French Quarter in attracting international 
tourism  and  business. The  French-style  villas  dating  from  the 19
th  century  are  very  popular  with 
embassies and international firms and are being restored by the national and international new users 
(Parenteau et al. 1995, 168). Hanoi municipal authorities have limited funds to restore the houses in 
the old areas; therefore a lot is financed through leasing buildings to foreign investors who covet 
centrally located spaces for business activities. As a consequence, the function of individual buildings 
is often changed from residential to retail or office space. Nearly 90 percent of the renovated buildings 
in  the  Ancient  and  French  Quarter  have  been  dedicated  to  commercial,  service  or  administrative 
functions (Parenteau et al. 1995, 172).  99 
 
Both the Ancient and the French Quarter are excellent areas for commercial activities, because of their 
central location within the city (ADB 2008, 33). Land prices in central locations are skyrocketing and 
therefore developers are vying for land to redevelop, which is a threat to conserving local heritage. 
Some historic buildings have already been destroyed in order to make room for more modern houses. 
Often developers try to integrate existing cultural heritage into new, high density residential and office 
buildings in the city centre. Thus some heritage structures have been damaged (Horen 2005, 171). 
Nonetheless, conservation efforts are not in vain. Many former residential structures are undergoing 
“commercial gentrification” (Quang and Kammeier 2002, 384). Quang and Kammeier further argue 
that an important advantage of “commercial gentrification” is that the architectural character of the 
area remains intact. In order to preserve the natural views and to ensure that buildings fit in with their 
neighbouring structures, there is a five-storey construction limit in the old parts of Hanoi, especially 
around Hoan Kiem Lake (Logan 1995, 335). In 1996, the Golden Hanoi Hotel project on the shores of 
the  lake  was  cancelled  due  to  public  protest,  because  the  hotel  was  planned  for  11  storeys.  The 
population was very concerned for the aesthetics of the scenery around Hoan Kiem Lake (Thomas 
2002, 1619). There are other examples where economic and conservation interests were balanced. The 
restoration of the French-colonial Metropole Hotel, for instance, was a conservation success (Logan 
1995, 339).  
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PART III:   RESULTS 
9. Comparison 
9.1 Socialist Beijing vs. socialist Hanoi 
After having described socialist and post-socialist Beijing and Hanoi in detail, the purpose of this 
chapter is to compare the two and to clarify where potential differences appear.  
The previous chapters have proven that there are elements of the socialist city in both Beijing and 
Hanoi. Quang and Kammeier (2002, 379) drew the same conclusion: “As a result of the centrally 
planned economy during the more than thirty years till 1985, the urban spatial structure of Hanoi 
developed features similar to those of Soviet or Chinese cities”.  
The main reason for the existence of socialist legacy in the urban form and function is that China and 
Vietnam have both experienced socialist revolutions in the 1940s. The communist parties that came to 
power aimed at transforming the city into a place where society was equal and everybody had a place 
to live and work. Due to previous lack of experience this was achieved with the help of Soviet experts 
of urban planning and architecture, who exported ideas from Moscow all over the world. Both the 
Chinese and Vietnamese communist governments accepted the help form the SU and utilised the 
imported  knowledge  to  create  a  Chinese  and  Vietnamese  socialist  urban  society.  Especially,  the 
monumental architecture attests to Soviet influence. While it is important to keep in mind that Soviet 
advisors greatly influenced the planning traditions in China and Vietnam, Hanoi and Beijing are still 
very  diverse.  External  circumstances  as  well  as  local  culture  and  traditions  created  different 
environments that constrained the socialist urban development and thus naturally lead to two different 
cities.  
Beijing's development suffered from waves of radical Maoist policy-making, which often favoured the 
countryside  and  even  led to  de-urbanisation.  Furthermore,  at  intervals  the  political  and  economic 
catastrophes  killed  large  parts  of  the  population  and  slowed  down  the  economy,  therefore  urban 
centres such as Beijing could not flourish. 
Hanoi's development in contrast, was plagued by wartime austerity as well as long-lasting bombing 
attacks. The VCP was often forced to be pragmatic in its socialist development agenda to ensure the 
well-being of the population during the war. For example, it accepted the existence of some small 
private businesses and private homeownership in order to provide goods for the population that the 
state could not supply. At the end of the war, the costly national reunification took away resources 
from further redeveloping Hanoi's urban area according to socialist principles. Funding from the SU 
was instead poured into industrial development of the South. Moreover, due to international economic 
sanctions Vietnam did not manage to sufficiently recover from the war until after doi moi.  
 The five analysed inner city elements (as explained in Chapter 6.4) in this thesis can be found in both 
cities, albeit in varying degrees. By and large they were all present in Beijing and Hanoi, but the 
aforementioned factors produced some specificities in their application. Figure 9.1 below highlights 
the main disparities of those elements in socialist Beijing and socialist Hanoi in bold script. 101 
 
Table 9.1 Summary of main differences and similarities in socialist Beijing and Hanoi 
(differences highlighted in bold script) 
Beijing  Hanoi 
City centre 
•  one centre around Tiananmen  
•  unites  political,  administrative  and  cultural 
functions 
•  Tiananmen  Square  is  a  large  open  space  for 
ceremonial purposes 
•  Tiananmen is the space of power for the CCP 
•  only limited state-controlled commercial function 
around Wangfujing 
•  no one clear centre 
•  Ba Dinh has political and cultural functions,  
the Ancient and French Quarter administrative and 
cultural centre functions  
•  Ba  Dinh  Square  is  a  large  open  space  for 
ceremonial purposes 
•  Ba Dinh Square is the space of power for the VCP 
•  state  outlets  in  the  Ancient  Quarter,  but  a  few 
private traders were tolerated  
Industrial sites 
•  built  on  free  land  in  the  near  periphery  initially 
east and south of the Old City 
•  no specialised industrial zones except a few for 
heavy industry 
•  from the Great Leap Forward on sites were spread 
out all over the city and bound to danwei 
•  old sites were not recycled but left alone 
 
•  built  far  outside  the  city  close  to  transport 
routes  during  the  war,  later  9  large  new  zones 
were built in the periphery of the centre 
•  highly specialised, but small industrial zones  
•  production sites were widely dispersed, in order 
to avoid agglomerations 
•  industry was always settled on new land, old sites 
were abandoned 
Micro-district 
•  very pervasive as urban planning unit 
•  self-reliant administrative unit 
•  average size of 20,000 residents and more 
•  walled compounds 
•  industrial  production  sites,  residences  and 
service  facilities  were  combined  in  the  danwei 
complex 
•  all  danwei  provided  similar  basic  services  and 
were not specialised 
•  planning  unit,  but  only  15  micro-districts  were 
built  
•  little administrative properties 
•  average size around 15,000 to 20,000 people 
•  open complexes with narrow streets, where illegal 
construction filled in open spaces  
•  workplaces  were  mostly  close  by,  but  not 
integrated 
•  poor service provision 
Residential buildings 
•  public housing arranged in the danwei 
•  standardised, prefabricated buildings introduced in 
the late 1950s 
•  Soviet-style concrete blocks 
•  built in a ring around the Old City 
•  cheap quality materials 
•  average height around 7 or 8 floors 
 
•  too little public housing−instead illegal self-built 
constructions 
•  prefabricated buildings only in the 1970s 
•  Soviet concrete block-design 
•  to the south and southwest of the old areas 
•  cheap materials not made for hot, humid weather 
•  5 storeys, but height increased with prefabrication 
techniques 
Architectural heritage 
•  break with historic principles on Tiananmen Sq.  
•  mostly left alone, little maintenance 
•  restored when it fitted ideological purposes 
•  the  function  of  historic  buildings  was  mainly 
altered to housing 
•  no state funds for restoration 
•  new Soviet design on Ba Dinh Square 
•  mostly left alone, but given new functions 
•  only embraced when it fit with political ideology 
•  heritage repurposed as housing 




Due to historic context Hanoi had three central areas, whereas the centre in Beijing was marked by the 
Forbidden City. The communist parties each chose their own new centre: Tiananmen Square and Ba 
Dinh Square. Both city centres were redeveloped according to socialist ideals in order to reflect the 
power of the communist parties. From the buildings we can deduce that the CCP had more financial 
means for the redevelopment, while at in the meantime the VCP was busy with warfare. War caused 
another difference in central Hanoi and Beijing. In contrast to Beijing, Hanoi used to have a small 
number  of  private  entrepreneurs,  even  under  socialism  because of  wartime  supply  problems.  The 
Hanoi authorities had to tolerate some measure of private commerce,  in order to guarantee the supply 
of goods to the population.  
Industrial zones 
Industrial zones were more specialised in Hanoi than in Beijing, where industrial production was 
divided among the self-sufficient danwei. However, Hanoi's industrial production facilities during the 
war were rather small and spread out over the city, in order to hide them from bomb attacks. Large 
industrial zones in Hanoi were only set up after the end of the American War.  
Micro-districts 
The micro-district concept has substantially influenced the urban planning in Chinese and Vietnamese 
cities, which both show signs of what McGee calls "'cellular' landscapes" (McGee 2009, 235). The 
micro-district was more pervasive in Beijing than Hanoi. The Chinese micro-district had a unique 
spatial feature in that it was surrounded by a wall. In Hanoi only 15 complexes were built, because  
large agglomerations of housing were mostly avoided during the war. Furthermore, the apartment 
blocks in the micro-districts were inadequate for the hot and humid climate as well as the size of 
Vietnamese families. Often the open spaces in the micro-districts were filled in with self-built housing 
in  order  to  provide  more  living  space.  Moreover,  Beijing's  micro-districts  were  self-sufficient 
neighbourhoods, where industry and residence were combined, whereas Hanoi's neighbourhood units 
were merely close to industrial sites and by no means self-sufficient. Some of them did not even 
include basic service facilities. In sum, the application of Hanoi's micro-districts resembles that of the 
SU more closely than that of China.  
Residential buildings 
The form of the residential structures that were put up in both cities during the socialist eras were 
mostly homogenous block-shape concrete buildings. The main difference in residential development 
in Beijing and Hanoi is that there was less public housing available in Hanoi, because the state could 
not afford a lot of construction during the war. Therefore, people built their own informal settlements. 
The  state  had  to  tolerate  them  because  it  could  not  provide  an  alternative,  as  mass-produced 
prefabricated  housing  only  reached  Hanoi  at  the  end  of  the  American  War  with  the  help  of  SU 
engineers.  
Architectural heritage 
Conservation was not high on the agenda of either the CCP or the VCP. Both eliminated symbols of 
the past when necessary and appropriated former imperial or colonial heritage to their own needs. The 103 
 
function of many former buildings was changed to suit socialist needs. Owing to financial constraints 
the historic parts of the city were mostly left alone. Due to housing shortages, Hanoi’s tube houses and 
Beijing’s courtyard houses became severely overcrowded. Consequently, they were damaged and their 
courtyards filled in.  
9.2 Post-socialist Beijing vs. post-socialist Hanoi 
To be able to answer the research question we also have to compare post-socialist Beijing with post-
socialist Hanoi. Despite the slight differences in the socialist urban legacies of Beijing and Hanoi, their 
post-socialist development is fairly alike—similarities clearly outweigh the differences.  
The market reforms in both countries have had similar effects on the urban landscape. Especially the 
revival  of  private  enterprise  and  commerce  has  revived  the  cities  and  demanded  new  forms  and 
functions of buildings and public space. Beijing and Hanoi's formerly quiet and grey socialist space is 
undergoing commercialisation and gentrification. Both cities now have specialised CBDs, industrial 
development  zones,  shopping  and  entertainment  complexes,  social  stratification  and  gated 
communities as well as heritage tourist activities. Indeed, Beijing has more commercialised areas such 
as CBDs and mall districts than Hanoi because it is larger and reforms have been in place longer.  
The end of centralised planning has produced another common feature in post-socialist Beijing and 
Hanoi.  Now,  instead  of  one  central  authority,  a  multitude  of  spatial  producers  has  emerged  that 
influences the urban environment. Foreign investors, large real estate companies, and municipalities 
all have some power over the development of space. Even the public, which is rarely consulted, has 
the means to partly shape spatial outcomes by public protest. 
Moreover,  both  cities  are  heavily  influenced  by  external,  global  market  pressures.  Hence,  urban 
planners in Beijing and Hanoi aim to create modern cities that are increasingly marked as global 
consumer spaces and can compete with other global cities. Both cities have started banning street 
traders because they give streets an untidy and backward look. Beijing and Hanoi are thus increasingly 
acting like other large urban centres around the world. For instance becoming a knowledge-based city 
with a strong creative industry is getting more important. Also, in the spirit of many cities around the 
world, China and Vietnam are keen on labelling their cities sustainable and environmentally friendly 
(McGee 2009, 242).  
These reasons are just a selection of the forces that induce changes in the spatial environment of 
Beijing and Hanoi. The main differences in the post-socialist urban development of Beijing and Hanoi 
are resulting from a different approach to economic reforms, in particular land reform. In China land 
can be leased for up to 99 years, whereas in Vietnam this period is only up to 70 years. Moreover, the 
land  market  in  Hanoi  is  distorted  due  to  the  aforementioned  two-tier  pricing  system,  in  which 
developers pay fixed prices to the state, but then resell the land use rights at market prices. Some state-
affiliated enterprises or institutions do not even pay rent or only very little of it to the government. 
This has consequences for the location new residential developments as well as the recycling of old 
industrial sites. 
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Table 9.2 Summary of main differences and similarities in post-reform Beijing and 
Hanoi (differences highlighted in bold) 
Beijing  Hanoi 
City centre 
•  Tiananmen Square and its surroundings is still the 
political, administrative and cultural centre 
•  new commercial functions in the central areas 
•  Tiananmen is still a space of political power used 
for spectacle  
•  Tiananmen  is  increasingly  used  for  leisure  and 
tourist activities  
•  several commercial and administrative centres in 
form of new CDBs 
•  Ba Dinh retains political and cultural functions,  
the Ancient Quarter has cultural and commercial 
functions and the French Quarter commercial and 
administrative functions 
•  commercial activity all over the centre 
•  Ba Dinh Square remains a space of power  
•  leisure and tourism activities on Ba Dinh 
•  polycentric development with several commercial 
centres 
Industrial sites 
•  moved to the urban fringe 
•  specialised  industrial  development  zones  and 
industrial parks 
•  located close to major transport routes 
•  old sites on valuable inner city land are recycled 
and redeveloped into  office and residential space 
or used by the creative industry 
•  new industry built outside the city on still cheap 
and undeveloped land 
•  industrial development zones in the suburbs 
•  old  industry  is  only  slowly  moving  out  of  the 
inner city as land rents are still subsidised 
•  few  industrial  sites  have  been  redeveloped  for 
cultural or commercial uses 
Micro-district 
•  not a planning tool anymore  
•  not an administrative unit anymore  
•  most walled danwei compounds have vanished 
•  similar  layout  is  applied  to  large  residential 
developments i.e. gated communities 
•  industrial and residential areas are separated 
•  neighbourhoods are economically differentiated 
and specialised 
•  not used any more 
•  some buildings of the micro-district development 
still exist 
•  large  scale  housing  developments  in  the  suburbs 
often developed as community complexes 
•  gated  communities  resemble  the  Soviet  micro-
district 
•  industrial and residential areas are separated 
Residential buildings 
•  also private ownership and development 
•  more  diverse  shapes  and  individual  designs: 
skyscrapers, luxury villas and apartment blocks 
•  densification through high-rises in the inner city, 
large-scale developments in the suburban areas 
•  better  amenities  and  higher  quality  building 
materials 
•  mostly high-rise developments 
•  little  public  housing  built:  instead  expensive 
private housing remains empty 
•  more individual designs, French- and tube house 
style are popular 
•  self-construction is common 
•  lax  construction  laws,  private  building 
extension usually illegal 
•  high-rises in the inner city, 2-5 storeys (suburbs) 
Architectural heritage 
•  cultural  heritage  important  for  nationalist  and 
economic reasons 
•  commercialisation of heritage sites 
•  preservation of the principle monuments 
•  height restrictions in the old city 
•  old courtyard houses are often demolished for 
new high-rise developments  
•  municipality  has  little  money  thus  often  private 
and foreign funds are used for restoration 
•  heritage preservation is a priority policy 
•  conservation  in  connection  with  tourism  and 
commercial development 
•  building height restrictions in the old city 
•  commercial gentrification of old houses 
•  functions of houses are changed from housing to 
commercial space 
•  little public funds, but foreign and local enterprises 
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In Figure 9.2 the main differences between post-socialist Hanoi and post-socialist Beijing are again 
highlighted in bold script. As can be easily seen, there are not as many differences as in the socialist 
development.    
City centre 
The functions of the city centres in Beijing and Hanoi after the market reforms have stayed the same. 
Tiananmen and Ba Dinh Square have remained symbols of political power and continue to embody 
the power of the communist party because the political situation has not really changed since the 
reforms in either country. Yet, at the same time the sacrality of Tiananmen and Ba Dinh Square has 
been  encroached  upon  by  the  local  population  who  increasingly  use  the  large  open  squares  for 
apolitical leisure purposes. Moreover, the two squares and their attractions such as the Mao and Ho 
Chi Minh Mausoleums have become important points of interest for visitors and tourists.  
Other  central  areas  besides  Tiananmen  and  Ba  Dinh  Square  have  transformed  into  bustling 
commercial spaces. In Beijing the Wangfujing area was one of the first neighbourhoods to regain its 
commercial flair and transform into a sort of CBD, whereas in Hanoi the area around the French 
Quarter attracted the initial office space seekers. In both cities, however, it soon became obvious that 
the  previous  central  areas  could  not  perform  all  new  business  functions  required.  Thus  several 
commercial, financial and leisure centres have grown around modern Beijing, which is now a poly-
centric city. Hanoi is smaller and therefore more compact than Beijing. Nonetheless, Hanoi municipal 
authorities too are constructing alternative centres.  
Industrial sites 
While both cities still have a lot of industry, they are also experiencing de-industrialisation. Heavy 
industry has been replaced by lighter manufacturing and now also increasingly by the service industry. 
In Beijing a lot of industry is moving to the suburbs because of cheaper land rents and more space to 
expand.  Urban  planners  have  adopted  zoning  measures,  which  means  that  related  industries  are 
clustered into industrial development zones. Most former industrial plots in the central areas have been 
redeveloped  as  residential  and  commercial  areas,  while  others  have  remained  intact  and  been 
converted to serve the culture and service industry.  
So far, industrial plots in Hanoi, in comparison, have mostly stayed in the vicinity of the centre. Due to 
state-subsidised land prices, industry can occupy valuable inner city land for free or for very cheap 
land rents and has no financial incentive to relocate. As a result, industry will usually only move out of 
the city if it needs space to expand. Still, there are a few unused industrial plots in Hanoi too. Yet, the 
government has not efficiently made use of these old industrial areas to form creative spaces for 
Hanoi's fairly lively art scene. This is a phenomenon that is already occurring in Beijing with the Art 
District 798 project or in Shanghai with the M50 area (Waibel 2011, 55). 
Micro-district 
By and large, the micro-district in its original function has vanished from the cityscapes of Beijing and 
Hanoi. It has been replaced with high-rise apartments and office space. Modern neighbourhoods do 
not provide all services, but are more specialised. Only the numerous gated community developments, 
which are mostly located in the suburbs, remind of the old communal lifestyle. 106 
 
In  Hanoi  the  few  micro-districts  built  under  socialism  now  simply  are  run-down  concrete  block-
houses, unless they have been demolished. In Beijing, where the micro-district/ danwei concept had a 
more profound impact on urban spatial development under socialism, most of the complexes and their 
walls were torn down to make room for more compact housing developments. The few remaining 
compounds  have  rented  space  to  private  entrepreneurs  and  are  accessible  to  the  public.  Modern 
Beijing does not retain the cell-like character it had during socialist times. 
Residential buildings 
Two features apply to the post-socialist form of residential buildings in Beijing and Hanoi: they have 
become taller and more diverse in design. Apart from these resemblances, the Vietnamese land laws 
have produced different land use patterns in this category as well. As can be seen when comparing 
Figure 9.1 to Figure 9.2, the lack of public housing has persisted in modern day Hanoi. Individual 
family-home construction, which has historic tradition, is still the logic alternative because apartments 
built by large private real-estate developers are usually geared for the upper middle class. Developers 
prefer high-end apartments because they need to compensate for the high price that they had to pay for 
the land-use right in Hanoi. Families plan and build their own homes on the edges of the inner city and 
the suburbs where land is still available and cheap. Recently, the authorities started addressing the 
problem of too little affordable housing in Hanoi, by forcing private developers to include cheaper 
apartment buildings in their projects. Private home development is thus much more common in Hanoi 
than in Beijing. 
Architectural heritage 
Beijing and Hanoi are both rich in architectural heritage and in the 1990s their city authorities have 
acknowledged  the  importance  of  maintaining  this  heritage.  For  example,  Hanoi  and  Beijing 
municipalities  have  both  introduced  building  height  restrictions  to  preserve  the  character  of  their 
historic city areas. Neither city has sufficient funds to maintain all heritage areas on public money and 
therefore local and foreign private developers are often responsible for restoration.  
Nevertheless, minor differences exist in their approach to conservation. Beijing is trying to maintain 
its  numerous  principle  monuments,  but  it  was  very  liberal  when  destroying  minor  structures,  in 
particular courtyard houses, in order to free up land for higher and more modern buildings. Only in the 
last decade, has Beijing encouraged conservation of these areas, albeit through private developers and 
commercialisation of heritage sites. Hanoi city, in contrast, has a more comprehensive approach to 
heritage conservation and actively tries to preserve the character of its Ancient and French Quarters. 
On the one hand Hanoi has less principle monuments and on the other hand it has less money to 
demolish and redevelop old areas. In sum, however, Hanoi authorities in general seem more careful 
when it comes to conserving heritage.  
 
To sum up, the market reforms had fairly similar effects on the socialist legacies of urban Hanoi and 
Beijing, especially on the form and distribution of buildings. There are however differences in the land 




This thesis has shown that Beijing and Hanoi have socialist urban legacies in their urban morphology. 
It has also proven that in their post-socialist era these legacies have been transforming in a comparable 
way.  Reasons  for  this  similar  development  are  the  analogous  histories  and  reform  paths  of  both 
countries, and the general production of space in a market economy. Subsequently, I would like to 
explain these conclusions in more detail.  
First of all, it can be confirmed that Beijing and Hanoi both developed the qualities of a socialist city, 
despite different external and local circumstances. Therefore, my first hypothesis articulated in the 
Introduction is true: Elements of the socialist city can be found in Beijing and Hanoi. 
A main reason why these similarities occurred is because Soviet urban planners brought their expertise 
to the redevelopment of both cities. Their knowledge had a lasting impact on urban planning in both 
countries, so that even when relations between the SU and China or Vietnam were interrupted the 
concepts remained. Ideas on urban planning spread through the international network of the SU and 
thus the socialist city as a framework applies to both, CEE and the former SU. This line of thought is 
not new, however, and has already been subject to research (see for example Myers 1994). Following 
this research, I assume that for countries at a low level of development with little previous experience 
in conceptual urban planning, the socialist city expertise made a more lasting impression on future 
planning approaches. Hanoi, for example, had already been in touch with traditional Chinese planning 
concepts  as  well  as  European  ones  under  the  French  colonial  administration  before  SU  planners 
entered the process. Beijing, in contrast, had only been shaped by ancient cosmological Chinese urban 
planning ideas beforehand. After the communist revolution, the CCP wanted and needed the cityscape 
to change and therefore the then available Soviet expertise made a lasting impression. Going forward, 
it would be interesting to analyse which other countries outside the SU have been as deeply influenced 
by Soviet urban planning as China. 
A further purpose of this thesis was to establish whether it is feasible to think about an East- and 
Southeast Asian manifestation of the post-socialist city. In this paper, I conclude that it makes sense to 
speak about post-socialist cities in East and Southeast Asia. Yet, the amount of socialist legacy that 
cities have in their urban fabric depends on the economic and political circumstances that were in 
place while a country was socialist. If the socialist government was occupied with war, famine, natural 
catastrophes,  international  economic  sanctions  or  similar  situations,  comprehensive  urban 
development was low on the national agenda. Interestingly, Hanoi has a fair amount of socialist legacy 
despite the wartime interruptions to its development.  
Thus far, Beijing and Hanoi have proven that the post-socialist transformation of their socialist city 
elements is reasonably similar. Therefore the research question can be positively answered: Yes, the 
transformation of socialist legacy in the urban environments in Beijing and Hanoi is similar. Thus, 
also my second hypothesis could be confirmed.  
Finally, the question why the transformations are similar remains. Possible reasons articulated in the 
third hypothesis were: A) the related socialist history and a comparable reform path, and B) the 
demands of the market economy on the urban environment. 108 
 
As far as claim A) is concerned, we have already seen that Beijing and Hanoi were influenced by 
socialist ideology and imported ideas from the SU. China and Vietnam's reform paths are comparable, 
as other researchers have concluded and I have merely touched upon in passing in Chapter 6.2. The 
political state of affairs in China and Vietnam is similar in the way that the communist parties are still 
in power. This is also reflected in the public space in Beijing and Hanoi. Tiananmen and Ba Dinh 
Square are still spaces of power—the flag is raised every morning and parades take place regularly. 
Nevertheless, both spaces have become more accessible to the population than they used to be under 
socialism. Thus the reforms have produced similar outcomes for the two squares, i.e. more leisure 
visitors  but  political  spectacle  remains.  However,  while  the  general  spirit  of  the  Chinese  and 
Vietnamese post-reform era may be alike, not all the details of economic reforms match. Vietnam's 
peculiar land law and the resulting distorted land market have created different spatial patterns in 
Hanoi's socialist legacy than in Beijing's.  
As far as my research has touched upon the matter, claim B) is also true. Due to revived commercial 
and specialised service activity, post-socialist cities in a market economy need office space, leisure 
centres, retail space, hotels and similar facilities. Moreover, the globalised market economy has had a 
significant impact on urban Beijing and Hanoi. In order to attract foreign and domestic capital, both 
put considerable effort into becoming an internationally competitive city. So far, Beijing, which is 
larger and the capital city of the bigger country of the two, has been more successful in this endeavour. 
Therefore, while this thesis cannot, in all honesty, affirm that the urban needs of a market environment 
are the reason for similar transformations of socialist urban legacy around the world, it can definitely 
do so for Beijing and Hanoi. 
An interesting future path of research in this respect would be to compare the transformations in East 
and Southeast Asia with the CEE experience. Unfortunately, the limited scope of this thesis does not 
allow for such further analysis. However, the post-socialist elements used in this paper could be used 
as the basis of a methodology to compare inner city redevelopment of former socialist cities across 
different geographical contexts. Indeed, if I ever write a PhD-thesis I would like to analyse this topic 
more extensively. 
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This thesis concerns itself with the transformation of socialist into post-socialist space. It is based on 
the  theoretical  background  that  urban  space  is  affected  and  produced  by  the  political  and  socio-
economic circumstances that it is embedded in. Consequently, the socialist central planning systems 
altered the urban environment to perform certain functions, thus leaving a socialist legacy behind. 
What is more, cities in former socialist urban countries have been exposed to market reforms for 
several decades. As a consequence, the form and function of the socialist urban legacy has been 
gradually transforming in order to meet the spatial demands of a market economy.  
This post-socialist transformation has been widely researched in Central and Eastern Europe and in the 
countries  of  the  former  Soviet  Union,  but  has  been  largely  neglected  in  the  Asian  context.  This 
research paper addresses this gap. Concretely, it tackles the question whether such a legacy in East and 
Southeast Asian cities exists at all and whether its transformations are alike or not.  
The paper examines two cities that have experienced periods of socialist governance: Beijing, People’s 
Republic of China and Hanoi, Socialist Republic of Vietnam. The method of research is a comparison 
using already existing literature as well as maps and photo sources. The analysis is done by examining 
how the form and function of five physical elements has changed in the reform period. These elements 
are the city centre, industrial sites, micro-districts, residential buildings and architectural heritage. 
These selected five inner city elements have been profoundly influenced by ideas and concepts of 
socialist  cities  and  represent  socialist  urban  legacy.  The  research  then  compares  how  the  urban 
morphology and land use patterns of those elements have changed in the post-socialist period. 
A result of the analysis is that the socialist city, as it is understood in Central and Eastern European 
urban development literature, also existed in Beijing and Hanoi. Furthermore, despite the different 
local context, this socialist legacy left in their urban fabrics is transforming in a fairly similar way in 
the post-reform period in Beijing and Hanoi, as far as the five examined elements are concerned. This 
is because of a shared history of socialist urban governance as well as a similar approach on reform in 
China and Vietnam. The differences in the post-socialist development mainly result from different 
land laws in the two countries.  
Since Beijing’s and Hanoi’s post-socialist urban environment are comparable, other cities may be 
analysed  in  future  using  the  same  methodical  framework.  Eventually,  the  analysis  in  this  thesis 
contributes to the wider question of whether the concept of a global post-socialist city exists or not. 
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12.2 German summary 
Diese Masterarbeit beschäftigt sich mit der Transformation von sozialistischen in post-sozialistische 
Stadträume. Die Analyse basiert auf dem theoretischen Hintergrund, dass Stadtraum von politischen 
und sozioökonomischen Gegebenheiten beeinflusst und ‚produziert‘ wird. Ehemalige sozialistische, 
zentrale Planwirtschaften haben daher sozialistisches Erbe in der physischen Struktur von Städten 
hinterlassen. Solche Stadträume sind seit mehreren Jahrzehnten Marktmechanismen ausgesetzt. In der 
Folge passen sich Form und Funktion des sozialistischen Erbes den neuen räumlichen Anforderungen 
einer Marktwirtschaft langsam an. Postsozialistische Transformationen in den Städten Zentral- und 
Osteuropas, sowie in anderen Ländern der früheren Sowjetunion wurden bereits ausreichend erforscht, 
im asiatischen Kontext jedoch weitgehend vernachlässigt. Diese Masterarbeit beschäftigt sich daher 
mit der Frage, ob sozialistisches Erbe in den Stadträumen Ost- und Südostasiens existiert und ob seine 
postsozialistische Transformation von Stadt zu Stadt vergleichbar ist. 
Die Analyse befasst sich mit den Fallbeispielen Beijing in der Volksrepublik China und Hanoi in der 
Sozialistischen Republik Vietnam, die beide sozialistischen Regierungsperioden ausgesetzt waren. Als 
Forschungsmethode  wurde  ein  Vergleich  der  beiden  Städte  anhand  bereits  existierender 
Sekundärliteratur sowie Karten und Bildmaterial angewandt. In der Analyse wurde überprüft, wie sich 
die Form und Funktion von fünf Bauelementen in der Reformperiode verändert haben. Diese fünf 
Kategorien wurden ausgewählt, weil sie besonders von den Ideen und Konzepten der sozialistischen 
Stadtplanung  geprägt  waren.  Konkret  vergleicht  die  vorliegende  Forschungsarbeit,  wie  sich 
Stadtstruktur und Landnutzungsmuster dieser Elemente in der postsozialistischen Periode verändert 
haben.  
Ein Hauptergebnis der Forschung ist, dass das Konzept der sozialistischen Stadt, so wie es in Zentral- 
und  Osteuropa  verstanden  wird,  auch  in  Beijing  und  Hanoi  existierte.  Dieses  sozialistische  Erbe 
verwandelt  sich  in  beiden  Städten  in  ähnlicher  Weise,  insoweit  das  anhand  der  fünf  analysierten 
Elemente  feststellbar  ist.  Diese  Ähnlichkeit  ergibt  sich  einerseits  auf  Grund  einer  analogen 
Vorgeschichte mit sozialistischen Stadtplanungsprinzipien und andererseits auf Grund vergleichbarer 
wirtschaftlicher und politischer Reformansätze in China und Vietnam.  
Aus der Tatsache, dass Beijing und Hanoi in diesem Zusammenhang gut miteinander vergleichbar 
sind, lässt sich schließen, dass man auch andere Städte anhand des hier verwendeten methodischen 
Rahmenwerks  vergleichen  könnte.  Die  Forschung  in  dieser  Masterarbeit  trägt  somit  zur 
übergeordneten Frage bei, ob das Konzept der ‚sozialistischen Stadt‘ globale Gültigkeit besitzt. 
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